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Abstract 
Rising global healthcare expenditures, the fallout from the global financial crisis and a 
commitment to improving patient outcomes have increased pressure on the budget of the 
National Health Service (NHS) in England to unprecedented levels. Therefore, ensuring 
services are delivered efficiently is key both politically and economically.  
In the context of the NHS, the large share of spending in secondary care means that this area 
is well analysed in the literature. However, the scale of the savings needed requires that both 
(a) more research is needed to identify further possible gains; and (b) the potential for 
improvement that has been identified by these studies is captured. To these ends, there are 
two specific aims of this thesis. The first is to examine the regulation of NHS hospital 
efficiency. Drawing from health care and other sectors of the economy, a number of lessons 
for regulators to promote hospital efficiency in the NHS and beyond are proposed. The 
second is to look to areas of hospital activity for which empirical evidence on efficiency is 
limited to identify further available gains. 
Many studies in the UK and beyond have sought to measure efficiency in health: the so-
called “supply” of efficiency analysis is booming. However, despite their potential, the use of 
these studies has been limited in the NHS. In response to this, this thesis seeks to answer 
some of the methodological and practical issues raised around efficiency measurement and its 
application to the setting of NHS hospital efficiency targets. How these findings are useful 
more widely to health care systems around the world is also discussed. 
Chapter 1 introduces the thesis, policy background and objectives of the work. Chapter 2 
gives an economic history of the NHS and observe trends in global health care costs. Chapter 
3 details the economic tools that are used to gather our empirical evidence. Chapters 4, 5 and 
6 report the thesis’s empirical work. Finally, chapter 7 concludes by drawing together 
findings and assessing the extent to which the aims set out have been achieved and comments 
on appropriate further research. 
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1.1 Thesis Motivation 
“Thesis, n. 
Forms:  Pl. theses /ˈθiːsiːz/ . 
Etymology:  < Greek θέσις putting, placing; a proposition, affirmation, etc., < root θε-
 of τιθέναι to put, place. 
 
4.  A proposition laid down or stated, esp. as a theme to be discussed and proved, or to be 
maintained against attack (in Logic sometimes as distinct from HYPOTHESIS n. 2, 
in Rhetoric from ANTITHESIS n. 3a); a statement, assertion, tenet.” 
Oxford English Dictionary Online (2015) 
 
The subject of this thesis is the efficiency of hospitals in the National Health Service (NHS) 
in England.  
The thesis – or proposition – posited here is that improvements can be made in both the 
regulation and the measurement of NHS hospital efficiency.  
This thesis describes the economic history and context into which the empirical work is set. It 
makes use of previous studies in health care and other sectors to provide direction for the 
regulation of efficiency in the NHS hospital market. It sets out the methodologies used to 
measure inefficiency; and some health-based issues in conducting efficiency analysis. It 
provides, by way of solutions, some advances in efficiency measurement. It provides 
empirical insights into where inefficiency resides within NHS hospitals - specifically, 
pathology laboratories within hospitals. 
1.2 Economic and Policy Landscape 
A long run issue for many governments is the amount of money that is spent on health care 
services. In England, the NHS is a publicly funded, largely publicly operated and publicly 
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regulated health care system. As such, the government’s focus on expenditure is particularly 
sharp. The British government spent around £140bn on the NHS in 2013/14 (HM Treasury, 
2015). This is, in terms of the proportion of GDP, around 9%, which roughly accords with 
comparable systems around the world (OECD, 2014). This proportion has been steadily 
growing over time across all observed health care systems (Chernew and Newhouse, 2012).  
Expenditure has been central in a litany of policies over the lifetime of the NHS, where we 
observe substantial increases over time. There appear to be a set of economic circumstances 
which explain this rise. Moreover, these reasons suggest rising expenditures are set to 
continue into the future. It is therefore of high importance to policy makers.  
In the short run, in the fallout from the economic crisis, there are substantial pressures on the 
NHS budget.  In response to this, the Nicholson Challenge set out targets for efficiency 
savings of £20bn by 2015 in the UK National Health Service (NHS) (Health Select 
Committee, 2010). However, financial pressure is expected to extend beyond 2015: the NHS 
will face a funding gap of £30bn by 2020 (NHS England, 2013). The NHS’s five year 
forward view proposes that around £22bn of this is to be derived from efficiency savings 
(NHS England, 2014a). Thus, ensuring efficiency in all areas of health care is key. 
Although there is a wide literature assessing efficiency in the NHS, new research is required 
since further gains are needed to meet the spending challenge. It has been argued that ‘easy’ 
efficiency savings have now been made across the NHS (National Audit Office, 2012). 
Further, surveys of NHS finance directors reveal growing scepticism about whether the 
Nicholson Challenge will be met at all (Appleby et al., 2013). Indeed, some hospital trusts are 
currently struggling to break even (Murray et al., 2014).  
A recent report detailed possible savings of £5bn p.a. based on staffing and pharmacy in 
hospitals (Department of Health, 2015); this is short of the £22bn required by some margin. 
Therefore, identifying additional potential efficiency improvements and encouraging them to 
be captured may ease budgetary pressure.  
The focus of this thesis is therefore efficiency in the NHS. To this end, a natural starting point 
is the question of whether the NHS is efficient. Although this question seems straightforward, 
beguilingly so, it has proved an area of contention for economists in the NHS setting and in 
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health care systems more widely, with little uptake of efficiency studies amongst policy 
makers (Hollingsworth and Street, 2006). 
There is a body of literature of both academic and non-academic studies (e.g. think tanks 
such as the King’s Fund, see Appleby et al., 2013) that has sought to measure inefficiency in 
the NHS. These may be at the macro or micro level. Typically, efficiency in the academic 
literature is measured by stochastic frontiers (SFs), data envelopment analysis (DEA) or 
multivariate, multilevel modelling (MVML), and using indicator analysis (such as spending 
per head, Davis et al., 2014) in the non-academic literature.  
At the macro level, the NHS itself is the unit of analysis, and is thus compared to other 
national health care services across the world. In Spinks and Hollingsworth (2009), the UK 
compared unfavourably (in terms of efficiency) amongst its OECD peers. However, the 
authors note that theoretical issues limit the interpretation of DEA results. Elsewhere, Smith 
and Street (2006) argue against the use of SFs at the macro level on theoretical grounds. 
Greene (2010) takes the view that using microeconomic tools at the macroeconomic level 
may be inappropriate. Practically, the usefulness of macro efficiency studies is somewhat 
restricted in the context of the current financial challenge because these studies do not 
indicate where specific savings can be made within the NHS.  
At the micro level, hospital studies dominate the national and international literature 
(Hollingsworth et al., 1999; Jacobs et al., 2006; Hollingsworth, 2003; 2008).  Within NHS 
services, expenditure on hospitals is dominant: in 2013/14, the NHS in England spent 
£58.3bn of public money on 244 providers of hospital services, representing around 55% of 
total NHS expenditure, and this proportion is growing over time (Department of Health, 
2014). At the same time the wealth of data available means that this is an area already well 
analysed in the more recent NHS-based literature (Farrar et al., 2009; Laudicella et al., 2010; 
Cooper et al., 2012; Gutacker et al., 2013a; Siciliani et al., 2013; Daidone and Street, 2013). 
There is work in other areas of service delivery, primary care services for example 
(Szczepura, 1993; Giuffrida and Gravelle, 2001), however, because the outputs of these 
services are difficult to define and to measure, eliciting meaningful efficiency estimates is 
challenging (Rosenman and Friesner, 2004; Lester and Roland, 2009; Amado and Santos, 
2009; Murrillo-Zamorano and Petraglia, 2011; Longo et al., 2012). Perhaps it is unsurprising, 
then, that Hollingsworth (2008) finds no recent NHS primary care efficiency studies. The 
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story is similar for other micro level services such as intermediate care. Given these issues, 
for the purposes of this thesis, our focus is on efficiency amongst NHS hospitals.  
Recently, following the introduction of the Health and Social Care Act (2012), the task of 
managing hospital efficiency has passed from the Department of Health to Monitor, the 
economic regulator of NHS hospitals that have achieved Foundation Status
1
. Since Monitor 
has assumed the role, it has begun to develop an approach to setting efficiency targets (known 
as the ‘efficiency factor’) based on econometric benchmarking (Deloitte, 2014b). This is in 
keeping with the aims of central government who have identified benchmarking as key to 
making efficiency savings in the public sector (HM Treasury, 2015). With this it aims to 
encourage hospitals to meet their efficiency targets and contribute to the top-level policy goal 
of plugging the oncoming funding gap. Our empirical work is designed around aiding this 
process. We therefore set out the following objectives. 
 
1.3 Thesis Objectives 
 
(i) To inform the process of setting efficiency targets for NHS hospitals by Monitor, 
by reviewing germane literature and conducting efficiency analysis and setting out 
empirical issues to which we are able to provide solutions; 
 
(ii) To provide new economic evidence for an area of NHS hospital activity for which 
empirical evidence is scant: pathology laboratories. This is, in turn, to feed into 
the top-level policy goal of making efficiency savings across the NHS; and 
 
 
(iii) To advance the measurement of efficiency in health markets and beyond. 
 
1.4 Structure of this Thesis and Empirical Chapters 
The rest of this thesis is set out as follows. Chapter 2 provides an economic history of the 
NHS in England where specific focus is given to NHS expenditure over time. This sets the 
                                            
1 Foundation status of a NHS trust (a trust is a hospital or small group of hospitals) means that it operates under an independent, not-for-
profit regime, allowing it financial autonomy which it does not have without having foundation status (Marini et al., 2008). Trusts apply for 
foundation status, which is granted by the regulator, Monitor, if the trust has satisfied the regulator of its financial competence. Foundation 
status has not been awarded to all NHS trusts. 
5 
 
economic context for this thesis and argues the case for the importance of efficiency – and 
therefore its measurement.  
Chapter 3 goes on to set out our methodological approach to efficiency measurement. We 
provide definitions of various concepts of, and relating to, efficiency. We justify of our 
approach, first by arguing in favour of frontier analysis, then our reasoning for adopting an 
econometric approach. We give an exposition of the cost function which we adopt in our 
empirical work, in both theoretical and empirical terms. We then set out, conceptually, our 
method for measuring inefficiency: the stochastic frontier model. We continue to describe 
three aspects of stochastic frontier methodology which are (a) of interest and importance in 
the health context; and (b) are the focus of empirical work in this thesis. These are efficiency 
change over time, unobserved heterogeneity and multi-level organisational structures.  
The main contribution of this thesis is across the three following chapters. In general, it is to 
contribute to the academic field of efficiency measurement and regulation in health markets, 
whilst providing evidence to enable regulators and policy makers to answer the economic 
challenge that faces NHS hospitals. We take two approaches in pursuing these ends. First, we 
examine the issue of regulating the performance of NHS hospitals. Second, we go on to 
measure efficiency in the NHS hospitals; we report our empirical work in two studies of 
pathology laboratories. We provide details of each chapter below. 
Chapter 4: National Health Service Performance Management, Price Regulation and 
Efficiency Measurement 
This chapter is an analysis comprising several aspects pertaining to NHS hospital efficiency. 
We first review a number of performance management regimes that have been applied to 
NHS hospitals to try to drive out performance improvements. We focus on the general issues 
that arise as regards what is effective, or otherwise, when setting targets. We draw out lessons 
for Monitor for use when applying efficiency targets.  Next, we review the hospital pricing 
mechanism for NHS hospitals, and suggest alterations that may encourage efficiency. Lastly, 
we review efficiency measurement and economic regulation in health care markets and other 
regulated industries in Britain. We make use of this to set out methodological challenges to 
efficiency measurement in health markets, and go on to propose solutions.  
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Chapter 5: Efficiency Over Time, Economies of Scale, Multi-Factor Productivity and 
Mergers in NHS Pathology 
In our first empirical study, we answer several policy-based questions regarding pathology 
services in that we, for the first time, provide insights in to the extent of inefficiency; how 
efficiency changes over time; how costs vary with a number of exogenous factors; economies 
of scale properties in pathology production; an account of overall multi-factor productivity in 
pathology services; and a simulation exercise to determine the cost implications of 
laboratories merging.  These features have been of interest to policy makers for a 
considerable length of time, as reflected in a number of prior studies. We are able to populate 
this policy debate with empirical evidence. 
Next, this study, being the first approach to efficiency analysis in NHS pathology, fulfils our 
research agenda’s goal of finding new areas of hospital services for efficiency gains. 
In addition, our study provides some methodological advances to the measurement of 
efficiency in health markets. We are the first to adopt an econometric approach to efficiency 
measurement in pathology services; the first to adopt a flexible model allowing for individual 
laboratories to have specific paths for efficiency change over time (Cuesta, 2000); and the 
first to use a cost function to simulate laboratory mergers.   
Chapter 6: Dual-level Inefficiency and Unobserved Heterogeneity in NHS Pathology 
In our second empirical study, we adopt a multi-level model that allows us to examine the 
organisational structure of pathology laboratories, and the location of inefficiency therein 
(Smith and Wheat, 2012). We use these estimates to derive an overall inefficiency measure 
per upper tier unit.  
We find that there are components of inefficiency at both of the levels examined. We find 
that inefficiency resides mostly at the lower, laboratory, level; whilst a small amount is found 
at the upper, strategic health authority (SHA)
2
, level. As with the previous application of this 
model, not only do we find that there is inefficiency at both levels, but that failure to account 
for the structure of the organisation may lead to the underestimation of overall inefficiency 
(Smith and Wheat, 2012). 
                                            
2 we note that these have, subsequent to policy reforms in 2012, been abolished. However, our data collected at the time that SHAs were in 
place and our analysis therefore uses this structure 
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Methodologically, there are several novel aspects. This study is the first application of the 
dual-level stochastic frontier (DLSF) model in health markets. In addition, ours is the first 
study to measure inefficiency at two vertically distinct organisational levels in health 
markets.  
The central contribution of this study, however, is the extension of the DLSF to account for 
unobserved heterogeneity between providers. We extend the model by taking advantage of 
methodological developments in the literature to augment the DLSF with statistical controls 
for unobserved heterogeneity (Farsi et al., 2005a; Kumbhakar et al., 2014). We use a set of 
statistical tests and adopt a measure which can account for different forms of unobserved 
heterogeneity. We demonstrate that it is important to do so, which is a key finding of this 
study. 
This study is thus important not only for studies in health markets but for inefficiency 
measurement across all sectors of the economy. 
Finally, chapter 7 concludes by bringing together the three studies. The major contributions 
of this thesis are in the review of incentive structures for NHS hospitals; the development of 
econometric techniques to measure areas of hospital activity that have not been studied 
previously to identify potential efficiency savings; novel application of econometric methods 
in health markets; the development of existing methods for health markets and for use 
beyond; development of appropriate testing strategies for the identification of various forms 
of unobserved heterogeneity; and the identification of vertically separate inefficiency in 
health. We discuss the extent to which the studies have answered the research objectives and 
go on to suggest useful areas for future work. 











2. National Health Service Structure, Expenditure and Productivity 
 
Following our introduction in the previous chapter, this chapter examines government 
spending and economic issues related to health care services, with a particular focus on the 
NHS. We examine NHS productivity and draw out its importance for the provision of health 
care.  
 
We begin by discussing health care system models to define the NHS and its position 
amongst its peers. We use this for reference in subsequent discussion. We then the 
progression of NHS expenditure over its lifetime, before moving to economic reasons for 
changes in health care expenditure. Finally, we move to NHS productivity and discuss how 
NHS productivity has changed in recent years. We conclude the chapter by suggesting that 
natural rises in health care expenditure over time implies that productivity and efficiency are 
crucial for policy makers, both in the NHS context and beyond. 
 
Subsequent chapters go on to define efficiency and set out how it may be measured (chapter 
3). Next, a chapter, 4, is devoted to efficiency in the NHS context: policy context, setting 
targets for efficiency and health issues pertaining to measuring efficiency. Following from 
this are the two empirical chapters, 5 & 6, which measure efficiency in NHS hospitals. 
Chapter 7 provides a synopsis and overall conclusions.  
 
The rest of this chapter is set out as follows. Section 2.1 considers health care system models 
to make clear the NHS’s position amongst its peers. In section 2.2 moves to the progression 
of NHS expenditure over its lifetime. Section 2.3 goes on to discuss economic drivers of 











2.1 Health Insurance Models 
 
To begin, consideration is given to the basic features of the NHS by way of comparison to 
other possible health care system structures. There are a number of ways in which a health 
system can be characterised, based on the regulation, financing and provision of health care. 
Bohm et al. (2013) set out ten basic types of system based on these features (of course, many 
more are possible, but these are deemed implausible; for example, a privately funded system 
with public provision). These are summarised in table 2.1. 
 
Health System Type Regulation Financing Provision Example(s) 
          
National Health Service State State State UK, Spain, Portugal, Scandinavia, 
Denmark, Iceland 
Non-profit National Health 
System 
State State Societal   
National Health Insurance 
System 
State State Private Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Italy, 
Ireland 
Etatist social Health System State Societal Societal   
Etatist Social Health 
Insurance 
State Societal Private France, Belgium, Poland, Israel, Japan, 
Korea 
Etatist Private Health System State Private Private   
Social Health System Societal Societal Societal   
Social Health Insurance 
System 
Societal Societal Private   
Corporatist Private Health 
System 
Societal Private Private Austria, Germany, Luxembourg, 
Switzerland 
Private Health System Private Private Private USA 
          
 Table 2.1: Types of Health System 
 
From a consumer’s perspective, from Rothenburg (1951) and Nagendran (2010), there are 
four basic types of medical insurance. These are private medicine – fee for service (i.e. no 
insurance); private medicine – voluntary sickness insurance; private medicine – compulsory 
sickness insurance; and socialised medicine. There is some overlap between health care 




The simplest way in which to conceptualise the various systems is to consider a continuum. 
On the far left is the National Health System, adopted in the UK and elsewhere (table 2.1), 
characterised by state regulation, state financing and state provision. The NHS model (also 
referred to as the Beveridge model, after Sir William Beveridge) is placed on the far left (or 
close thereto). On the far right is private medicine – fee for service characterised by complete 
private sector provision for all services and no state intervention. The remaining insurance 
models lie along the continuum, with the compulsory insurance model to the left of the 
voluntary insurance model. The Etatist Social Health Insurance model (sometimes referred to 
as the Bismarck model, after Otto Van Bismarck’s late 19
th
 century welfarist reforms) rests 
close to the compulsory insurance model, but has elements of socialised medicine. Its 
defining features include the stringent regulation of insurance (often but not necessarily sold 
on a not for profit basis), claims paid without being challenged, no exclusion for pre-existing 
conditions, prices fixed by the state and private primary and secondary care outlets. The 
system in the USA was close to a compulsory insurance model (the 1934 American Blue 
Cross and Blue Shield models), although the recent health care bill
3
 looks to have shifted the 
system towards the Beveridge and Bismarck models. Indeed, more is spent on public health 
in the USA than in the UK: Medicare and Medicaid programmes (in 2013, Medicare cost 
$586bn, Medicare cost $449bn
4
 - both of which are in excess of the approximate £140bn 
spent on the NHS). The Canadian National Health Insurance (NHI) model is close to the 
compulsory health insurance model. In less developed nations, e.g. Senegal, health care is 
almost always uninsured private medicine. These are demonstrated below. 
 
Figure 2.1: Health Systems and Insurance Models 
 
The position of the various models along the continuum across time is subject to change. 
Remembering that all health systems were at one stage on the far right, there looks to be a 
                                            





movement to the left, implying systems move to the left as development occurs. However, 
this is a discussion for another set of ends. The point here is that this continuum gives a way 
in which to observe whether reforms over the course of the NHS have changed it 
fundamentally, from its far left origin.  
 
 
2.2 National Health Service Expenditure over Time 
 
We begin this chapter by considering NHS expenditure in real terms and as a proportion of 
total government expenditure. These are presented in figure 2.5 below.  
 
 
Figure 2.2: NHS Expenditure in real terms and as a proportion of GDP, 1950-2011. Source: 
Harker (2012) 
 
Figure 2.2 shows the growth in NHS expenditure since its beginning. In real terms, spending 
has increased from its base of around £12bn in 1950 to its peak of around £121bn in 2011. In 
terms of GDP, the % share of NHS spending has increased from 3.5% in 1950 to 8.3% in 
2011. Both series share a common trend which is that there is fairly uniform growth from 
1950 until around 2000, at which point the trend increases sharply, with the increased 
trajectory holding until 2011. This is a substantial increase in spending, particularly in more 




Given this rise in expenditure over time, a natural question to ask is whether other sectors in 
the economy have experienced similar trends in expenditure in terms of total GDP. Presented 
below are such trends.  
 
 
Figure 2.3: Government Expenditure by Sector as a % of GDP, 1993-2013. Source: HM 
Treasury (2014). NB – only a selection of sectors have been taken for ease of interpretation 
 
Figure 2.3 shows the proportion of total GDP that is devoted to a number of sectors between 
1993 and 2013. Five have been chosen for comparison, rather than all areas of spending, to 
make for ease of interpretation. Health represents government expenditure on publicly 
provided health, the provision of which may be either public or private (see table 2.1). Other 
sectors include social protection which is the governments largest outlay (health is second), 
education, defence, housing (and community amenities) and environmental protection.  
 
As can be seen, health, education and social protection have had expenditure as a proportion 
of total GDP increased over the period. Health expenditure has outstripped increases in 
education spending over the period. The remainder of the sectors have either had fairly 















% of GDP, 1993-2013
Public Sector Expenditure on Services by Function
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expenditure reduced, as in the case of defence. Thus, not only has health expenditure grown 
as a proportion of GDP, it has grown relative to other sectors of the economy.  
 
The next question to consider is whether these rises in expenditure are being driven by certain 
aspects within health care services or whether it is all aspects of health care that are 




Figure 2.4: NHS Cost Indices, 1950-2006. Source: Hawe (2009) 
 
Figure 2.4 shows cost indices for various services within the NHS over time. The Hospital 
index shows the cost index for hospitals. The Family_Health index refers to the costs of 
services that are considered to be for families, including primary care, optometry, dentistry 
and pharmacology. The NHS_other index refers to the costs of other services such as mental 
health, ambulances and special health authorities (e.g. National Blood Authority). These 
suggest that the costs of various subsets of NHS production are each increasing over time. 
The rates at which they increase vary: the costs of other services appear to have grown most 
over the period, followed closely by hospital costs. The costs of family health services seem 




















Hospital costs, family health services, other NHS services
NHS Cost Indices, 1950-2006
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to the 950 of other or the 800 of hospital costs. For Hospital and other services, the growth of 
the value of the indices appears to be reasonably constant from 1950 up until 2000, beyond 
which the trend appears to increase sharply. This corresponds to the pattern observed for 
overall spending, as in figure 2.2. For family health services, the trend appears to rise 
smoothly over the entire period.  
 
In summary, health care expenditure has increased over time in both real terms and in terms 
of the proportion of GDP spend. The rise in GDP spend has occurred in many other countries 
– none of the reported countries’ proportions of GDP spending reduced over the period. In 
addition, costs of various subsets of NHS activity have increased over time. In light of this, 
the natural question is as to why. To answer this, the following section explores reasons to 
explain these trends. 
 
2.3 Health Care Expenditure Drivers 
 
We first distinguish spending level and spending level growth. Spending level is simply the 
product of the quantity of outputs and their factor prices at a given equilibrium state. 
Spending level growth reflects a set of factors that cause this equilibrium state to shift over 
time; that is, those factors over and above the output alone that are causing health care costs 
to change over time. See Chernew and Newhouse (2012). Focus is given to spending level 
growth in this exposition. 
 
Population trends include the rising population over time. Simply, more people require more 
health care services. This is especially true in the context of NHS where, under its universal 
service, there is non-excludability. Over the last 50 years, the UK has seen a population 
increase of around 18.7%, around 10 million in number, to 63 million (ONS, 2014).  The 
population in the UK is set to rise by around 16% to 73 million by 2035 (ONS, 2012b). 
 
The next population trend is the rise in long term conditions (LTCs). Rising incidence and/or 
prevalence across a number of conditions, for example diabetes (Diabetes UK, 2012), has 
increased pressure on health care services. This issue is linked to health behaviours, which 
were identified as a driver of service use, and correspondingly as a driver of costs, in the 
context of the NHS (Wanless, 2002). For example, BMI, indicative of health behaviours, was 




Further, multimorbidity is expected to rise in the coming years, which has significant cost 
implications (Department of Health, 2012). Multimorbid patients are resource intensive: it is 
estimated that the 30% of patients with one or more long term conditions account for 70% of 
health care spending in England (NHS England, 2013). Moreover, spending per case appears 
to have increased with time, largely due to increases in multimorbidities and as a result of 
technological advance (Chernew and Newhouse, 2012).  
 
The next, and perhaps best documented, population trend is an ageing population. The 
median age in Britain is predicted to rise from just under 39 in 2010 to over 42 in 2035 (ONS, 
2012c). Economists had for a long time believed that it was the age of patients themselves 
that was driving the association with increases in health care costs (Bos and Weizsacker, 
1989). However, Zweifel et al. (1999) proposed the ‘red herring hypothesis’: that the driver 
of the observed expenditure rise was the patient’s proximity to death, rather than their age. 
Age was therefore just a proxy for proximity to death. Later, Seshamati and Gray (2004) 
revisited this issue, finding that both age and proximity to death appeared to be driving 
increases in health care expenditure. This finding is corroborated by recent evidence, which 
proposes an interaction of the two factors as a further determinant of rising costs (Geue et al., 
2014). Further evidence is in accordance but finds that whilst ageing did increase 
expenditure, the effect was meagre, by around a factor of four, relative to the effect of 
technological change (Dormont et al., 2006). 
 
A corollary of average age is age structure, that is, proportion of the population across age 
strata. The belief is that given two populations of equal average age, the one with a higher 
share of elderly patients will be more costly. However, there is little empirical support for this 
(Baltagi and Moscone, 2010).  
 
There is a growing recognition of frailty as a medical condition common amongst elderly 
populations (Clegg et al., 2013). It is inherently tied to both ageing and comorbidities, 
although is distinct from them (Fried et al., 2004). Frailty, both as an increased health risk 
itself and as an amalgam of several deleterious conditions, is likely to be financially 




Economic factors that have been suggested as driving health care expenditure growth include, 
firstly, Baumol’s law
5
 (Baumol, 1967; Baumol, 2012). The central idea is that, over time, the 
more labour-intensive industries will, ceteris paribus, become costly relative to the less 
labour-intensive industries, which are able to reduce production costs more rapidly through 
the adoption of technology. For example, the use of technology can be used to greater effect 
in reducing the unit cost of producing, say, an automobile than it can to reduce the unit cost 
of, say, an education, which requires a far higher share of labour input than its comparator. 
This is intuitively reasonable in the context of health markets, where there is a significant 
labour input. Indeed, labour cost shares are typically high in health markets (around 63% of 
total spend on hospitals, Department of Health (2015); as much as (circa) 80-90% in 
pathology production, see Department of Health (2008)). Much empirical testing shows that, 
whilst some results suggest that Baumol’s cost disease pervades health markets (Hartwig, 
2008; Hartwig, 2011; Bates and Santerre, 2013), other studies do not find evidence to support 
this idea (Gerdtham et al., 1992; Murthy and Ukpolo, 1994).  
 
The next economic factor is technological change. Technological advance is thought to be a 
major driver of health care expenditure (Manning et al., 1987). Indeed, one study estimated 
75% of expenditure growth was attributable to technological progress (Newhouse, 1992). 
This has become known as the ‘Newhouse conjecture’. This issue has proven challenging for 
economists - finding a suitable proxy for technological change has been difficult in empirical 
applications (Baltagi and Moscone, 2010). If proxy measures are supported, then the 
Newhouse conjecture has been supported empirically. As proxies, Baker and Wheeler (1998) 
used the number of surgical procedures; Okunade and Murthy (2002) used R&D spending; 
and Gerdtham and Lothgren (2000) used the passage of time. A recent study made use of two 
novel indicators, namely the number of approved medical devices and pharmaceutical 
products (Willeme & Dumont, 2015). The study findings are consistent with prior literature, 
where technological progress accounted for, on average across OECD countries, around 43% 
of health expenditures between 1980 and 2009. Dormont et al. (2006) make use of changes in 
clinical practice (pharmaceutical expenditures) as a proxy for technological change. The 
authors find that technological change is substantially more effective on expenditure 
increases than population age.  
 
                                            
5 Elsewhere referred to as ‘Baumol’s cost disease’ 
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Another issue around technology is the capability of clinicians: as technology advances, it is 
possible to treat conditions that had not been possible previously. This has been documented 
in the NHS, congenital heart disease services being a recent example (Glenwright et al., 
2014).  
 
Of course, the positive relationship may not hold true in all cases; some technological 
progress may help to lower costs in some settings. Much depends on the view – the 
Newhouse conjecture is a more macro, long-run effect. There may be different effects at 
different levels of aggregation or over different time horizons. For example, technological 
progress (as proxied by the passage of time) was thought to be explaining short run cost 
reduction in pathology services (Buckell et al., 2015). In some cases, medical intervention 
can be substituted by the use of drugs – termed ‘drug cost offset’ – evidence for which has 
been found in the literature (Willeme and Dumont, 2015).  
 
Next is the effect of rising incomes. Economic theory predicts that demand for health care 
will increase with rising incomes, both at the micro and macro levels (Rice, 2003). Health 
care expenditure will consequently rise. This has not only been supported in many empirical 
applications where studies reveal that health care expenditure is highly correlated with 
income, income has been shown to explain a significant share of the variation in total health 
care spending (Morris et al., 2007). The current debate amongst economists is whether the 
income elasticity of demand is greater than or less than one, and thus whether health care is a 
‘necessary’ (or ‘normal’) or ‘luxury’ good. Although many empirical studies have sought to 
answer this question, and a range of approaches employed, the evidence is mixed and the 
answer remains ambiguous (Lago-Penas et al., 2013).  
 
There are also often political factors that have bearing on expenditure. The structure of health 
finance and provision may have implications for expenditure. Chernew and Newhouse (2012) 
do not find significant differences between insurance schemes in markets in the USA. Xu et 
al. (2011) found some evidence to suggest that social insurance is expensive relative to 
general taxation across OECD countries. Insurance models based on co-payments present an 
additional aspect to insurance. The central example of such a scheme was the Rand Health 
Insurance Experiment in the USA in the 1980s. Economic analysis has shown that the system 
of insurance can indeed have bearing on health expenditures (Manning et al., 1987). 
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However, the authors note that the effect is inferior to that of technological change. 
Nonetheless, this issue may be important with the growth in private insurance in the UK.  
 
For public vs. private provision, Hollingsworth (2008), in an authoritative literature review of 
efficiency analyses, finds no clear consensus amongst empirical studies. If anything, the 
literature may point to public provision being preferable, but the answer remains unclear. 
Moreover, the optimum is likely to vary by region.  
 
Reforms to health care systems are often expensive. The Health and Social Care Act (2012) 
was a major top-down reorganisation of the NHS. Not only is evidence around the savings 
dubious, the actual costs have exceeded projections and the upheaval in service provision 
itself has likely driven up costs (cf. NAO, 2013; Walshe, 2014). Political commitments can 
also drive spending: New Labour famously
6
 matched NHS expenditure per capita to 
European levels during the 2000s (Smee, 2005; fig. 2.2). A further contributory factor can be 
major shocks, as Maynard and Ludbrook (1980, pp. 293) have described 1970s funding, 
 
“…what you got last year, plus an allowance for growth, plus an allowance for scandals.” 
 
Recession, or rather the fallout of recession, can have implications for health care 
expenditure. For example, the 2008 global financial crisis increased pressure on public sector 
expenditure and so on the costs of the health care system in the UK. In response to this, the 
Nicholson Challenge set out targets for efficiency savings of £20bn by 2015 in NHS (Health 
Select Committee, 2010). There have been real terms freezes in expenditure during the last 
few years, and financial pressure is expected to extend beyond 2015, with a funding gap of 
£30bn expected by 2020 (Roberts et al., 2012; NHS, 2013).  
 
In the long run, NHS expenditure has risen over time, both in absolute and real terms. 
Expenditure has grown as a proportion of GDP in Britain and across health care systems the 
world over. Expenditure has grown within all observed subsets of NHS activity. There are a 
number of reasons to explain this growth. Further, there are a number of reasons to expect 
that this growth will continue for the foreseeable future. As Baumol (2012) argues, this 
growth is not necessarily an issue; more an indication of gains made in other sectors.  
                                            





In more recent times, there have been issues that have had implications for health 
expenditure, both positively and negatively. In some cases, political intervention is often 
associated with expenditure rises; whereas in the fallout of recessions, health budgets are 
more constrained. 
 
The implication of these factors is that there is a delicate balance for budget holders in health 
markets. On the one hand, spending on health services must track the growth in costs. If 
spending reductions, or even spending held in line with inflation, services will, assuming 
constant productivity, be deprived. On the other hand, financial pressure on budgets often 
means budget holders must be cautious not to overspend. Therefore, increasing productivity, 
and its economic counterpart, efficiency, will allow policy makers to minimise over-
spending. Efficiency and productivity will have a central role in enabling governments to 
maintain levels of service and levels of quality under increasingly stringent budgets. We 
therefore move to discuss these concepts in the context of the NHS.  
 
2.4 NHS Efficiency and Productivity 
 
In the previous section, the growth – and likely continuation thereof – of NHS expenditure 
was discussed. Governments ought not therefore, where possible, to reduce or freeze health 
budgets, as services – and/or service quality – are risked when (real terms) budgets are wilted 
by health cost inflation. In response to this, the government has two basic options, namely to 
increase spending to match rising costs, or to improve efficiency and/or productivity so that 
the same level of output (in terms of both volume and quality) can be achieved whilst costs 
rise. We therefore consider these concepts in turn to examine this issue, but also to take a 
general view as to how the NHS is performing. 
 
The global level of NHS efficiency, that is considering the entire NHS as the unit of analysis, 
has been sought across a number of studies using a variety of methods. Three examples of 
these are presented in table 2.2 below. Here, SFA – stochastic frontier analysis and DEA – 
data envelopment analysis; see chapter 3 for definition. Indicator measures are just that, 






Study Year Method Conclusion 
        
Tandon et al. 2000 SFA 0.88-0.93; close to the top of rankings 
        
Spinks and Hollingsworth 2009 DEA 0.96-0.99; close to the bottom of rankings 
        
Commonwealth Fund 2014 Indicator Analysis NHS most efficient amongst peers 
        
Table 2.2: Macro NHS Efficiency Studies.  
 
On the basis of this evidence, it would appear that the NHS is highly efficient: across a 
number of studies which use a variety of methods, the estimates of efficiency are close to 1. 
Even in the case of the DEA estimates where the ranking is low, the estimates indicate there 
is almost no inefficiency. However, a number of issues arise when attempting to gauge 
efficiency at this aggregate level.  
 
First, the estimates and rankings are sensitive to estimation. Greene (2004), using the same 
data as Tandon et al. (2000), showed that both efficiency estimates and rankings are sensitive 
to model specification. Spinks and Hollingsworth (2009) outline theoretical issues in DEA 
estimates when methods are applied at the aggregate level which inhibit the validity of 
estimates. More broadly, Greene (2010) suggests that the application of microeconomic tools 
at the macroeconomic level may be inappropriate. Second, the results are somewhat 
conflicting. The DEA and SFA results both suggest that the NHS is highly efficient. 
However, the DEA results suggest the NHS is more efficient than the SFA results, yet the 
NHS ranks amongst the lowest according to DEA whilst it ranks amongst the highest in the 
SFA ranks. This conflict casts doubt over the legitimacy of these estimates. Thirdly, there are 
methodological issues. The indicator analysis uses the expenditure on health as a % of GDP 
as one of its measures of efficiency (Davis et al., 2014, pp. 23). These rather crude metrics 
neglect a number of aspects of expenditure, for example quality. Moreover, there are perverse 
incentives in adopting this approach: in order to rank more highly, expenditure on health 




Overall, whilst studies indicate that the NHS is highly efficient, there are technical issues for 
which the credibility of these estimates is questionable. We therefore look to measures of 




, like efficiency, is critical for expenditure, as highlighted by the Office for 
Budget Responsibility’s health spending projections (OBR, 2014). If productivity rises by 
2.2% p.a. then spending is expected to be just over 8% of total GDP by 2063/64. If 
productivity rises, as historically, by around 1% p.a., then spending is expected to reach more 
the 20% of GDP by 2063/64.   
 
NHS productivity has been analysed directly in a number of ways. One way is at the macro 
level, such that an overall NHS productivity index is derived (Bojke et al., 2015; ONS, 2015). 
Another approach is at the regional level, assessing the inputs and outputs of the NHS by 
region (Bojke et al., 2013). There are also studies aimed at a more disaggregate level, 
hospitals being a recent example (Castelli et al., 2015).  
 
We consider two indices of overall NHS productivity to consider how the general level of 
NHS performance of the NHS has changed in recent years. Comparison of these indices is 
useful in identifying some issues that arise when constructing measures of productivity. 
Figure 2.5 below shows both the ONS’s (ONS, 2015) and University of York’s (Bojke et al., 
2015; referred to as UoY hereafter) indices of NHS productivity.  
 
                                            
7 For the purposes of discussion here, we refer to Total Factor Productivity (TFP); for a definition see chapter 3. This is in keeping with the 




Figure 2.5: ONS Productivity Indices, ONS and University of York, 1995-2012. NB – the 
University of York use two indices which vary by input definition (“Mixed” uses staff 
numbers and expenditure; “Indirect” uses expenditure only). (TFP = Total Factor 
Productivity). Sources: ONS (2015), Bojke et al. (2015) 
 
As shown above, the overall productivity of the NHS appears to have increased over time. In 
both cases, the level of growth is similar, from each index’s origin at 100, to around 110 by 
2012. However, the time series for both indices varies. The ONS index commences in 1995, 
whereas the UoY indices commence in 2004. This would suggest that the gradient in growth 
in the UoY indices is higher on average. As can be seen, however, this is not the case since 
the gradient of the ONS index is rather flat until around 2003. Indeed, the pattern of both 
indices is rather close in the years 2004-2013, in terms of both direction and magnitude. To 
examine this issue in greater detail, Figure 2.6 below shows the annual change of each index 











































Figure 2.6: Annual NHS Productivity Change, ONS and UoY Productivity Indices, 1995-
2012. Sources: ONS (2015), Bojke et al. (2015) 
 
Figure 2.6 above shows that in some years productivity change was positive, where values 
are to the right of the line (at zero), and in other years where growth was negative and values 
are to the left of the line. That the majority of the values are to the right of the line, and their 
distances are generally further from it, reflects that, on average, according to these indices, 
NHS productivity has grown. The average change across the indices, reflecting average 
productivity growth in percentage terms, is 0.71, 1.30 and 1.38 for the ONS, UoY Mixed and 
UoY Indirect, respectively.  
 
In many years, all three indices’ values are in the same direction. In 2008 they are all positive 
and in 2009 they are all negative. In other years, this was not the case, as in 2012. In most 
cases, the estimate of productivity change is similar between indices, as in 2007. However, in 
other cases, the indices’ values diverge, as in 2005. In these years, and more broadly, a 
question arises as to which is most reliable and thus how each index is constructed. To 
examine this issue, table 2.3 below compares the indices.  
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Table 2.3: Composition of NHS Productivity Indices
8
. Sources: ONS (2015) and Bojke et al. 
(2015). 
 
Table 2.3 highlights some difference and similarities in the methods that have been applied to 
analyse NHS productivity. In terms of input categories and index methods, the indices are 
similar. However, in terms of data, output categories and years covered, the two methods 
diverge. Overall, whilst there is some divergence in some years, there is, considering the 
differences in construction, noticeable concordance between the two measures in other years 
in terms of both direction and magnitude (figure 2.5; figure 2.6): the two measures broadly 
agree. 
 
In principle, productivity is central to the aims of NHS resource management. However, there 
are two theoretical issues which hinder its usefulness, both of which have been observed 
when looking to measure NHS productivity directly.  
 
First, productivity, being a ratio of inputs to output, is unbounded. This means that the 
measure itself can neither define nor reach its own limit. The implication for using 
productivity measures in the NHS context is that targets can be continually reset with no 
regard to their potential limit, the ‘goalposts are kept shifting’. In this regard, some have 
                                            
8 Glossary: DH – Department of Health, RC – Reference Costs, WG – Welsh Government, SG – Scottish Government, DHSSPS – 
Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety Northern Ireland, HSCIC – Health and Social Care Information Centre, GOC – 
General Ophthalmic Council, GDC – General Dental Council, SD – Survey Data, PCA – Prescription Cost Analysis, GPPS – GP Patient 




questioned whether the current push for productivity gains is sustainable (Appleby, 2012). 
One way to overcome this issue is to use productivity to benchmark, as per, for example, 
health regions in the NHS (Bojke et al., 2013). 
 
The second issue is that the way in which these indices are constructed can often have a 
significant bearing on their magnitude. This is highlighted in the context of ONS’s NHS 
productivity measure (figure 2.5), which shifted from suggesting a decline in NHS 
productivity to an increase following a revision of the index (Black, 2013). One way to 
overcome this issue is to measure various components of productivity in order to avoid 
having to aggregate various metrics. This is the starting point of our analysis. 
 
Productivity comprises a number of aspects. Productivity can be improved through gains in 
efficiency, gains in the scale or scope of operation or through technological change. It is 
possible to measure these aspects of productivity separately in empirical settings (chapter 3 
which follows defines and describes how to measure each of these features). Moreover, it is 
possible to combine them to arrive back at an overall measure of productivity.  
 
For policy, efficiency is particularly useful. Here, the basic question is around how the 
government raises expenditure so as to cope with the natural rise in health costs, whilst 
concurrently not overspending (particularly during times of financial pressure). This would 
be a straightforward exercise if all the factors that cause health costs to rise are both known 
and perfectly observable, which they are not. Thus, defining a ‘natural’ rise in health costs is 
doubtless an impossible task. However, one clear way to satisfy these constraints is to 
maximise efficiency (or, conversely, to minimise inefficiency). Put differently, if budget 
holders know that services are efficient, then they also know that any cost increases are the 
result of natural economic factors rather than overspending.  
 
Overall, efficiency and productivity are crucial tools for policy makers seeking to spend as 
much as necessary but as little as possible on the provision of health care, both in the NHS 
and for health care systems around the world. Therefore, in the following chapter, we proceed 
to define efficiency, and set our methods to measuring efficiency and productivity. We are 
then prepared to approach formally efficiency in health, to which we turn in the following 




3. Measuring Efficiency  
 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we argued that, driven by natural rises in a number of factors over 
time, rising expenditure on healthcare was justifiable. To manage this growth, governments 
should seek to maximise efficiency in the delivery of health care services. To achieve this 
goal, efficiency must first be measured. We make use of econometric methods in our 
empirical applications in subsequent chapters, we therefore discuss the econometric approach 
to efficiency analysis here. We set out our justification for doing so by way of comparison to 
rival methods.  
Once we have established the methods, we move to the first research chapter, 4, which 
reviews the literature on measuring performance in NHS hospitals; discusses the regulation of 
efficiency amongst NHS hospitals; and sets out the methodological landscape for measuring 
efficiency in health markets and other regulated sectors. From this, we set our research 
agenda which we go on to fulfil in two empirical chapters, 5 and 6. In all three chapters we 
develop the discussion of empirical efficiency analyses in health markets; we set the basis for 
this discussion in the remainder of this chapter.  
In this chapter, we first introduce the concept of efficiency and discuss its theoretical 
underpinnings. We give an exposition of the economic approach to efficiency analysis based 
on the cost function, which is the framework that is employed in later chapters and also 
commonly in the literature. We then proceed to the econometric development of the 
economic models, making the case for our use of econometric techniques. We describe these 
methods – based on the stochastic frontier (SF) model - in detail, in particular paying 
attention to three aspects of importance in the health context: time-varying inefficiency, 
unobserved heterogeneity and multi-level organisational structures. We further review the 
measurement of efficiency in health care, paying particular attention to econometric 
approaches. Finally, we describe an overall measure of performance, Total Factor 
Productivity, which makes use of the various components of the models described during the 
chapter by bringing them together into a single measure of overall performance.  
This chapter draws from a number of sources. We describe methodological aspects of use in 
this thesis, but leave a great deal for the purpose of brevity. For a fuller exposition of the 
theoretical aspects of the cost and production function, see Chambers (1988). For the link 
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between the production economics and the measurement of efficiency and productivity, see 
Coelli et al. (2005) and Fried et al. (2008). For the application of theory and methods in 
health, see Feldstein (1968), Jacobs et al. (2006), Morris et al. (2007) and Hollingsworth and 
Peacock (2008). Coverage of econometric techniques is provided in Gujarati (2003), Baltagi 
(2008) and Greene (2012c). For the estimation of econometric efficiency analysis, see 
Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) and Greene (2012b). Finally, for the application of modelling 
techniques using contemporary software packages (e.g. LIMDEP, STATA), see Greene 
(2012b) and Kumbhakar et al. (2015).  
 
3.1.1 Defining Efficiency 
 
Koopmans (1951, pp. 460) defines efficiency as, 
“An attainable set of commodity flows [or attainable point in the commodity space]…is 
called efficient if there is no other attainable set of commodity flows in which all flows are at 
least as large as the corresponding flows in the original set, while at least one is actually 
larger.”  
 
Debreu (1951) and Shephard (1953) provided graphical representations of efficiency through 
radial distances of producers from a frontier, both in an output-expanding direction (Debreu) 
and an input contracting direction (Shephard).  
 
Farrell (1957) made, simultaneously, a number of significant steps. First, he defined cost 
efficiency as distinct from productive efficiency (and in doing so paved the way for the 
development of its analogue, revenue efficiency). Cost efficiency embeds input prices and 
asserts a behavioural assumption, cost minimisation, on the analysis of inputs and outputs in 
the production process. This leads to the second of Farrell’s developments, which is the 
recognition that cost inefficiency is the product of two components, namely technical and 
allocative efficiencies. In this thesis, cost efficiency is measured. We therefore pay attention 
to its definition below.  
 
Technical efficiency is the extent to which more resources are used in the production process 
than are absolutely necessary. Allocative efficiency is the extent to which suboptimal 
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combinations of inputs are used to produce a given level of output. In other words, there are 
usually many ways in which two (or more) inputs can produce a single desired output.  It is 
unlikely that the two inputs are the same price to the producer. Then, the optimal combination 
is that which uses the least of the more expensive input whilst maintaining the production of 
the desired output. Any deviation from this optimum is the allocative inefficiency. These 
concepts are shown below in figure 3.1. 
 
Figure 3.1: Allocative and Technical Efficiency 
 
Figure 3.1 shows a firm’s production of a given output, q. The graph shows a locus of 
production at q=100 representing the minimum combination of inputs, x1 and x2, that can 
produce 100q; the gradient represents the marginal rate of technical substitution between 
inputs. The parallel lines are isocost curves, C1 and C2 that represent uniform costs of 
production along them and increasing cost with distance from the origin: C2 > C1.  The 
gradient reflects the ratio of input prices.  
 
Assuming an output of q=100, the producer seeks to minimise its costs of production. The 
producer is technically efficient at any point along the locus of production, that is, it is not 
possible to produce 100q without using at least each amount of input along the curve. Any 
point above the curve for which production is 100q is technically inefficient, e.g. A3, since it 




Points A1 and A2 are both technically efficiency. However, at A1 the cost of production is 
lower. This is due to the use of a combination of inputs which, for the same output, have a 
lower cost. This is, relative to A2, allocatively efficient.  
 
The optimal point of production is where the locus of production is tangential to the isocost 
curve; that is, it is not possible to produce 100q at lower cost. Here, technical and allocative 
efficiency are jointly achieved. A corollary of this is that allocative efficiency implies 
technical efficiency, but not the reverse. That is, technical efficiency is a necessary condition 
for cost minimisation and allocative efficiency is a sufficient condition for cost minimisation. 
Isocost line C3 is unattainable for 100q.  
 
Overall, cost efficiency is defined at the sum of technical and allocative efficiencies.  
 
Finally, Farrell was the pioneer of empirical application, using linear programming 
techniques in agriculture. This seminal work inspired the development of two broad empirical 
techniques for frontier analysis, data envelopment analysis (DEA) and stochastic frontier 
analysis (SFA). In this thesis, we make use of SFA as our device for the measurement of 
efficiency. We justify our use of this method in the subsections that follow.  
 
We proceed to the justification of frontier techniques on theoretical grounds, before 
presenting the cost function, which forms the basis of our approach. We then move to the 
econometric cost function, then to the stochastic frontier model and finally to total factor 
productivity. 
 
3.2 The Theoretical Case for Frontier Techniques  
 
As noted in previous chapters, we are interesting in NHS efficiency. Specifically we are 
interested in hospitals within the NHS. Despite a litany of theoretical groundwork, empirical 
analyses and sequential methodological advances, there exists, at present, no singly accepted 
framework for assessing hospital efficiency (cf. Hollingsworth, 2008; Hussey et al., 2009; 
Mutter et al., 2011). There is significant potential for frontier-type efficiency measures in 
health markets (Lovell, 2006; Mutter et al., 2011). We argue in favour of frontier techniques. 




The implication of attempting to measure efficiency at all is that all economic agents are not 
completely efficient. A widely accepted theory of inefficiency is Leibenstein (1966), who 
labels organisational inefficiency X-efficiency. Leibenstein’s contention is twofold: at the 
firm level, that as a result of information dissemination, motivation, difficulty in monitoring 
all staff and agency issues, any sizeable organisation is likely to be – at least to some degree - 
inefficient; and at the individual level, that human behaviour is composed of two parts, one of 
rationality (maximising their utility) and another of non-rational behaviour (suboptimal 
performance), which may lead to an inefficient level of individual or firm performance.  
 
Other authors have proposed theories for both firm and individual behaviour (Table 3.1 – and 
this list is by no means exhaustive) which may lead to some suboptimal level of individual or 
(by extension) firm performance. These theories are thought to share an ontological core – 
inefficiency - and are thus interchangeable with Leibenstein's X-efficiency. Put differently, 
underlying these theories is the basic notion that for one reason or another, be it X-efficiency, 
the Peter Principle, weak identification, bounded rationality, etc., organisations may not be, 
always and everywhere, fully efficient.  
 
Two further important developments in the literature are, firstly, Leibenstein & Maital 
(1992), who posit that frontier techniques are perhaps the best way in which to measure X-
efficiency and secondly, Rice (2003), who suggests X-efficiency is valid in health markets. 
Rosko and Mutter (2011) is a recent example of an X-efficiency based health care frontier 
efficiency analysis. These together suggest that frontier methods are appropriate for 
determining the quantity of interest, namely inefficiency. Further, that frontier methods are 
derived from the foundations of empirical efficiency analysis (Cooper and Lovell, 2011)
 9
, 
and have been applied frequently in health care, give us confidence in this approach 
(Hollingsworth et al., 1999; Hollingsworth, 2003, 2008; Mutter et al., 2011).   
 
Finally, Shleifer’s (1985) theory of yardstick competition operationalises measurement of 
relative efficiency in a franchised monopoly market. This represents another health based use 
of frontier-type analyses and has been applied recently in health efficiency analysis (Olsen 
and Street, 2008).  
                                            
9 See http://www.terry.uga.edu/~knox/courses/READINGLIST8820I.pdf for a fuller literature survey of ‘raw methods’. 
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These together constitute a robust theoretical case for frontier techniques in health care. 
Recently, economists in the NHS setting appear to have discarded frontier methods, but 
maintain the use of cost function-based approaches. Frontiers are elsewhere seen as the 
foremost hospital efficiency analysis tool and are seen to have great potential in health (cf. 
Lovell, 2006; Mutter et al., 2011). Then, the natural question is as to why these methods are 
out of favour with NHS-based economists. Some answers are to be found in the empirical 
setting. Indeed, we seek to answer some of these concerns in our empirical work. We return 
to this issue in due course.  
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1935 Hicks Econometrica Individual Behavioural 
Once a monopolist has obtained a monopolistic position, s/he is unlikely to continue 
to maximise 
profits; Monopolists enjoy a quiet life 
1938 Skinner The Behaviour of Organisms Individual Behavioural Operant conditioning 








American Economic Review Firm Technical The A-J Effect 
1964 Williamson 
The Economics of Discretionary Behaviour: Managerial Objectives in a Theory 
of a Firm 
Both Behavioural Maximising profit is but one of several managerial objectives 
1965 Alchian Il Politico Firm Technical Defrayed ownership leads to diminished managerial monitoring and thus control 
1966 Leibenstein American Economic Review Firm Behavioural 
X-inefficiency at firm level due to information, agency issues, monitoring, 
decentralisation of 
Command 
1969 Peter & Hull The Peter Principle Individual Technical The Peter Principle – individuals rise to reach their level of incompetence 
1971 Niskanen Bureaucracy and Representative Government Individual Technical Public mangers maximise their budgets regardless of inefficiency 
1971 Evans Canadian Economic Journal Both Technical 
No reason for doctors to be efficient; hospitals do not cost minimise/profit maximise 
in the 
neo-classical sense 
1974 de Alessi Public Choice Individual Technical Public managers have bias towards capital-intensive budgets 
1976 Lindsay Journal of the Political Economy Individual Technical Public managers seek visible inputs 
1976 Stigler American Economic Review Both Technical X-inefficiency is a myth; individuals maximise utility in different ways 




Journal of Economic literature Firm Technical Hospitals are scarcely fully occupied always and everywhere 
1988 Hansmann Journal of Law, Economics and Organisation Firm Technical 
Firms have more complex classification than simply public or private; problems arise 
via 
hierarchy, coordination, incomplete contracts, monitoring, agency costs 
2003 Rice The Economics of Health Reconsidered Firm Technical X-efficiency applicable in health 
2006 Smith & Street The Elgar Companion to Health Economics Firm Technical Principal-agent relationship at all levels 
2012 Oliver Journal of Health Politics, Policy & Law Individual Behavioural Behavioural economics applied to the health sector (NHS) 
Table 3.1: Theories of Inefficiency
33 
 
3.3 The Cost Function 
Frontier approaches to efficiency measurement are based on cost and production functions. In 
this section, we outline our tool of choice, the cost function, which is the basic economic 
model from which our econometric counterparts in later chapters are derived. Because we do 
not use the economic counterpart of the cost function, the production function, it is presented 
only tangentially, where necessary, in our discussion. The cost function is preferred to a 
production function as it embodies a richer economic problem (that is both allocative and 
technical inefficiencies; production function-based frontiers permit measurement of technical 
efficiency only) and allows multiple outputs to be included simultaneously (cf. Jacobs et al., 
2006; Eakin, 2008). Attention is given to the conceptual features and properties of the cost 
function, and health-specific considerations. In our econometric work, we test these 
properties to validate empirical models. We pay attention only to aspects of theory relevant to 
this thesis; for comprehensive coverage of production theory, econometrics and health 
applications thereof, see Chambers (1988), Greene (2012c), Hollingsworth and Peacock 
(2008), respectively.  
 
3.3.1 The Economic Cost Function 
In theory, firms are assumed to seek to minimise costs according to output(s) and input (or 
factor) prices. Therefore, a cost function represents the minimum attainable cost for a firm in 
a fixed period of time for a given combination of outputs and input prices. These are assumed 
exogenous to the firm; thus the mix of inputs is sought which minimises costs. Then, the 
problem is typically defined mathematically as one of minimisation, 
𝐶(𝑦, 𝑤) = min
𝑥≥0
(𝑤′𝑥: 𝑥 ∈ 𝑉(𝑦))                                                                                                      (3.1) 
Where C are costs and 𝑦 = (𝑦1, 𝑦2, … , 𝑦𝑛)′ is a vector of outputs. Similarly, w and x are 
vectors of input prices and inputs, respectively. 𝑤′𝑥is the inner product of the vectors w and 
x
10
. 𝑉(𝑦) is the feasible set of outputs. A feasible set denotes the range of outputs that are 
attainable to the firm; not all outputs are attainable (there may be minimum levels of output, 
indivisible units of output, etc.).  
The cost function is said to embody a set of regularity conditions, meaning that the following 
properties are upheld: 
                                            
10 that is, 𝑤′𝑥 = 𝑤1. 𝑥1 + 𝑤2. 𝑥2 + ⋯ + 𝑤𝑛. 𝑥𝑛 
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(i) Non-negativity: Costs can never be negative. Mathematically, 
 
𝑐(𝑦, 𝑤) > 0 ∀ 𝑦 > 0, 𝑥 > 0                                                                                         (3.2) 
 
(ii) No fixed costs: Zero output is costless11. Mathematically, 
 
𝑐(0, 𝑤) = 0                                                                                                                      (3.3) 
 
(iii) Non-decreasing in w: When input prices are increased, costs do not decrease. 
Mathematically, 
 
𝑖𝑓 𝑤0 ≥ 𝑤1𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑐(𝑦, 𝑤0) ≥ 𝑐(𝑦, 𝑤1)                                                                      (3.4) 
 
(iv) Non-decreasing in y: When outputs are increased, costs do not decrease. 
Mathematically, 
 
𝑖𝑓 𝑦0 ≥ 𝑦1𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑐(𝑦0, 𝑤) ≥ 𝑐(𝑦1, 𝑤)𝑖𝑓 𝑤0 ≥ 𝑤1𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑐(𝑦, 𝑤0) ≥ 𝑐(𝑦, 𝑤1) (3.5) 
 
(v) Positive linear homogeneity: multiplying all input prices by an amount k will 
result in a k-fold increase in costs. Mathematically, 
 
𝑐(𝑦, 𝑘𝑤) = 𝑘𝑐(𝑦, 𝑤) ∀ 𝑘 > 0                                                                                      (3.6) 
 
(vi) Concavity in w: This property is derived directly from the fundamental inequality 
of cost minimisation (Chambers, 1988 pp.53). Mathematically, 
 
𝑐(𝑦, 𝜃𝑤0 + (1 − 𝜃)𝑤1) ≥ 𝜃𝑐(𝑦, 𝑤0) + (1 − 𝜃)𝑐(𝑦, 𝑤1)                                    (3.7) 
 
For a fuller discussion of these properties, and their proofs, the reader is referred to Chambers 
(1988). The fundamental uses for these properties in empirical settings are discussed by 
Coelli et al., 2005 (pp. 24). One important feature is that these properties allow validation of 
                                            
11 In some circumstances, there may be short run costs incurred for zero production, e.g. start-up costs before production begins.  
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econometric cost functions. We make use of the cost function as the basis of assessing 
producer inefficiency. For the purposes of the empirical work in this thesis, it is therefore 
important that the cost function is justifiable on economic grounds.  
 
3.3.2 Economies of Scale and Scope 
Economies of scale properties are often a quantity of interest to both researchers and policy 
makers. Economies of scale properties in production can readily be assessed via the cost 
function. Economies of scale are defined as the proportional change in costs that corresponds 
to a change in the level of output. By taking natural logarithms, proportional changes are 
observed, then scale economies can be assessed by differentiating the cost function with 








                                                                                                                          (3.8) 
Where there are up to n outputs
12
. If 𝑐 > 1, economies of scale exist; 𝑐 = 1 denotes the 
optimal scale of production; 𝑐 < 1 reflects that the firm is operating under diseconomies of 
scale. We make use of this measure in our empirical work in subsequent chapters.  
When n > 1, a further quantity of interest is economies of scope; that is, the extent to which 






] − 1                                                                                                                      (3.9) 
Where S is the global (i.e. across all outputs) economies of scope (for product-specific 
measures refer to Coelli et al. 2005, pp.30). This represents the proportional change in costs if 
all outputs are produced separately. If 𝑆 < 0, then production should be separate; where 
𝑆 > 0, produce jointly. In our empirical chapters, n = 1, we are therefore unable to compute a 




                                            








3.3.3 Additional Features of the Economic Cost Function 
The basic cost function defined above relates firms’ costs of production to levels of output 
and input prices, considered to be exogenous to the firm. That is, the basic cost function takes 
the form, 
𝑐 = 𝑓(𝑦, 𝑤)                                                                                                                                        (3.10) 
Where c are costs, y is (are) output(s) and w are input prices. In reality, there are a number of 
other exogenous characteristics of the production environment in which firms operate. This 
point is of particular relevance in the field of health. It is therefore important to augment the 
basic function with these features.  
The first of these features is time. Incorporating time into the cost function can accommodate 
exogenous shifts in the production environment that firms face over time. Time trends are 
interpreted as technological change (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000); indeed, they are typically 
used to compute total factor productivity (TFP) indexes from econometric efficiency models 
(Coelli et al., 2005). In empirical settings, this can be operationalised in a number of ways, 
for example by inserting a time trend or time period dummy variables into the cost function. 
The cost function then becomes, 
𝑐 = 𝑓(𝑦, 𝑤, 𝑡)                                                                                                                                    (3.11) 
Next, there may be exogenous heterogeneity present in the production environment - that has 
bearing on firms’ costs – that can be captured in the cost function. Empirically, capturing this 
observable heterogeneity is conducted using what are termed environmental variables (Coelli 
et al., 2005).  
To the extent that hospitals offer a range of services and specialisations, it is unlikely that two 
are the same. Indeed, hospitals are commonly in various stages of investment cycles, under 
differing ownership regimes, providing varying levels/types of teaching, and to varying 
extents are part of service networks, inter alia (Mutter et al., 2011). Unless these features are 
controlled for, assigning common cost or production functions is questionable. Some features 
can be readily incorporated into efficiency analysis, ownership status for example (Tiemann 
et al., 2012). For other sources of heterogeneity, data are continually refined and developed 
for various aspects of service heterogeneity in health. For instance, the way in which 
healthcare diagnoses and procedures are coded - by ICD or OPCS coding – are subject to 
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regular updates to reflect developments in practice (WHO, 2004; HSCIC, 2013). These 
should be, where possible, incorporated into the cost function. 
In addition, there is heterogeneity at the patient level. Patient-level heterogeneity is a clear 
issue when characterising cost functions (Iezzoni, 2009). Daidone and Street (2013) used 
patient-level data to control for patient-level heterogeneity in the costs of specialised care in 
the NHS, in part to make judgements on performance.  
However, even in the case that highly granular data are to hand, there are likely many 
differences that remain unobserved, the age of hospital buildings or their physical layout, for 
example. This implies controlling for unobservable heterogeneity is critical. We return to this 
issue in subsection 3.5.4.4. 
The incorporation of environmental variables (observable heterogeneity), denoted z, leads to, 
𝑐 = 𝑓(𝑦, 𝑤, 𝑡, 𝑧)                                                                                                                                (3.12) 
Lastly, it is important to characterise the quality of the services provided in the hospital 
setting (Sloan, 2000). Capturing service quality in health efficiency analyses is a challenging 
task owing to it being unobservable directly and complexity. There are a number of ways to 
proxy its measurement, a number of health studies that have incorporated the measurement of 
quality in their efficiency analyses. We return to discuss this issue in detail in section 4.5. 
Irrespective of the specific measure of quality, the amendment to the general cost function 
yields, 
𝑐 = 𝑓(𝑦, 𝑤, 𝑡, 𝑧, 𝑞)                                                                                                                            (3.13) 
With this, we complete the definition of the economic cost function in hospital markets. It is 
then possible to define and test a cost function empirically as the basis for our analysis of 
efficiency. We return to the specific realisations of these general features both later in this 
chapter, and in our empirical applications.  
Of course, it is necessary to make the link between the definition of the cost function and the 
measurement of efficiency using frontier-based techniques. As a first step in this process, we 
move to the discussion of the econometric cost function, which is the basis of our empirical 
endeavours in later chapters.  
One central issue to highlight in passing is that of unobserved heterogeneity. In the case that 
data for the features of the cost function are lacking, the features are measured imperfectly or 
that the properties of the cost function are breached, there may be inaccuracy in the cost 
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function itself. Thus, when making use of frontier techniques, which are based on distances 
from the cost function, it is of importance to make allowances for any unobserved influences 
on costs. We return to this issue in detail in subsequent sections in this chapter and in 
chapters, 4, 5 and 6.  
 
3.4 The Econometric Cost Function 
In this section, we develop the econometric counterpart to the economic cost function defined 
above. We begin by setting out the cross-sectional (or pooled panel) model. Next, we discuss 
panel models, that is, models based on several cross-sections observed over time. Next, 
functional form is considered. Estimation and testing are discussed throughout. These models 
represent the basis from which our efficiency analysis tools are developed. We therefore 
proceed to develop the efficiency analysis tool – the stochastic frontier model.  
3.4.1 Cross-sectional Econometric Cost Functions 
In cross-sectional settings, firms are observed only once, and observations are assumed to be 
independent. The cross-sectional cost function takes the form, 
𝑐𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑤𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑧𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑞𝑖 + 𝑖                                                                                (3.14) 
Where ci is the cost of firm i and 𝛼0 is a constant term. 𝑦𝑖 is a kx1 vector of outputs for firm i, 
𝑤𝑖, 𝑧𝑖 and 𝑞𝑖 are kx1 vectors of input prices, environmental variables and quality, 
respectively. The 𝛽 terms are parameters to be estimated. 𝑖is the error term (also referred to 
as the residual or the disturbance) which captures any variation in costs that are not captured 
by the regressors (Gujarati, 2003). 
The betas are the first derivative of cost with respect to each variable, so, for example in the 
case of output, 
𝜕𝑐
𝜕𝑦
= 𝛽1. This allows the researcher to, ceteris paribus, estimate the 
relationship of cost and each variable.  
The model is assumed to embody Gaussian assumptions (for detail, see Gujarati, 2003 pp.66-
76). Estimation proceeds typically via Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). 
 
3.4.2 Econometric Cost Functions with Panel Data 
We now consider the case where the cross-section of firms is observed repeatedly over 
several time periods. When such data exists, it is termed panel data. One way in which to 
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proceed is to ignore the structure of the data, assuming the observations are independent. This 
is called pooling, and the treatment is as section 3.4.1 above. However, there are many 
advantages to using panel data that are of use in our empirical work. First, there is likely to be 
information about firms held in the structure of the data, which can be exploited. Specifically, 
repeated observations of the firm mean that a firm-specific effect can be observed. Second, 
panel data are more informative: there is more variability in the data, a greater number of 
degrees of freedom and parameter estimates are more efficient from panel data models.  
Importantly, collinearity is less of an issue than in the cross sectional equivalent models. 
Third, the dynamics of data can be studied using panel data. Lastly, issues around 
aggregation across firms may be reduced with panel data. See Baltagi (2008) for details.  
The panel data cost function is, with the reintroduction of time into the cost function, of the 
general form, 
𝑐𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑤𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑧𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑞𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡                                                            (3.15) 
Where 𝑐𝑖𝑡 are the costs of the i
th
 firm in time period t. 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is a kx1 vector of outputs for firm i 
in time period, t; 𝑤𝑖𝑡, 𝑧𝑖𝑡 and 𝑞𝑖𝑡 are kx1 vectors of input prices, environmental variables and 
quality, respectively. The 𝛽terms are parameters to be estimated. 𝑖𝑡 is the residual. 𝛼𝑖 is the 
firm effect, that is, the capture of all factors that are unobserved, firm-specific and time-
invariant. 
Estimating the model can be done in two ways, namely fixed or random effects. For fixed 
effects, the 𝛼𝑖 are fixed parameters - simply firm dummy variables; estimation proceeds via 
Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) regression with the constant term removed. In this 
setting, any correlation between the regressors and firm effects is captured in the effect. 
Estimates of beta are within (group) estimates and are unbiased.  
For random effects, estimation proceeds via either Generalised Least Squares (GLS) or 
maximum likelihood (ML). In this setting, the firm effects are assumed uncorrelated with the 
regressors; this can be duly tested. Estimates of beta are thus within and between (group) and 
are (potentially) biased, if there is correlation between regressors and firm effects. 
Advantages of the random effects approach is that the beta estimates are, relative to the fixed 
effects, efficient. In addition, the random effects model can incorporate time-invariant 
variables, which is not possible for fixed effects estimation. 
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The choice between fixed and random effects can be made in a number of ways. The 
researcher may have their own preference depending on their own circumstances. For 
example, if there are important binary variables, then a random effects approach is preferable 
because the fixed effects approach cannot accommodate these variables. Statistically, a 
Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) based on the strength of the correlation between the firm 
effects and the regressors, can indicate whether fixed or random effects are preferred. 
However, this should only be an indicator; there should not be an overreliance placed on this 
test (Baltagi, 2008). An alternative approach is the Wu test proposed by Greene (2012b) 
which makes use of group mean variables. In a similar spirit, it is possible to retrieve within 
beta estimates in random effects estimation using group mean variables, which capture the 
correlation between the regressors and the firm effects (cf. Mundlak, 1987; Baltagi, 2006). 
This allows estimation of unbiased and consistent beta parameters. However, this is at the 
expense of degrees of freedom, and so the approach may be of limited use in smaller samples.  
 
3.4.3 Data Transformation and Functional Form 
In preceding sections, the variables are in their raw form. In empirical settings, researchers 
typically use transformations of the data when estimating models. This is for a number of 
economic and technical reasons. We begin with the commonly used Cobb-Douglas functional 
form (Nerlove, 1963). 
A Cobb-Douglas cost function, which is said to be the dual
13
 of the Cobb-Douglas production 
function, is imposed by taking the natural logarithms of the dependent and independent 
variables, such that, in the case of the (cross-sectional) cost function, 
ln (𝑐) = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑛ln (𝑥𝑛)
𝑁
𝑛=1
+                                                                                                       (3.16) 
Where 𝑥𝑛 = (𝑦, 𝑤, 𝑧, 𝑞). The Cobb-Douglas functional form has a number of appealing 
features. First, it imposes concavity (and thus is in agreement with property (vi) section 3.3.1) 
of the economic cost function. Second, it implies that (as per its name), the estimates of beta 
can be directly interpreted as cost elasticities. Third, it allays (to some extent) 
heteroscedasticity concerns (Jacobs et al., 2006), which is in keeping with the Gaussian 
assumptions of the econometric model.  
                                            
13 That is, from the cost function, it is possible to work back to the production function via the transformation function, and vice versa (see 
Coelli et al., 2005, chapter 2). 
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Next, another commonly used functional form, is the transcendental logarithmic or translog 
(Christensen and Greene, 1976). A translog is a generalisation of the Cobb-Douglas, with the 
addition of squared and interaction terms for all variables. Thus for n variables, there are 
approximately 𝑛(𝑛 + 1)/2 parameters. The translog takes the form, 











+                                              (3.17) 
Where 𝑥𝑛 = (𝑦, 𝑤, 𝑧, 𝑞) and ln (𝑥𝑛)ln (𝑥𝑚) denotes interactions between variables. A translog 
has some appealing empirical and economic features: its flexible nature means it provides a 
second-order differential approximation to any unknown function 𝑓(. ) (Kumbhakar and 
Hjalmarsson, 1995); it does not impose restrictions on substitution possibilities; and allows 
economies of scale to vary with output levels. This is likely to provide a better empirical 
approximation of the unknown cost function than the Cobb-Douglas. The price is the addition 
of variables, which may affect the precision of estimates.  The translog has the useful feature 
that it is possible to mean-scale the regressors in order to interpret the first order terms as 
elasticities. See Appendix A for derivation of this result. 
For a complete approximation of an unknown function, the Fourier functional form has been 
proposed (Gallant, 1981). The Fourier cost function comprises squared terms and linear 
combinations of the sine and cosine of the variables, thus, 











+ ∑[𝛽𝑚 cos(ln(𝑥𝑛)) + 𝛽𝑝sin (ln(𝑥𝑛))] +
𝑁
𝑛=1
                                                (3.18) 
Where 𝑥𝑛 = (𝑦, 𝑤, 𝑧, 𝑞). Calculus shows that a Fourier series can exactly represent any 
underlying function, 𝑓(. ) (Mitchell & Onvural, 1996). To achieve its exact representation, 
the addition of (potentially infinite) higher order sine and cosine terms are required. Thus 
estimation may problematic in small samples (Mitchell & Onvural, 1996). Therefore, a trade-
off may be required between the number of parameters and the desired fit.  
As shown above, the Fourier form nests the translog. The Fourier form – an exact 
representation of 𝑓(. ) - may be preferable to the translog, which is an approximation. Indeed, 
a translog may have difficulty capturing the true underlying cost function when the size of 
firms varies significantly (Feng & Serletis, 2009). The translog, in turn, nests the Cobb-
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Douglas, which again is more restrictive. Therefore, using this sequence of functional forms, 
the researcher is equipped with the full range of flexibility when seeking to characterise the 
underlying cost function. Given that these forms are nested, it is readily possible to test down 
to arrive at a preferred specification. In empirical applications, the Fourier functional form is 
not widely used; the translog is used most often. 
Other common functional forms include the linear, quadratic, normalised quadratic and the 
generalised Leontief (Coelli et al., 2005 pp. 211).  
In passing, we note some alternative methods for transforming variables, including the Box-
Cox (of which a special case is the Cobb-Douglas as being a logarithmic transform) and the 
Inverse Hyperbolic Sine transformation (Burbidge et al., 1988). However, we do not make 
use of these in this thesis, in keeping with the wider literature in making use of the translog.  
Finally, we discuss the imposition of positive linear homogeneity in the cost function 
(assumption (v) section 3.3.1). Consider a cross-sectional, Cobb-Douglas cost function with a 
single output and two input prices variables, 
ln (𝑐𝑖) = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1ln (𝑦𝑖) + 𝛽2ln (𝑤𝑙𝑖) + 𝛽3ln (𝑤𝑘𝑖) + 𝑖                                                          (3.19) 
Here, 𝑤𝑙𝑖 are labour input prices and  𝑤𝑘𝑖are capital input prices. For linear homogeneity of 
degree one in input prices, we require ∑ 𝛽𝑤 =𝑤 𝛽2 + 𝛽3 = 114. Imposing this is possible in 
two ways. First, the restriction can be imposed for estimation (this is done straightforwardly 
in any modern software package). Alternatively, it is possible to normalise costs and input 
prices variables by one of the input price variables and substitute in terms (see Kumbhakar et 
al., 2015, pp103-104 for derivation). The choice of input price with which to normalise is 




) = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1ln (𝑦𝑖) + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛 (
 𝑤𝑙𝑖
𝑤𝑘𝑖
) + 𝑖                                                                          (3.20) 
 
3.4.4 Summary: Cost Functions 
In sections 3.3 and 3.4, we have defined and described the cost function, both in terms of its 
economic features and its econometric representation and estimation. As noted, the cost 
function is the tool from which our efficiency analysis is derived. Further, we make use of 
features of the cost function in our empirical work, underlining the importance of its 
                                            
14 Which is extended to include ∑ 𝛽𝑤𝑘 = 0 ∀ 𝑘𝑤  and ∑ 𝛽𝑤𝑦 = 0 ∀ 𝑦𝑤  in the translog setting. k are other input prices; y are outputs. 
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exposition. Specifically, we look to validate our empirical models by testing correspondence 
with the economic properties of cost functions. Next, we make use of the ability to measure 
both scale properties and technical change in our empirical application. We make use of and 
test a number of functional forms, as detailed here.  
 
3.5 The Stochastic Frontier Model 
We have introduced the concept of efficiency, argued in favour of frontier approaches for 
measuring efficiency and presented the cost function, both economically and 
econometrically. We now move to the final methodological stage, which is to define our 
efficiency measurement method of choice: the stochastic frontier (SF).  
We present the model conceptually and go on to justify its use over mathematical 
programming alternatives. We then present the stochastic frontier in its simplest form, the 
model’s assumptions and estimation. In the next subsection we discuss the retrieval of firm-
specific inefficiency predictions. Next, we consider extensions of the SF for panel data and 
additional features for capturing efficiency change over time and unobserved heterogeneity. 
Finally, we consider SF models for inefficiency measurement at vertically separate 
organisational levels.  
In the section that follows, we round off the methodological discussion with an overview of 
the features defined in this section and introduce the concept of Total Factor Productivity. We 
demonstrate how to measure the change in Total Factor Productivity based on cost frontiers. 
This is important insofar as it allows an overall account of performance in the sample; we go 
on to estimate such a quantity in chapter 5 of this thesis. 
The SF model, in essence, uses the cost function as the efficiency frontier faced by firms in 
the market. The frontier assumes the shape of the cost function. The frontier represents, in the 
case of the cost frontier, the minimum attainable cost for a firm, given its levels of outputs 
and input prices (and other features defined by the cost function, see section 3.3.3). 
Deviations of firms from the frontier are considered to be, in part, due to inefficiency. The 
distance to the frontier represents the magnitude of the inefficiency. In addition, the SF model 
allows for the removal of random statistical noise in the data from inefficiency estimates
15
.  
                                            
15 It is from this feature that the model derives its name; without the treatment of noise, the frontier is deterministic 
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Random noise can encompass a number of features. Typically, researchers suggest the noise 
comprises random shocks to production, including untoward events such as strikes, unusual 
weather, force majeure, etc. In addition, this component can account for measurement error 
and approximation error (from the choice of functional form) (Coelli et al., 2005). The 
defining feature of the SF model is its ability to remove these factors so that they do not 
distort the underlying metric of interest – inefficiency. We discuss how this is achieved in 
following subsections.  
Then, the overall observed deviation from the frontier is considered to comprise both 
inefficiency and random shocks to firms’ production that impinge on their costs. Figure 3.2 
shows the conceptual features of the SF model. 
 
 
Figure 3.2: The Stochastic Cost Frontier Model 
Fig 3.2 shows the basic features of the SF model. The gradient of the frontier is defined 
according to the cost function and is the deterministic element of the model. In this case, 
costs, 𝑐, are defined as a function of outputs, 𝑦 (i.e. 𝑐 = 𝛼0 + 𝑦′𝛽).  
We consider observation A, representing firm A. Here, as shown, firm A has output, 𝑦𝐴, at 
which the conditional costs for firm A – shown via the cost frontier - are 𝑐𝐴 = 𝛼0 + 𝑦𝐴
′ 𝛽. The 
observed value is in fact point A, which is higher than the expected (conditional) costs for 
firm A, given its level of output. Then, the firm-specific observed deviation, 𝐴, comprises 
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both the firm’s inefficiency, 𝑢𝐴, and random statistical noise, 𝑣𝐴. In this case, both noise and 
inefficiency have a positive influence on costs. 
In some cases, firms are observed as below the deterministic frontier, as in observation B 
where the observed deviation from the frontier, 𝐵, is negative. This is the result of a noise 
component, 𝑣𝐵, which is negative and greater than the firm’s (positive) inefficiency, 𝑢𝐵. 
Here, firm B has output, 𝑦𝐵, at which the cost frontier is 𝑐𝐵 = 𝛼0 + 𝑦𝐵
′ 𝛽.  
We discuss our preference for the stochastic frontier model next, before considering the 
econometric estimation of the SF model.  
 
3.5.1 Stochastic Frontier Analysis versus Data Envelopment Analysis 
It would be possible to measure efficiency using data envelopment analysis (DEA), an 
approach to efficiency measurement based on mathematical programming
16
. Here, the 
frontier is a perimeter around the extreme points of the data (the minimum in the case of a 
cost frontier); measures of inefficiency are based on distances to this frontier. This is shown 
in figure 3.3 below. 
 
Figure 3.3: Data Envelopment Analysis 
                                            
16 See Fried et al. (2008) for methods and applications of DEA 
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We make use of SF models exclusively - we do not make use of DEA in this thesis. The SF 
approach is preferred for a number of reasons, which can be broadly categorised as 
methodological, cost function-based advantages and the incorporation of uncertainty. 
Methodological issues include, firstly, that the residual is composed in DEA measures – there 
is no distillation of noise from the measure of inefficiency (fig. 3.3). This means that the 
inefficiency measure is necessarily biased by noise, unless noise is assumed away. This may 
distort the expected duality between costs and production functions (Greene, 2008). 
Importantly, total inefficiency is overestimated, which is undesirable in the policy context. Of 
course, in the SF world, an assumption must be made around the distribution of inefficiency 
to allow estimation, which some have argued is arbitrary (Newhouse, 1994). However, there 
is evidence to suggest that efficiency predictions and corresponding ranks are correlated 
between distributional assumptions, both in the general setting (Coelli et al., 2005) and 
specifically in the NHS context (Jacobs et al., 2006, pp. 68). Moreover, in some cases, 
distributional assumptions are preferable to distribution-free approaches based on panel data 
(Kim and Schmidt, 2000).   
Next, that the DEA frontier is constructed on the extreme data points in the sample implies 
that inefficiency estimates are susceptible to extreme outliers, meaning that, again, overall 
inefficiency is overestimated. Further, the method is unable to account for measurement error 
and approximation error. This may introduce bias, both positively and negatively, which is 
unwanted.  
DEA measures do not have the advantage of being able to analyse features of the cost 
function which is possible with SFs. Specifically, cost efficiency cannot be delineated into its 
technical efficiency and allocatively efficiency components, which is possible in the SF 
framework. Next, although it is possible to observe scale changes, it is not possible to 
examine scale properties in the depth that can be achieved in the SF model. Using a translog 
functional form, for example, allows the researcher insights into the economies of scale 
properties across the output range. This is not possible in the DEA framework. Further, the 
incorporation of other variables into the cost frontier allows for the measurement of the effect 
of certain features on costs, which is likely of high value to policy makers. For example, 
estimating the marginal cost of quality, or, as we do in our empirical work, estimating the 
effect on costs of providing teaching is key information sought by policy makers. A further 
advantage is that it is possible to check that the coefficients correspond to the economic 
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reality, or not as the case may be. This is helpful when looking to validate the model. This is 
not possible with DEA. 
Lastly, the estimated cost function can be used for predictions, which can be useful in a 
number of ways. For example, in our empirical work in chapter 5, we are able to make 
predictions based on the estimated parameters of the cost function to simulate the effect on 
costs of organisational units merging. This was useful for policy makers who observed a 
trend of mergers, but lacked data, and thus evidence, on the effect on costs. Again, this would 
not be possible using DEA. 
Lastly, the DEA framework does not allow the incorporation of uncertainty into the analysis 
in the same way that the SF framework does. Firstly, uncertainty can be reflected in 
confidence intervals around parameter estimates of cost function variables; and prediction 
intervals around point estimates of inefficiency (intervals are not confidence intervals for 
inefficiency predictions - this is an important distinction, see Wheat et al., 2014). There are 
bootstrapping techniques available for confidence intervals around DEA estimates to reflect 
the sampling uncertainty (Simar and Wilson, 2000). There are further methods to use a DEA 
approach and separate efficiency and noise, the Stochastic Non-smoothed Envelopment of 
Data (STONED) method (Kuosmanen and Kortelainen, 2012). However, these approaches do 
not allow the wealth of advantages relative to an econometric approach.  
In addition, that SF modelling is based on econometrics means that there is a wealth of 
testing available for sensitivity in a number of forms (model specification, functional form, 
etc.), which there is not for DEA being based on mathematical programming.   
Therefore, for these three general categories of reasons, we adopt an econometric approach in 
favour of a mathematical programming approach. 
 
3.5.2 Cross-Sectional Stochastic Frontiers 
We begin the discussion with the simplest form of econometric efficiency analysis: Corrected 
Ordinary Least Squares (COLS). This model makes use is the econometric cost function, 
equation (3.14), and subtracts the minimum error from each observed residual. This, in effect, 
shifts the cost function to the minimum observation in the sample. The measure of 
inefficiency is then the distance of each observation from the frontier. Thus, 
?̂?𝑖 = 𝑖 − min
𝑖
{ 𝑖}                                                                                                                            (3.21) 
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This model is not strictly a stochastic frontier, given that there is no decomposition of noise 
and inefficiency; COLS is, in essence, the econometric equivalent of DEA. The practical 
appeal of COLS is its simplicity – it can be run via OLS, and does not impose the 
distributional assumptions of the stochastic frontier model. Accordingly, it is typically used in 
settings where the stochastic frontier model is unidentified
17
. Technically, COLS allows the 
possibility of fully efficient firms, which is not the case in the stochastic frontier model, to 
which we now turn.  
 
The stochastic frontier was proposed simultaneously by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen 
and van den Broeck (1977). It takes the form (a Cobb-Douglas functional form is assumed), 
ln (𝑐𝑖) = 𝛼0 + ln (𝑥𝑖)
′𝛽 + 𝑖                                                                                                            (3.22) 
𝑖 = 𝑢𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖                                                                                                                                        (3.23) 
Where 𝑐𝑖are the costs of firm i, 𝛼0 is a constant term, 𝑥 is a vector of cost function variables, 
𝑥 = (𝑦, 𝑤, 𝑧, 𝑞), and 𝛽 are corresponding parameters to be estimated. The observed error, 𝑖, 
comprises both random noise, 𝑣𝑖, and the metric of interest, the firm-specific inefficiency, 𝑢𝑖 
as per eqn. (3.22).  
The model is based on a number of assumptions. First, the two components of the error term 
are assumed orthogonal to each other and to the regressors. In addition, there a number of 
assumptions made about the noise and inefficiency components. Noise is assumed to have 
zero mean, to be homoscedastic and uncorrelated,  
𝐸(𝑣𝑖) = 0                                                                                                                                           (3.24) 
𝐸(𝑣𝑖
2) = 𝜎𝑣
2                                                                                                                                        (3.25) 
𝐸(𝑣𝑖𝑣𝑗) = 0 ∀ 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗                                                                                                                         (3.26) 
The inefficiency component is assumed homoscedastic and uncorrelated, 
𝐸(𝑢𝑖
2) = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡                                                                                                                           (3.27) 
𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑢𝑗) = 0 ∀ 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗                                                                                                                        (3.28) 
The inefficiency component is not assumed to have zero mean since some inefficiency is 
assumed.  
                                            
17 This is often the case in regulatory settings where the sample size is small; see chapter 4.5 
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These assumptions are problematic for estimation by OLS. Parameters can be estimated 
consistently, however, the inefficiency causes upward bias to the intercept, meaning that via 
OLS it is not possible to estimate cost efficiency. However, by making suitable distributional 
assumptions regarding both components of the error term, it is possible to estimate the model 
via maximum likelihood. Therefore, the following assumptions are made, 
𝑣𝑖~𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣
2)                                                                                                                               (3.29) 
𝑢𝑖~𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑁
+(0, 𝜎𝑢
2)                                                                                                                            (3.30) 
With these at hand, Aigner et al. (1977) proposed the log likelihood function for a production 
frontier, which can readily be adapted for a cost frontier, 
















𝑖=1                                          (3.31) 
Where c are costs, I is the number of observations, 𝜎2 = 𝜎𝑢
2 + 𝜎𝑣
2 and 𝜆2 = 𝜎𝑢
2 𝜎𝑣
2⁄ . When 
𝜆2 = 0, the variance is due solely to random noise – there is no inefficiency18. The 
disturbance is defined as 𝑖 = 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 = 𝑐 − 𝛼0 − 𝑥′𝛽. Finally, Φ(𝑥) is the cumulative 
distribution function (CDF) of the standard normal variable evaluated at x.  
Estimation of the parameters cannot be achieved analytically since the first derivatives are 
highly non-linear, meaning that they have no analytical solution. Instead, an iterative 
maximisation procedure can be conducted, by using some starting values (say those derived 
from OLS) and altering their magnitude to maximise the likelihood function. See Greene 
(2012c) for maximum likelihood estimation techniques. 
It is possible to use alternative assumptions of the distribution of inefficiency. Alternative 
distributions include exponential and gamma (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). Using different 
distributional assumptions will have bearing on the predictions of inefficiency. Given that the 
choice is somewhat arbitrary, this poses issues for the validity of estimates. Helpfully, 
estimates and their rankings are often robust to the assumptions imposed (Coelli et al., 2005; 
Jacobs et al., 2006). However, independent of the choice of distribution, all firms are, by 
construction, to some degree inefficient
19
.  
Truncation can be introduced to allow for the centre of probability mass to leave zero. This 
parameter can be tested. The Rayleigh distribution allows for similar flexibility without the 
                                            
18 A test on this parameter has been suggested as a test for the presence of inefficiency, however, researchers typically use a likelihood ratio 
based test of the SF model versus ordinary least squares (Coelli et al., 2005 pp. 258). 
19 This is due to the fact that the probability of drawing any value from the distribution exactly is zero, so although zero is a possible value, 
the probability that zero is drawn from the distribution is exactly zero (Rho and Schmidt, 2015). Recent models have been developed to 
overcome this issue (Kumbhakar et al., 2013; Rho and Schmidt, 2015) 
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need to estimate an additional parameter (Hajargasht, 2014).  It is further possible to 
introduce variables into the mean and variance of the inefficiency. This allows insights into 
factors which affect inefficiency. However, there is little consensus as to whether variables 
should be included in the cost function or in the mean of the inefficiency (Kumbhakar and 
Lovell, 2000). It is possible to introduce the variables in both parts of the model, however, 
this may induce endogeneity, which is known to distort inefficiency estimates in SF models 
(Mutter et al., 2013).  
 
3.5.3 The Retrieval of Firm-Specific Inefficiency Predictions 
The estimate of cost efficiency from the SF model above is,   
𝐶?̂?𝑖 = exp (−?̂?𝑖)                                                                                                                               (3.32) 
Where 𝐶?̂?𝑖 is the estimate of firm i’s cost efficiency and ?̂?𝑖 is the component of inefficiency 
in the SF model. This is not observed directly. The SF model yields residuals, ?̂?, which are a 
composition of both statistical noise and inefficiency. Having estimated the model, therefore, 
an additional stage is required to compute the firm-specific inefficiency predictions.  
By using the assumptions about the distributions of both noise and inefficiency, it is possible 
to derive the joint density of the composed error term (see Kumbhakar et al., 2015 pp. 319-
322 for the derivation). From this, the conditional mean (or mode) can be taken as the point 
estimate of inefficiency, 𝑢𝑖. This work was pioneered by Jondrow et al. (1982). For the case 







𝜙( 𝑖𝜆 𝜎⁄ )




]                                                                                  (3.33) 
Where 𝜎, 𝜆 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖 are as before. Equally, Φ(𝑥) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) 
of the standard normal variable evaluated at x; 𝜙(𝑥) is the corresponding probability density 
function (PDF). 𝑢𝑖 is the inefficiency component of the model which can be used to compute 
the prediction of firm cost efficiency, as above.  
Once firm-specific predictions are obtained, the level of efficiency across the sample can be 
computed by extension, 





                                                                                                                                 (3.34) 
                                            
20 Alternatively, the minimum squared error predictor can be used to derive point estimates (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 200 pp. 104) 
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Where 𝐶𝐸̅̅ ̅̅  is the market (sample) average cost efficiency and 𝐶?̂?𝑖 are firm-specific cost 
efficiencies.  
3.5.4 Stochastic Frontier Models for Panel Data 
The stochastic frontier model can be extended when panel data are available. Panel data sets 
are often much larger than their cross-sectional counterparts, allowing greater precision of the 
estimated model parameters. In addition, the richer information that can be derived from 
panel data models can be exploited in measuring firm inefficiency. Panel data models also 
allow characterisation of three conceptual features, namely temporal efficiency change, 
unobserved heterogeneity and multi-level organisational structures. We focus on these three 
aspects of SF models because they feature in our empirical work. They do so because these 
issues are of particular relevance in health markets and specifically in the NHS. We discuss 
these in turn. First, we present the general form of the panel data stochastic frontier, 
ln(𝑐𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼0 + ln(𝑥𝑖𝑡)
′ 𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡                                                                                             (3.35) 
Where 𝑐𝑖𝑡are the costs of firm i in time period t and 𝑥𝑖𝑡 are cost function variables. 𝛼0 is the 
intercept and 𝛽 is a vector of parameters to be estimated. 𝑢𝑖 is the inefficiency of firm i which 
is time-invariant; and is 𝑢𝑖𝑡 when inefficiency varies over time. 𝑣𝑖𝑡 is random statistical noise.   
Estimation proceeds in a variety of ways, depending on the model’s features and 
specification. Greene (2012b) provides technical details for the estimation of all models 
detailed below.  
 
3.5.4.1 Stochastic Frontier Models for Panel Data: Time-Invariant Inefficiency 
Perhaps the simplest of the panel data stochastic frontiers are those that consider the firm-
specific effect in panel data models as the firm’s inefficiency (that is, the 𝛼𝑖s in section 
3.4.2). These models include a fixed effects model based on LSDV (Schmidt and Sickles, 
1984) and random effects model based on GLS (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000) formulations. 
The following transformation is made on the firm effect to derive the measure of inefficiency, 
?̂?𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 − min
𝑖
{𝛼𝑖}                                                                                                                           (3.36) 
The advantage of the fixed effects formulation is that it does not impose the distributional 
assumptions of SFs more widely. The drawback of this approach is that the effect captures all 
firm-specific, time-invariant effects on costs which, although likely include inefficiency, may 
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also include a number of other features – anything that is not captured by the regressors. 
Further, this method neglects any variation in inefficiency over time.  
In the random effects setting, the firm effects are assumed uncorrelated with the regressors. 
The central advantages of this approach are that estimation of the firm effects is more 
efficient than its fixed effects equivalent; and it allows for time-invariant regressors, which 
the fixed effects approach does not. Of course, the estimated of beta may be biased if the 
assumption of no correlation with the regressors is breached. As with its fixed effects 
counterpart, this method does not allow for temporal inefficiency change. 
Finally, in the case where distributional assumptions are tenable and when there is little 
concern for correlation between inefficiency and noise, then a time-invariant SF model 
(estimated ML) is available (Pitt and Lee, 1981). The advantage is that in general, this 
method is more efficient than its alternatives, since it exploits the distributional information. 
The drawback is that assumptions need to be imposed for estimation. The equivalent to the 
Jondrow et al. (1982) prediction of firm inefficiency is, 
𝐸[𝑢𝑖| 𝑖,𝑡=1, 𝑖,𝑡=2, … , 𝑖,𝑡=𝑛]
= (1 − 𝛾𝑖). (− ?̅?)
+ 𝜎𝑢
2𝛾𝑖 [𝜙
(1 − 𝛾𝑖). (− ?̅?)
𝜎𝑢2𝛾𝑖
Φ
(1 − 𝛾𝑖). (− ?̅?)
𝜎𝑢2𝛾𝑖
⁄ ]                                                                         (3.37) 
Where 𝜎, 𝜆, 𝑖𝑡, 𝜙 𝑎𝑛𝑑 Φ are as per section 3.5.3. In addition,  𝛾𝑖 =
1
1+𝜆2𝑇𝑖







Empirical evidence suggests that, in general these three approaches produce similar results in 
terms of rank correlation (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 200 pp. 106-107 for discussion of studies 
which make comparisons). However, there is Monte Carlo evidence to suggest that, in cases 
where the technology that firms face is complex, the performance of these models 
deteriorates (Gong and Sickles, 1989). This point is particularly relevant in health markets 
which are characterised by vast heterogeneity. Therefore, we pay attention to this issue in our 
empirical work. 
This general class of models is appropriate for short panels (that is, panels where the number 
of time periods is limited). As the length of the panel increases, the assumption of constant 
inefficiency becomes less plausible. Schmidt and Sickles (1984) suggest these models are 




3.5.4.2 Stochastic Frontier Models for Panel Data: Time-Varying Inefficiency 
The general panel data stochastic frontier with time varying inefficiency is, 
ln(𝑐𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼0 + ln(𝑥𝑖𝑡)
′ 𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡                                                                                          (3.38) 
There are broadly two approaches to modelling the temporal evolution of firm inefficiency. 
These are, firstly, those that estimate a time-invariant component and apply to it a parameter 
estimated from changes over time. These models specify a deterministic relationship between 
time and inefficiency, indeed they have been termed time-dependent rather than time-varying 
(Greene, 2012b). These include the models of Kumbhakar (1990), Cornwell et al. (1990) and 
Battese and Coelli (1992) (amongst others, see Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000 pp. 108-115 for 
details). The Battese and Coelli (1992) model specifies, 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝑢𝑖 . exp {−𝜂(𝑡 − 𝑇)}                                                                                                               (3.39) 
Where 𝑢𝑖 is the time-invariant, firm-specific inefficiency
21
, t is the time period, T is the final 
year in the data and 𝜂 is a parameter estimated from the data. Here, the sign on 𝜂 determines 
whether firms are becoming more or less inefficient over time. Whether firms’ inefficiency 
changes at all over time can be tested readily via a t-test on 𝜂22. Where 𝜂 = 0, the model 
reduces to that of Pitt and Lee (1981). This model is referred to as BC92 hereafter. 
This model has the advantage of being estimable by maximum likelihood, which is generally 
more efficiency that LSDV or GLS (as per alternative models such as Cornwell et al. (1990)) 
and has relatively few parameters relative to its alternatives. 
In some cases, this formulation results in ‘drop-off’, which is when firms’ inefficiency in 
some cases curiously drops off the frontier in their final year. The model can be amended to 
correct for this by using an estimated parameter, rather than T (Wheat and Smith, 2012). 
Thus, 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝑢𝑖 . exp {−𝜂(𝑡 − 𝜉𝑖)}                                                                                                              (3.34) 
                                            
21 As per the Pitt and Lee (1981) formulation from section 3.5.4.1 
22 𝐻0: 𝜂 = 0 
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The model can be extended further in two important ways. First, as proposed by Battese and 
Coelli (1992), to allow (and test) for efficiency change to be non-monotonic, it is possible to 
specify a squared term as
23
, 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝑢𝑖 . exp {−𝜂1(𝑡 − 𝑇) + (−)𝜂2(𝑡 − 𝑇)
2}                                                                            (3.41) 
Second, to address that the BC92 model imposes the rather restrictive assumptions that all 
firms’ inefficiencies move in the same direction over time (including, by implication that 
rankings are constant), a generalisation can be made. The BC92 model has been extended by 
introducing individual time trends for each firm (Cuesta, 2000). The model with this feature 
has proved useful in the regulatory setting (Smith, 2012). The model takes the form, 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝑢𝑖 . exp {−𝜂𝑖(𝑡 − 𝑇)}                                                                                                             (3.42) 
Where now there are individual time paths for firm-specific inefficiency, 𝜂𝑖. Of course, this is 
at the cost of having up to i-1 additional parameters to estimate. Each can, accordingly, be 
tested. We utilise this model in our empirical work in subsequent chapters. 
The second approach to capturing changes in inefficiency over time is one in which 
realisations of inefficiency are independent over time. Models in this category include the 
simple pooled panel model, the Battese and Coelli (1995) model for the truncated normal 
panel data SF model and the ‘true’ models proposed by Greene (2005). We present the ‘true’ 
models in subsequent subsections, and so do not present them here for brevity.  
It is thought that the independence of inefficiency over time allows a more realistic reflection 
of firms’ performance than an invariant component with a systematic time trend applied to it. 
This essentially implies that inefficiency in previous time periods has no bearing on 
inefficiency in current periods, which is questionable. Indeed, in regulatory settings, a model 
in which there is no link between firms’ efficiency year-on-year is unattractive. On the other 
hand, whilst a smooth pattern of temporal evolution may be realistic, that same evolution of 
inefficiency over time may neglect any volatility in inefficiency change, which again may be 
questionable. Ultimately, the researcher makes choices as to their preferred assumptions 
about how inefficiency evolves over time. In our empirical work, our solution is to test a 
number of specifications with differing assumptions.  
                                            
23 The non-monotonicity derives from the squared term which allows a point of inflection in the time path of inefficiency. It would be 
possible to add higher order terms to allow more than a single point of inflection. This may be of use when T is large and the direction of 
inefficiency changes multiple times. Higher order terms can readily be tested.   
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Finally, we note that, in contrast to time-invariant inefficiency models that assume away 
time-varying inefficiency, this class of model cannot isolate any firm-specific time-invariant 
inefficiency. We therefore move to models that are able to capture both forms of inefficiency. 
 
3.5.4.3 Stochastic Frontier Models for Panel Data: Short and Long Run Inefficiency 
In both of the preceding approaches, make somewhat restrictive assumptions about the nature 
of inefficiency: either that it is entirely time-invariant or that it is entirely time-varying. Of 
course, in reality, there may be a component of both in the firm’s total inefficiency. Models 
have been developed that allow these assumptions to be relaxed. They do so by allowing 
estimation of both time-invariant and time-varying inefficiency. The time-invariant 
component of inefficiency is referred to as ‘long run inefficiency’ and the time-varying 
inefficiency is known as ‘short run inefficiency’. These models are of the general form, 
ln(𝑐𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼0 + ln(𝑥𝑖𝑡)
′ 𝛽 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡                                                                               (3.43) 
Where 𝛾𝑖represents the firm-specific, time-invariant inefficiency and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is the firm-specific, 
time-varying inefficiency. This model can be estimated in a number of ways. Kumbhakar and 
Hjalmarsson (1995) take a multi-stage approach.  
Despite the conceptual appeal of being able to capture short and long run inefficiency, these 
models, like the Schmidt and Sickles (1984), rely on the regressors to capture all 
heterogeneity. In the case of hospital production, this is highly implausible. Therefore, we 
extend our review of SF models to consider models that seek to capture unobserved 
heterogeneity.  
 
3.5.4.4 Stochastic Frontier Models for Panel Data: Unobserved Heterogeneity 
The conceptual appeal of making an allowance for unobservable heterogeneity is to allay 
concerns about differences in production environments between providers, across a number 
of dimensions, which are not captured by a set of explanatory regressors. Significant 
developments in the recent literature have been made regarding methods to control for 
unobservable heterogeneity.  
In the frontier literature, much attention has been given to this topic, and a number of 
methods have been developed to accommodate unobservable heterogeneity. Approaches 
based on restrictions to the cost or production function have been applied in models across a 
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number of sectors, including health. Simply adding time-invariant dummy variables to 
account for unobserved characteristics is perhaps the simplest approach – in Chapter 5 
(Buckell et al. (2015)) regional dummies are used as one (of a range) control for unobserved 
heterogeneity. In this case, the SF model (3.35) is extended to, 
ln(𝑐𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼0 + ln(𝑥𝑖𝑡)
′ 𝛽 + 𝜓𝑧𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡                                                                               (3.44) 
Where 𝑧𝑖 are time-invariant variables capturing unobserved heterogeneity. This approach 
relies on the there being such variables available and that these variables are appropriate, that 
is, there is economic reasoning for the unobserved heterogeneity being captured in this way. 
A test on 𝜓 can be readily conducted. 
Another approach to capturing unobserved heterogeneity is based on Mundlak (1978) and 
decomposes firm-specific effects using group mean variables. The central assumption in this 
framework is that unobserved heterogeneity is correlated with regressors, which is 
disentangled by the use of the group mean variables. In random effects models, these 
variables are inserted directly into the equation. This method has been applied in health 
markets to nursing homes (Farsi et al., 2005a). The SF model (3.35), if estimated by GLS is 
extended as follows, 
ln(𝑐𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼0 + ln(𝑥𝑖𝑡)
′ 𝛽𝑎 + ln(?̅?𝑖)
′ 𝛽𝑏 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡                                                                  (3.45) 
Where ?̅?𝑖 are group mean variables. This approach can be readily tested via a joint test on the 
group mean parameters, 𝛽𝑏.  
Next, there are a set of models that can account for unobservable heterogeneity making use of 
firm-specific effects. These include, firstly, the “true” models (Greene, 2005). These models 
make the assumption that the firm effect captures the unobserved heterogeneity; inefficiency 
is then captured by applying the standard SF decomposition to the residual. That is, 
unobserved heterogeneity is assumed time-invariant, and inefficiency is assumed to vary over 
time. Thus, if all inefficiency is time-varying (that is, the firm effect is considered to 
comprise unobserved factors only), then these models are able to correctly identify firm 
inefficiency. In cases where there is time-invariant inefficiency, total inefficiency is 
underestimated. These models assume the general form, 
ln(𝑐𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼0 + ln(𝑥𝑖𝑡)
′ 𝛽 + 𝜔𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡                                                                                 (3.46) 
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Where the firm effect, 𝜔𝑖 is considered to be unobserved heterogeneity. These models can be 
based on either fixed effects or random effects. The model in this form has a clear parallel 
with model (3.42). Indeed, the difference here is in the interpretation of the firm effect. 
For fixed effects, the ‘true fixed effects’ (TFE) model is tantamount to the classic panel data 
SF with firm dummies (Greene, 2012b). The model is estimated via maximum likelihood, 
and as such is at risk from the incidental parameters problem, especially when the T, the 
number of periods, is small (Greene, 2012c). Two approaches to deal with this issue have 
been proposed. Firstly, by model transformation, using either within-transformation or first 
differences (Wang and Ho, 2010). Second, an approach based on deviations from the mean 
(Chen et al., 2014). 
For random effects, the ‘true random effects’ (TRE), estimation is slightly more involved 
than its fixed effect namesake. The procedure makes use of maximum simulated likelihood 
(Greene, 2005) and results in the segregation of three model components: time-invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity, time-varying inefficiency and random statistical noise. In addition, 
this model, being based on random effects, has the advantage that it can be augmented with 
Mundlak approach described above, as per (Farsi et al., 2005a; Filippini and Greene, 2015). 
Next are a set of models that are an extension of the ‘true’ models to allow for the separation 
of firm-specific unobserved heterogeneity and time-invariant inefficiency. These have been 
referred to as ‘four component’ or ‘generalised true random effects’ models. These models 
take the general form, 
ln(𝑐𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼0 + ln(𝑥𝑖𝑡)
′ 𝛽 + 𝜔𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡                                                                        (3.47) 
Where the model components are as per previous models, with the additional component, 𝛾𝑖, 
which is the firm-specific, time-invariant inefficiency. 𝜔𝑖 captures unobserved heterogeneity.  
Here, overall cost efficiency is computed as the product of the short and long run 
inefficiencies, such that, 
𝑂𝐶𝐸 = 𝐿𝑅𝐶𝐸 ∗ 𝑆𝑅𝐶𝐸 = exp(−𝛾𝑖) . exp (−𝑢𝑖𝑡)                                                                            (3.48) 
Where OCE is overall cost efficiency, LRCE is long run cost efficiency and SRCE is short 
run cost efficiency. The model can be estimated in a variety of ways, including the multi-
stage residual decomposition approach of Kumbhakar et al. (2014), a single-stage approach 
based on Bayesian estimation (Tsionas and Kumbhakar, 2014) and a single-stage approach 
based on maximum likelihood (Columbi et al., 2014; Filippini and Greene, 2015). As with 
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the true random effects models, this model, being based on random effects, has the advantage 
that it can be augmented with the Mundlak approach described above.  
It is useful to point out that unobserved heterogeneity may arise in a number of forms. Using 
the Kumbhakar et al. (2014) approach is able to disentangle unobserved heterogeneity that is 
uncorrelated with the regressors. Using the Mundlak approach, it is possible to remove 
unobserved heterogeneity that is correlated with the regressors. This means that it is useful to 
combine the two approaches. Indeed, each can be tested separately. This is the approach we 
have adopted in chapter 6, which corresponds to Smith et al. (2015).  
Finally, there are approaches to capturing unobserved heterogeneity through differences in 
the parameters of the cost function variables. These include, firstly, parameter heterogeneity 
by group, or class, known as the latent class stochastic frontier (LCSF) (Orea and 
Kumbhakar, 2004; Besstremyannaya, 2011). Here, it is assumed that the firms are members 
of a finite number of groups, or classes, unobserved to the researcher. Estimation allows these 
groups to be identified, and individual firms assigned to classes. The LCSF is of the general 
form, 
ln(𝑐𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼0 + ln(𝑥𝑖𝑡)
′ 𝛽𝑗 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝑗 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡|𝑗                                                                                     (3.49) 
In this setting, subscripts i and t denote firm and time as before. Subscript j denotes the class. 
Here, j classes have their own group-specific parameter estimates, 𝛽𝑗, and corresponding 
inefficiency and noise terms, 𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝑗 and 𝑣𝑖𝑡|𝑗, respectively. The number of classes is typically 
determined by the fit of the data, but it is possible to specify a predetermined number of 
classes (Greene, 2012b). Assignment of firms to classes is conducted probabilistically post-
estimation. Inefficiency is relative to the group’s own frontier. Estimation proceeds via 
maximum likelihood.  
A related but distinct approach is the random parameters stochastic frontier model (RPSF) 
(Greene, 2005). In this model, heterogeneity is captured by allowing a firm-specific 
parameter to be estimated for each firm. This is, in essence, a fully generalised case of the 
latent class SF (that is, in the case that the number of classes is equal to the number of firms). 
The general form of the RPSF, 
ln(𝑐𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼0 + ln(𝑥𝑖𝑡)
′ 𝛽𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡                                                                                         (3.50) 
Where 𝛽𝑖 reflects the firm-specific estimates of the parameters. Estimation proceeds via 
maximum simulated likelihood.  
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Although these models can incorporate unobserved heterogeneity, they have some 
drawbacks. Firstly, they require large data since there are a large number of parameters to be 
estimated. Indeed, when T is small, especially in the case of the RPSF, estimation may be 
problematic. Second, as with some comparator models, these models are unable to identify 
time-invariant inefficiency. Thirdly, estimation may be prohibitively slow. Here, Halton 
sequences provide a solution to accelerating the estimation (Greene, 2005). These methods 
are not commonly used in empirical applications. 
Before we turn to the estimation of vertically separate inefficiency, we summarise the models 
presented above. Table 3.2 below shows the model features and empirical specifications of 
the models presented above (we suppress the dummy variable and Mundlak approaches for 
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Random Error, εi 𝑖𝑖𝑑(0, 𝜎𝜀
2) 𝑖𝑡 = 𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑡 = 𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑡 = 𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 
𝑖𝑡
= 𝜔𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 
𝑖𝑡
=  𝛾𝑖 + 𝜔𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑣𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑡|𝑗




























2 ) 𝑣𝑖𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣
2) 




?̂?𝑖 − 𝑚𝑖𝑛{?̂?𝑖} 𝐸[𝑢𝑖|𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡] N/A N/A N/A 𝐸[𝛾𝑖| ln(𝑐𝑖𝑡)] N/A N/A 




N/A N/A 𝐸[𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡] 𝐸[𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡] 𝐸[𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝛼𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡] 𝐸[𝑢𝑖𝑡|ln (𝑐𝑖𝑡)] 
𝐸[𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝑗|𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝑗
+ 𝑣𝑖𝑡|𝑗] 𝐸
[𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡] 




𝑢𝑖𝑡 = exp[𝜂(𝑡 − 𝑇)] . 𝑢𝑖 
 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 = exp [𝜂𝑖(𝑡 − 𝑇)]. 𝑢𝑖 
 
𝑢𝑖,𝑡 ⊥ 𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1 ∀ 𝑡 
 
𝑢𝑖,𝑡 ⊥ 𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1 ∀ 𝑡 
 
𝑢𝑖,𝑡 ⊥ 𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1 ∀ 𝑡 
 
𝑢𝑖,𝑡 ⊥ 𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1 ∀ 𝑡 
 
         
Unobserved 
Heterogeneity 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 𝜔𝑖 𝜔𝑖 𝛼0|𝑗 , 𝛽𝑗 𝛼0|𝑖, 𝛽𝑖 
         
Table 3.2: Empirical Specifications and Features of Stochastic Frontier Models. REM – random effects model (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000); P&L – Pitt and Lee (1981); 
BC92 – Battesse and Coelli (1992); CUESTA – Cuesta (2000); TRE – True Random Effects (Greene, 2005); GTRE – Generalised True Random Effects (Filippini and 
Greene, 2015); LCSF – Latent Class SF (Orea and Kumbhakar, 2004); RPSF – Random Parameters SF (Greene, 2005)
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3.5.4.5 Stochastic Frontier Models for Panel Data: Multi-Level Organisational Structures 
Many organisations are typified by hierarchical organisational structures, where upper tier 
entities have some degree of control over entities lower down in the hierarchy. Due to this, it 
may be the case that the upper tier has an effect on the overall inefficiency of the 
organisation. If this issue is overlooked, there may be several implications for analysis of 
inefficiency, for example, that inefficiency beyond the control of lower tier units is 
incorrectly apportioned to them. Worse, there may be distortions to overall estimates. There 
have recently been models developed that are able to incorporate the organisational structure, 
and decompose inefficiency variation vertically.  
There are two basic approaches that have been applied to account for this. We consider the 
cost frontier for the purposes of illustration. The first is the two tier stochastic frontier (2TSF) 
first proposed by Polacheck and Yoon (1987). In this model, the effect on cost at the lower 
tier is, as per standard SF models, considered to be positive. Conversely, the effect at the 
upper tier of the organisation is negative; that is, the upper tier is assumed to be reducing 
inefficiency, rather contributing to it. The second approach is the dual-level stochastic 
frontier (DLSF) proposed by Smith and Wheat (2012). In this model, the effects on costs at 
both organisational levels are positive, that is, both upper and lower tiers are assumed to be 
contributing to the total inefficiency. We make use of the DLSF in our empirical work, we 
therefore present this model.  
The DLSF model is derived from panel data stochastic frontier models, with the exception 
that the structure of the panel is amended from firm and time to firm and sub-company, 
where the sub-company units are repeat observations of their respective firms. In this way, 
the structure of the organisation is embodied in the model. This allows the decomposition of 
inefficiency at the two organisational levels in the hierarchy.  
 
The imposed form of inefficiency is well suited to the multi-level model. As discussed above, 
in traditional panels, having an overall inefficiency comprising a component of upper tier 
inefficiency that is time-invariant and a lower tier component that varies randomly over time 
may not accurately capture the natural temporal evolution of inefficiency. In contrast, 
imposing an upper tier-invariant component and a lower tier-varying component to the 
structure of inefficiency (that allows for independence between observations) befits the aim 
of characterising the organisational structure.  
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The DLSF takes the general form, 
ln(𝑐𝑖𝑠) = 𝛼0 + ln(𝑥𝑖𝑠)
′ 𝛽 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑠 + 𝑣𝑖𝑠                                                                                  (3.51) 
Where 𝑐𝑖𝑠 are the costs of lower tier unit, s, nested within its upper tier unit, i. 𝛾𝑖 is the 
component of upper tier inefficiency and 𝑢𝑖𝑠 is lower tier unit-specific inefficiency. 𝑣𝑖𝑠 is 
random noise, 𝑥𝑖𝑠 are cost function variables and 𝛽 is a vector of parameters to be estimated.  
Estimation can be carried out broadly in two ways. The first follows the multi-stage approach 
of Kumbhakar and Hjalmarsson (1995). Here, the first stage is an upper tier-stratified within 
or GLS regression (depending on fixed or random effects, respectively), followed by a 
second stage stochastic frontier applied to the residuals, stratified by the lower tier, once 
purged of the upper tier effect.  
The second approach is based of the ‘true’ formulations of Greene (2005), though our 
interpretation of this effect is upper tier inefficiency, rather than unobserved heterogeneity. 
For a true fixed effects approach, required is the insertion of upper tier dummies directly into 
the lower tier-stratified stochastic frontier. This has the clear advantage of being a single 
stage procedure. Potential drawbacks include that it may be difficult to identify upper tier-
specific effect (if the dummy variables are not significant) and, as with all true fixed effects 
models, may suffer from the incidental parameters problem. There have been solutions found 
to this problem in standard models, see subsection 3.5.3.4. 
The true random effects formulation is available as an alternative and a feasible single-stage 
approach. Its disadvantage is that it may be difficult to estimate in small samples, which has 
been found in the literature (Farsi et al., 2007).  
Once predictions of inefficiency at two vertically distinct levels are retrieved, it is necessary 
to compute and overall measure, as below, 







                                                                                                                      (3.52) 
Where ?̅?𝑖 is the measure of overall inefficiency across unit i. This is the sum of the upper tier-
specific inefficiency and the cost weighted lower tier-specific inefficiencies (Smith and 
Wheat, 2012).  
This model has significant potential in health markets where organisations often have some 
hierarchical structure. However, the model in this form is of limited use due to the issue of 
unobserved heterogeneity. Smith and Wheat (2012) assume the unobserved heterogeneity 
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away, which is untenable in health markets. Therefore, in the empirical work, we extend this 
model in a number of ways to account not only for unobserved heterogeneity, but to allow for 
it to enter the model in a number of forms. We apply a suitable testing procedure to identify 
the presence and/or form of the unobserved heterogeneity. For details, see chapter 6. 
 
3.5.5 Summary: Stochastic Frontier Models 
In seeking to measure inefficiency in NHS hospitals, we have chosen to use the stochastic 
frontier model. We have presented a number of stochastic frontier models which are able to 
reflect a number of features. The literature on stochastic frontiers is vast, we could not hope 
to provide a complete coverage. For this, the reader is referred to Kumbhakar and Lovell 
(2000), Greene (2012b) and Parmeter and Kumbhakar (2014). In light of this, we have 
focussed our discussion methods to capture three important issues that relate to health 
markets. These are the temporal variation of inefficiency, unobserved heterogeneity and 
multi-level organisational structures. These features form the basis of the empirical work in 
this thesis and, therefore, the contribution of this thesis. In subsequent chapters, we discuss 
why these features in particular are of relevance. Before doing so, we round off our 
methodological discussion by combining elements from the preceding discussion into an 
overall measure of performance: total factor productivity. We then complete this chapter with 
an overall view of efficiency measurement in health with a particular focus on the NHS.  
 
3.6 Total Factor Productivity 
We noted in section 2.7 that productivity comprises several separate features. We have shown 
that it is possible, using the cost function (or derivatives of cost functions, notably the 
stochastic frontier), to measure these features, namely economies of scale, technical change 
and inefficiency. Whilst these are individually doubtless important to policy makers, it may 
be of use to take an overall account of performance over time, by combining these features. 
This is achieved by making use of productivity, or its full economic title, Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP) (or Multi-Factor Productivity (MFP), in the absence of a full set of 
components). Moreover, given the overarching goal of cost reduction, savings in scale and 
through technical change may be as important as efficiency.  
It is possible to observe Total Factor Productivity change, between subsequent years, defined 
by Coelli et al. (2005) pp. 300-306, 
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𝑇𝐹𝑃 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 = 𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 ×  𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 × 𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒                (3.53) 
These concepts are demonstrated below in figure 3.4, with the concepts drawn from prior 
subsections. 
 
Figure 3.4: Total Factor Productivity Concepts 
Technical change: technical change, also termed frontier shift, is the change in technology 
that firms face – the frontier itself - between time periods. On fig. 3.4, this is shown as the 
shift of the cost frontier from t=0 to t=1. In this case, technical change is positive, in the sense 
that costs are declining over time. This is called technical progress; the reverse is technical 
regress. Technical change is measured empirically by the time trend in the cost function (see 
section 3.3.3).  









)}                                                   (3.54) 
Efficiency change: whereas technical change concerns the frontier itself, efficiency change 
concerns the movement of firms either towards or away from the frontier. Then, efficiency 
change is the average change across firms between time periods. Point c on fig 3.4 shows that 
a firm is inefficient. If the position c is unchanged from t=0 to t=1, then the firm will be 
further from the frontier than in the previous period. If this is true across all firms, efficiency 
change will be negative. Of course, it is realistic to expect that some firms will gain whereas 
others will lose between periods. For this reason, models which allow this are preferred. 






                                                                                                      (3.55) 
Where 𝐶𝐸̅̅ ̅̅  is the sample average cost efficiency, see section 3.5.2. 
Scale change: scale change pertains to how the (average) scale of production affects the 
average cost of production. On fig 3.4, rays from the origin reflect the average cost per unit of 
production (i.e. cost/output), thus the shallower the slope gradient, the lower the average cost. 
Therefore, at point b, the average cost per unit of output is lower than at point a. This is 
reflected in the shape of the frontier which shows increasing returns to scale. If, on average, 
firms increase their scale of production, scale change is positive in the sense that average 
costs are reduced. Scale change is calculated as,  
𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 {
1
2
( 𝑐𝑦,𝑡=0 + 𝑐𝑦,𝑡=1)}                                                                            (3.56) 
Where 𝑐 is the elasticity of cost with respect to output, see section 3.3.2. 
 
3.7 Efficiency Measurement in Health Care 
In this section, we discuss the general health efficiency literature and, given that we have 
discussed the econometric approach based on econometric techniques, discuss specific 
applications of econometric techniques to NHS facilities. Whilst we adopt the stochastic 
frontier approach in our empirical work, we discuss other econometric approaches that have 
been applied to measure efficiency.  
Hollingsworth and Street (2006) note that the supply side of the efficiency analysis market is 
booming. The supply of health care efficiency studies has grown substantially in recent years: 
between 1983 and 1987, the average annual number of health care efficiency studies was 1.6; 
whereas between 2002 and 2006 the annual average was 25 (Hollingsworth, 2008). A number 
of journal articles and text books review the application of efficiency analysis techniques to 
health care (Hollingsworth et al., 1999; Hollingsworth, 2003; Worthington, 2004; Jacobs et 
al., 2006; Hollingsworth, 2008; Hollingsworth and Peacock, 2008; Mutter et al., 2011).  
Hollingsworth (2003; 2008) provides useful meta-analysis which is helpful in characterising 
the application of efficiency measurement to health care. As noted, the literature is large and 
growing. Non-parametric analysis dominates, with 80% of studies using DEA, Multiple 
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methods or Malmquist indices
24
. These are applied mainly to cross-sectional data sets, often 
with a low number of observations (<100). This may explain the low proportion of 
parametric studies, 18%, although the author notes that this proportion is growing. This 
growth may also be due to the development of methods to overcome some of the issues posed 
by users of efficiency analyses (cf. Hollingsworth, 2008; Mutter et al., 2011). This is one of 
the central themes of this thesis and we discuss these issues in detail in chapter 4. 
In terms of areas of application, hospitals dominate, claiming over 50% of applications. The 
next two areas of application, namely nursing homes and physicians, account for under 10% 
of the applications each.   
Hospital efficiency analyses are analysed by hospital type. Of these, public hospitals are the 
most efficient, with an average efficiency of 0.90. These are closely followed by Defence 
(military) hospitals, whose average efficiency is just under 0.90. For profit hospitals average 
around 0.86, whereas teaching hospitals average around 0.65 (although the sample size is 
small). Psychiatric hospitals appear to be least efficient, with an average of 0.60, but again 
numbers are low, with only two studies having been conducted. 
Hospital applications are mainly in the USA, with approximately two thirds of studies here; 
European studies account for around a third. Of these, the average measured efficiency is 
0.86 (0.84 for all hospitals), with a minimum of 0.72 (0.47). That is, European hospitals 
appear to be more efficient than their peers in the USA and around the world, according to 
the evidence presented.  
Within these European studies are, of course, those conducted on NHS hospitals, which are 
of particular interest. Perhaps a slight limitation of this literature review is that is it conducted 
on studies until mid-2006. Therefore, table 3.3 below is a literature review table containing 
these studies and those in more recent years. We concentrate on econometric studies so as to 
be in keeping with the analysis in this thesis.  
Table 3.3 shows that studies vary considerably across a number of dimensions. Methods vary 
from those based on cost/production functions using OLS to more complex analyses 
including SFA and multi-level models to policy evaluation techniques such as difference-in-
differences regression. The unit of analysis across studies also varies, from those that conduct 
analysis at the whole hospital level down to analysis at the level of the individual procedure 
(e.g. hip replacement). Perhaps the area in which the studies vary most is sample size, where 
                                            
24 A form of productivity index; see Coelli et al. (2005) for exposition 
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the range across the studies varies by a factor of close to two million – from 31 to 54 million 
observations.   
In light of this variation, a question arises as to why we adopt a SFA framework as opposed 
to other available methods. First, we note the link between the cost function methods used 
and the SFA literature. In several studies, a hospital-specific effect from a cost function is 
used as the measure of hospital efficiency (some authors use the term performance) 
(Laudicella et al., 2010; Daidone and Street, 2013; Gutacker et al., 2013; Moran and Jacobs, 
2015). In this sense, they are akin to the panel data SF models identified in chapter 3.5.4.1 
that measure time-invariant inefficiency (Schmidt and Sickles, 1984; Kumbhakar and Lovell, 
2000). Indeed, in other applications of these models in health care, the direct link has been 
expounded (Sorensen et al., 2009).  
There are three main reasons for which we adopt the SFA approach. First is the policy debate. 
We began by identifying spending pressures and the need not only to find efficiency savings, 
but to go beyond this in quantifying them. Some of the methods available in table 3.3 do not, 
in the form presented, allow explicit valuation of available monetary savings, e.g. difference-
in-differences regression. This point extends to the analysis of Moran and Jacobs (2015) who, 
although identify variation in provider performance, do not provide results in monetary terms. 
For our purposes, we prefer a method which does.  
Second, the nature of the data does not allow the application of these methods. In our data, 
we have neither changes in policy across observed units nor patient level data, meaning that 
alternative methods such as difference-in-differences or the 2 stage least squares approach are 
unavailable here.  
Third, The SFA framework allows us to develop methods for examining important aspects of 
hospital performance that we have identified in this chapter. We begin by extending the 
existing work on temporal variation of inefficiency by introducing new flexible models to 
NHS hospitals that have previously not been employed (chapter 5). This, in turn, allows us to 
develop an econometric measure of multi-factor productivity (the full form of which is total 
factor productivity, as defined in section 3.6 above). This is lacking in table 3.3. Next, we 
introduce a measure of multi-level inefficiency to NHS hospitals. Whilst previous studies 
have adopted multi-level approaches (e.g. Gutacker et al., 2013), their efficiency measures 
remain limited to a single level. We develop models for the analysis of multi-level efficiency 
(chapter 6). Lastly, whilst some studies have used controls for unobserved heterogeneity, we 
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adopt a range of methods and testing procedures to look more closely at this issue (chapters 5 
and 6).  
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Year Authors Methods Unit of Analysis Sample size Years Observations Findings 
                
1967 Feldstein Production 
function 
Whole hospital 177 1961 177 more and less efficient units identified; efficiency itself not quantified 
explicitly 
        
1987 Wagstaff SFA Maternity hospitals 193 1971/72 193 hospitals are all technically efficient; caveats issued 
        
1995 Scott and 
Parkin 
Cost Function Whole hospital 76 1992/93 76 statistical issues inhibit interpretation; no results presented 
        
2001 Harper, Hauck 
and Street 





62 no efficiency predictions reported; rank correlations only which were highly 
correlated between models 
        
2002 Street and 
Jacobs 
COLS; SFA Whole hospital 217 1999 217 Average inefficiency: 0.74 COLS; 0.90-0.92 for SFA. 
        
2003 Street COLS; SFA Whole hospital 236 1999 236 Average inefficiency: 0.69 COLS; 0.87-0.90 for SFA. 
        
2006 Ferrari SFA (distance 
function 
approach) 
Whole hospital 52 1991/92
-
1996/97 
312 productivity gain average 3% p.a.; no time-varying inefficiency; no efficiency 
estimates reported 
        
2006 Jacobs, Smith 
and Street 
COLS; SFA Whole hospital 185 1994/95
-1997-
98 
740 mean efficiency across range: COLS 0.69; SFA cross section 0.87-0.90; panel 
0.61-0.92 
        




























2005/06 952,273 more and less efficient units identified; efficiency itself not quantified 
explicitly 














1,882,750 competition appeared to induce efficiency improvements 
        








2008/09 12,154,599 some variation in hospital efficiency but not reported 












2009/10 194,570 for hip replacement, 95% of providers within range -£2740 and +£3690 
(mean = £6335) 








2006/07 42,948 treatment centres can provide more efficient care than hospitals due to 
specialisation; private providers have lower LOS 
        












342,288 Performance based on outcomes; variation of around 11% in ordered probit 
and around 2% in linear model attributable to providers 
                




In this chapter, we have established the meaning of efficiency. We have then argued that 
frontier techniques, derived from economic theory, are our favoured method for capturing 
efficiency. We have set out what we mean specifically by the term cost efficiency, and 
detailed our methodological approach to measuring it. Further, we have discussed the aspects 
of the cost function, which are of use empirically and for policy purposes. Finally, we have 
detailed a procedure to reflect overall change in the sample over time, based on production 
theory.   
With these economic tools at hand, we are now ready to proceed to our application: NHS 
hospitals. The following chapter, the first study of this thesis, is an overture to our empirical 
work. In this chapter, we set out our interest in hospitals and hospital efficiency; and the 
policy context, specifically with regard to costs and expenditure. Our starting point is that the 
duty to set hospital efficiency targets for NHS hospitals has shifted from the Department of 
Health to the economic regulator, Monitor.  
We consider the various policy regimes that have been used for performance improvement 
and review evidence on how NHS hospitals have responded to them. Next, we draw on the 
extensive experience of economic regulators in Britain in measuring the efficiency of firms in 
their respective markets. We combine this with a review of the measurement of efficiency in 
healthcare markets – in particular hospitals in the NHS. We conclude by setting our research 
agenda for measuring inefficiency in NHS hospitals, which we pursue in the following 



















As noted in earlier chapters, following the introduction of the Health and Social Care Act 
(2012), the task of managing hospital efficiency has passed from the Department of Health to 
Monitor
25
, which is the economic regulator of NHS hospitals that have achieved Foundation 
Status
26
. Since Monitor has assumed the role, it has begun to develop a more transparent 
approach to setting efficiency targets (known as the ‘efficiency factor’) than the Department 
of Health previously, based on benchmarking e.g. by comparing expenditure between 
services across hospitals (Monitor, 2013a). This is in keeping with the aims of central 
government who have identified benchmarking as key to making efficiency savings in the 
public sector (HM Treasury, 2015). Benchmarking is well developed, being used by other 
economic regulators in England across a range of industries (Crew and Parker, 2006). 
Monitor is interested in developing a more rigorous approach using economic techniques 
(Deloitte, 2014a; Deloitte, 2014b). With this, it aims to encourage hospitals to meet their 
efficiency targets and contribute to the top-level policy goal of plugging the oncoming 
funding gap.  
 
The aim of this chapter is threefold: to inform the setting of efficiency targets for hospitals by 
reviewing incentive schemes applied to NHS hospitals; to inform the setting of efficiency 
targets for hospitals by reviewing the regulation of prices in other sectors of the economy; 
and to inform the setting of efficiency targets for hospitals by reviewing the measurement of 
efficiency in health markets and other sectors. These together are aimed at the top level cost-
based policy goals. We do so by bringing together literature from NHS performance 
measurement, health-based efficiency measurement and regulatory economics. 
 
                                            
25 The responsibility is held jointly by Monitor and NHS England. For brevity, we use monitor throughout to denote Monitor and NHS 
England. 
26 Foundation status of a NHS trust (a trust is a hospital or small group of hospitals) means that it operates under an independent, not-for-
profit regime, allowing it financial autonomy which it does not have without having foundation status (Marini et al., 2008). Trusts apply for 
foundation status, which is granted by the regulator, Monitor, if the trust has satisfied the regulator of its financial competence. Foundation 
status has not been awarded to all NHS trusts. 
73 
 
In section 4.2 we set out the hospital reimbursement scheme, discuss hospital efficiency since 
2006, set out central issues and how we go on to answer them. In section 4.3 we discuss 
performance management schemes applied to NHS services since 1991. In section 4.4 we 
discuss the theory and practice of economic regulation and its implications for Monitor. In 
section 4.5 we consider the measurement of inefficiency, in the contexts of both economic 
regulation in other sectors and health care markets. Section 4.6 brings together the preceding 
3 to draw out lessons for Monitor and section 4.7 concludes. 
 
4.2 Hospital Price Setting and Efficiency Targets in the National Health Service 
 
For NHS hospitals in England, under the National Tariff Payment System (NTPS) (formerly 
Payment by Results (PbR) under Department of Health – we consider these as 
interchangeable for the purposes of this discussion) activity-based reimbursement scheme, a 
“national tariff” (i.e. price) is set for each service provided (known as Healthcare Resource 
Group, HRG
27
) based on the national average cost for that service. These are termed 
Reference Costs. NTPS has been in operation since April 2013; PbR previously operated 
from 2003/04 (Audit Commission, 2004). Setting prices at average cost is a form of yardstick 
competition used to mechanise productive efficiency (Shleifer, 1985).  
Under NTPS, the national tariff for each service provided is adjusted annually according to 
two factors. The first, to reflect inflation and other rises in the costs of service provision, is 
known as ‘cost uplift’, which raises the service price. The second, to encourage efficiency 
gains, an ‘efficiency factor’ which reduces the service price. The sum of these two factors 
determines the net annual adjustment applied to the price of each HRG.  
Therefore, under NTPS, there are two basic mechanisms to encourage efficiency 
improvements: HRG prices set at average costs and the efficiency factor of the national tariff. 
This is shown in equation 4.1 below, 
𝐻𝑅𝐺 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐻𝑅𝐺 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑡 − 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑡                               (4.1) 
                                            
27 Analogous to Diagnosis Related Groups, or DRGs, used in Europe and the USA 
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That is, the reimbursement for a given HRG, i, in year, t, is the sum of the preceding year’s 
average cost (across all hospitals)
28
, the year-specific cost uplift and the year-specific 
efficiency factor. The combination of the cost uplift and the efficiency factor is termed the net 
deflator
29
. In this study, we focus on setting the efficiency factor in our methodological 
discussion, but consider broader efficiency improvement throughout.   
 
Figure 4.1: Efficiency Factor for NHS Hospitals, 2006/7 to 2014/15
30
. Sources: Department 
of Health Reference Costs Guidance and Monitor NTPS Guidance. 
 
Figure 4.1 shows the efficiency factor for English NHS hospitals (Efficiency Factor)
31
. 
During this period, the Department of Health was responsible for setting the efficiency factor 
until 2014/15, when Monitor began to set the target. Hospitals have failed to reach these 
targets in recent years (Monitor, 2013b). Average targets were 3.8% between 2010 /11 and 
2012/13, with savings, at best, 3.4% p.a. (Monitor, 2013b, pp.11). Therefore, despite the two 
mechanisms to encourage efficiency improvements, it does not appear that targets have been 
met. We seek to answer why this is the case. 
 
                                            
28 For ease of exposition; it may be the case that prior years’ (t-2, t-3, etc.) are used, or that some average is used, depending on 
circumstances. For example, the 2014/15 HRG prices were based on 2010/11 reference costs because Monitor wished to maintain stability 
in its first setting of prices (Monitor, 2014).  
29 In practice, the net deflator is calculated as (1 + 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑡)(1 + 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑐𝑛𝑦 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑜𝑡𝑟) − 1, but we retain equation (4) for ease of 
exposition 
30 For ease of reading, we have used just the first year of the financial year on the graph. 2008 refers to 2008/09, 2012 to 2012/13, etc. 
31 NB – the change in cost is compared to its target from the year at the start of the period, e.g. the 2008/09 target is compared to cost 
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Historically, the efficiency factor has been decided in a number of ways, including funding 
disparities between NHS service commissioners’ allocations and their expected expenditures 
(Deloitte, 2014a). Other targets were set as part of national government policy on efficiency 
gains in the public sector. For example, the 3% target in 2008/09 is derived from the NHS’s 
settlement from central government’s Comprehensive Spending Review (Department of 
Health, 2007). Thus the efficiency factors have been set based on central expenditure saving 
requirements by governments. This may be a reason contributing to hospitals’ failure to meet 
targets. Another reason may be that these savings are unrealistic; NHS hospital managers 
suggested that around 1% annual savings were possible (Jacobs and Dawson, 2003). (We 
note that this survey is now over fifteen years old.) To these ends, Monitor is interested in a 
more data-driven approach to measuring efficiency and then setting the efficiency factor 
(Monitor, 2013).  
Monitor’s first year of NTPS was 2014/15 (Monitor, 2013c). Prices from the preceding year’s 
tariff were kept for stability given that this was Monitor’s first regulatory review period. The 
efficiency factor was 4%, drawn from indicator measures between hospitals, reports by 
consultants and past productivity gains (Deloitte, 2014b). 
The current proposals for the 2015/16 NTPS have been referred to the competition and 
markets authority (CMA), given that 75% of providers had rejected the pricing proposal
32
. 
Although the efficiency factor has been reduced to 3.8%, the challenge remains. Monitor has 
this year adopted a more rigorous approach, making use of econometric benchmarking 
techniques and bottom-up hospital modelling (Deloitte, 2014b). This substantial opposition 
reflects objection to the methods used. We therefore look to motivate our empirical work by 
examining in detail the methods used in the determination of the efficiency factor.  
Another important element to Monitor’s role is controlling for quality, following from the 
Francis Report in which Monitor was thought to be too focussed on financial aspects of 
performance (Francis, 2013).  
Thus, the central question for Monitor is how to ensure that these targets are appropriately set 
and then met. In this paper we bring together several strands of literature to inform two 
aspects of this question. 
                                            





(i) How to measure hospital efficiency whilst controlling for the quality of care; and 
(ii) How to incentivise efficiency amongst NHS (i.e. publicly owned) hospitals 
 
As a starting point, we review studies on the response of NHS hospitals
33
 to various policy 
mechanisms that have been applied in the NHS’s recent history. We describe the various 
policy regimes, and consider evidence on how hospitals have responded to them in order to 
inform Monitor’s role of promoting efficiency amongst hospitals. We do not try to draw 
parallels with efficiency measurement; rather we look to observe the features of applying 
performance measures that are effective and those that are not. This is section 4.3. 
 
We then turn to the theory of regulation and its implications for NTPS; see 4.4.  
 
Next, we examine the practice of efficiency measurement in the joint contexts of health 
markets and across regulated industries. To the extent that there are some similarities between 
measuring efficiency in a cross-sectorial way, there are likely lessons for regulators in health 
markets. We further assess efficiency measurement in health and focus on methodological 
issues that have hindered the uptake of efficiency analyses amongst policy makers. We 
identify solutions to espoused issues based on recent developments in the literature. This is 
section 4.5. 
 
Our main contribution is in the discussion: we seek to identify lessons for Monitor (and 
regulators in health more widely) for setting and enforcing efficiency targets for hospitals, 
both methodologically and practically, based on the recent developments in the literature. 
These lessons are drawn from the critical review of NHS performance management 
initiatives, from the regulation of other sectors that are subject to economic regulation; and 




                                            
33 Predominantly English hospitals, although in some cases English hospitals are compared to Scottish or Welsh hospitals; or indeed Scottish 
or Welsh hospitals in their own right. We are careful to note this throughout. 
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4.3 Performance Management in the National Health Service 
 
We are concerned in this thesis with efficiency. Whilst we have identified the background to 
NHS hospital efficiency and its regulation in the previous section and we go on to its 
measurement in subsequent sections, it is important to consider other aspects of performance. 
There have been many policy schemes applied to NHS hospitals since the early 1990s. 
Insofar as hospitals have reacted to each of these schemes, there are likely general lessons to 
be drawn in observing hospitals’ responses to them. We therefore examine literature that has 
assessed these schemes, looking for features of targets that are effective, and those that are 
less so. We then proceed to discussion of regulation, and its relevance to NTPS. We then 
consider measuring efficiency, both in the health and regulatory contexts.  
 
A reason for missed efficiency targets may be hospitals’ incentives. There have been a 
number of concurrent initiatives that successive governments have implemented to encourage 
performance improvements. These are broadly termed performance management (Smith et al. 
2009). They have had varying degrees of success, and have been assigned varying levels of 
prioritisation (cf. Bevan, 2006; Oliver, 2009). Then, the consideration of the efficiency factor 
is more complicated than the efficiency factor; efficiency targets may have risen up/fallen 
down hospital mangers’ agendas over time. In other words, given that there have been a 
number of other schemes that may have taken priority over the efficiency factor, managers’ 
focus may have shifted from improving efficiency. In light of this, for enforcing the 
efficiency factor, there may be important hospital incentives found in by observing hospitals’ 
reaction alternative policies, as well as potential pitfalls to be avoided. We therefore examine 
studies that have analysed these policy schemes. 
 
Until the early 1990s, the belief was that system agents acted altruistically and that, to 
maximise performance, all that was needed was the proliferation of information – agents for 
whom performance was sub-optimal would aspire to improve. Agents are motivated via 
identification with the ideals and values of the system (Oliver, 2012). This system is referred 
to as ‘trust and altruism’ (T&A) (Bevan and Wilson, 2013). However, concerns arose around 
hospitals’ efficiency towards the late 1980s, which undermined this belief, leading policy 
makers to reassess their approach (Maynard, 1991). Indeed, there are two major flaws with 
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T&A that act to erode incentives, namely, that rewards are maintained irrespective of 
performance and that failure is rewarded (Bevan, 2015). 
 
Bevan and Wilson (2013) describe, as departures from T&A, three basic approaches to 
performance management that have, subsequent to the reforms in the early 1990s, been 
adopted by NHS policy makers. We review evidence to shed light on the above issues with a 
view to informing regulatory practice in the NHS context and beyond. Table 4.1 below gives 
an overview of the four basic regimes.  
 
Scheme Description Economic Rationale NHS examples 
        
Trust & 
Altruism 
Publicly-spirited individuals need 
only performance information as 
incentive 
Identity (Oliver, 2012) Until the 1991 reforms 
        
Choice & 
Competition 
Choice induces improved 
performance through competition 
Invisible hand (Smith, 1776); 
contestable markets (Dranove, 
2012).  
Internal market 1991-1999; choose and book 
(2006); patients choose any provider (2008); 
gatekeeper-aided choice (2012) 




Publishing performance stimulates 
improvements amongst poor 
performers, "naming and shaming" 
Loss aversion/Prospect Theory 
(Oliver 2012; Maynard, 2012; 
Bevan and Wilson, 2013) 
Hospital star ratings 2000-2005; Surgeon 
league tables, 2013 
        
Hierarchy 
and Targets 
Setting targets with rewards for 
high performers and sanctions for 
missing targets, “targets and terror” 
Loss aversion/Prospect Theory 
(Oliver 2012; Maynard, 2012; 
Bevan and Wilson, 2013); 
‘humans’ and ‘econs’ (Bevan 
and Wilson, 2013)  
Cancer waiting times; ambulance response 
times; accident and emergency 4-hour waiting 
times 
        
Table 4.1: Policy Regimes for NHS Performance Management 
 
A timeline of major policies is given below in table 4.2. For some schemes, e.g. waiting times 
policies, policies are aimed at specific services, meaning that reporting all of them in a table 
would be impossible. For a review of waiting times polices, see Smith and Sutton (2013). We 






1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
                           




Choice Pilot Schemes; 
Choose & Book; Patients can choose any Provider 
CCG commissioning 
                           
             
Private Sector Hospitals Enter Market 
                           
TPR 
          
Hospital Star Ratings 
        
Surgeon 
Rankings 
                           
H & T Inpatients 
           




           
15 12 6 3 
                           
 
All Patients 
                 
18 week waiting time RTT 
                           
Table 4.2: Overview of Policy Regimes Applied to NHS hospitals, 1991-2015. Sources: Oliver (2009); Cooper et al. (2010); Smith and Sutton (2013); Bevan 
and Wilson (2013). NB – this is meant to provide a general overview; the actual implementation of these regimes was more complex. 
Notes: the NHS constitution set out a raft of waiting times polices, including those for ambulances, cancers, access to primary care, revascularisation and 
others, see Smith and Sutton (2013). RTT – referral to treatment, meaning the time taken from an initial GP consultation to seeing a specialist. C&C – choice 
and competition, TPR – transparent public ranking, H&T – hierarchy and targets, CCG – clinical commissioning group
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4.3.1 Choice and Competition (C&C) 
Choice and competition is based on the microeconomic doctrine of allowing market forces to 
engender efficiency. However, theoretically, the effects of competition will vary depending 
on the underlying market conditions (Draonve and Satterthwaite, 2000; Siciliani, 2005; 
Dawson et al., 2007). There needs to be sufficient competition in the marketplace for it to be 
preferable to monopoly (Brekke et al., 2008). Once providers begin to compete on quality 
and not prices, there does not appear to be a preferable theoretic market structure (Brekke et 
al., 2011). Allowing patient choice introduces contestability into hospital markets with, 
effectively, no sunk costs (hospitals already exist), implying that competitive conditions arise 
(Dranove, 2012).  
C&C has been introduced in the NHS broadly in three waves (Propper, 2012). The first, 
during the 1990s, is referred to as the internal market. This introduced price competition 
through allocating funds to local providers
34
 who, in turn, prospectively purchased annual 
bundles of services from hospital providers on behalf of the patients they served (Propper, 
1996). The second was through a set of policy changes between 2002 and 2008. The thrust 
was to fix prices for reimbursement and allow patients both choice and information on 
providers. Thus, hospitals were to compete on quality rather than price. The third was 
implemented by the coalition government under the Health and Social Care Act (2012), 
which gave purchasing responsibility to GP consortia to procure hospital services on behalf 
of the patients they served. Between these periods, patient choice remained, but after 1997 
when labour came to power, competition was actively discouraged by the government and 
fundholding was itself abolished in 1999 (Dusheiko et al., 2004; Propper et al., 2008).  
A number of studies have reviewed these policy changes. Overall, there seem to be two 
emerging themes. First, under the internal market’s price competition, whilst waiting times 
and prices seemed to be reduced, outcomes (in terms of mortality rates) declined (Dowling, 
1997; Soderlund et al., 1997; Propper and Soderlund, 1998; Hamilton and Bramley-Harker, 
1999; Propper et al., 2002; Dushieko et al., 2004; Propper et al., 2004; Ferrari, 2006; Propper 
et al., 2008). Second, under quality competition, outcomes, efficiency and waiting times seem 
to have improved (Dawson et al., 2007; Siciliani and Martin, 2007; Cooper et al., 2010; 
Bloom et al., 2010; Cooper et al., 2011; Cooper et al., 2012; Gaynor et al., 2013).  
                                            
34 either District Health Authorities (DHAs), who served larger patient populations (circa 315,000); or GP fund holder schemes (GPFH) who 
served smaller patient populations (circa 9000) and could select patients (usually by registers), i.e. could cream-skim. 
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Bevan and Skellern (2011) compare and contrast evidence on the two periods of provider 
competition. They attach a number of important caveats to the positive findings from studies 
of competition on quality. They note that metrics are focussed on single departments and 
therefore findings are difficult to generalise. In addition, they note that the potential for 
gaming
35
 and for the diversion of resources from less visible areas of hospital activity may 
weaken the findings. This is reflected in the findings of Propper et al. (2006), who note that, 
although there is some evidence of improvement in outcomes due to competition, there is 
insufficient theoretical and empirical support to make its case conclusively. Thus the overall 
effect of competition and choice remains ambiguous. 
 
4.3.2 Transparent Public Ranking (TPR) 
TPR is a system under which entities’ (which could be hospitals, departments or, as recently 
introduced, individual surgeons) performance is judged in some way and the entities are 
ranked. These ranks are then publicly disseminated. The intuition follows from the human 
condition of loss aversion, that is, humans naturally respond to loss more than gain. Being 
close to or bottom in rank carries a sense of shame and disappointment. Thus there is 
motivation in avoiding being ranked last. That said, there is also clear motivation derived 
from the prestige associated with being ranked highly. Thus, the system can be characterised 
as one in which victors are rewarded and failures are penalised: ‘knights and knaves’ (Bevan, 
2010). Proponents of TPR argue its justification on this idea, but also that it is in the public 
interest to be transparent and that we are, collectively, better able to identify substandard or 
harmful practice when results are in the public domain (Iacobucci, 2012). Critics argue that 
TPR is inaccurate and may apportion blame incorrectly, that it instils anxiety amongst the 
workforce and necessarily casts entities as ‘poor’, which may be undue (Adab et al., 2002; 
Westaby, 2014).  
Under New Labour, TPR was introduced in the form of hospital ‘star ratings’ in 2000 
(Bevan, 2010). Hospitals were judged in three domains of performance, and awarded a star if 
each were met. An overall score along a scale of 0-3 stars was then awarded. Those for which 
0 stars were awarded came under fire, the 12 hospitals with 0 rating in year one were labelled 
the ‘dirty dozen’ (Bevan and Wilson, 2013).  
                                            
35 An example of gaming is given in Bevan and Hood (2006). After the implementation of 8-minute ambulance response times targets for 
critical calls was implemented, data show a significant spike 8 minutes, implying that many 8 and 9 minute responses had been recoded as 
just under 8 minutes in order to meet the target. 
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The evidence suggests that the ‘naming and shaming’ of hospitals has been effective in 
stimulating performance improvement. The star ratings system was reported by NHS trusts 
themselves as helpful in transmitting priorities from central government, to help modernise 
practice amongst trusts and to expose substandard management (Mannion et al., 2005). 
However, the same study reported evidence of substantial gaming, unintended consequences 
(such as disincentives to invisible services, myopia, tunnel vision, bullying) and erosion of 
public trust; although these issues seemed to arise due to the measures used for analysis 
(mainly waiting lists and performance indicators, i.e. incomplete measures) rather than the 
TPR system itself. Besley et al. (2009) find that TPR successfully lowered waiting times for 
English hospitals relative to Welsh hospitals which maintained a T&A-type policy regime. 
Bevan (2010) reached a similar conclusion, but emphasised a number of conditions that were 
satisfied to enable success. These were that the ratings were given clear priority, were 
communicated clearly and applied with consistency (pp. 48). Crucially, relative to the Welsh 
system, there were sanctions applied for failure. Bevan and Wilson (2013) conclude that TPR 
is more effective than T&A. However, they note that there was evidence of gaming and that 
there were a number of policy models simultaneously in place.  
 
4.3.3 Hierarchy and Targets (H&T) 
Under H&T, a target is set for hospitals (e.g. four hour accident and emergency maximum 
waiting times). High performers are rewarded; those that fail to reach the targets face 
sanction. As with TPR, there is a loss aversion rationale here. Further, Bevan and Wilson 
(2013) propose a ‘humans’ and ‘econs’ argument
36
 in that providers, characterised as ‘econs’ 
as opposed to ‘humans’, respond equally to potential gains as to potential losses. This implies 
hospitals should be motivated in seeking to avoid the sanctions and equally be motivated to 
reach the targets. In the NHS, the implementation of H&T in the 2000s was referred to as 
‘targets and terror’. Waiting times have been the primary focus of the application of H&T. As 
an example of current policy, missing the 18 week referral to treatment (RTT, see table 4.2) 
target results in a reduction of up to 5% of revenue, depending on the speciality, for the 
month of the breach (Smith and Sutton, 2013).  
There are a number of studies which report the basic finding that, subsequent to the 
implementation of targets, performance against these targets improved (Alvarez-Rosete et al., 
                                            
36 Thaler and Sunstein (2008) 
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2005; Bevan and Hood, 2006; Hauck and Street, 2007; Dimakou et al., 2009; Harrison and 
Appleby, 2009; Bevan and Hamblin, 2009; Propper et al., 2010; Marques et al., 2014). 
Further, evidence suggests that the removal of sanctions for failing to reach targets weakens 
performance (Smith and Sutton, 2013).  
There have, however, been a number of criticisms aimed at these measures. Bevan and Hood 
(2006) and Bevan (2006) describe three assumptions that underpin H&T which have been 
breached in application to NHS performance management. These are that the target-setting 
authority is able to determine a system which prioritises what matters; that failure to meet 
features not built into performance measures are irrelevant (i.e. unintended consequences); 
and that the advantages of any outcomes offset any gaming activities. Indeed, Bevan and 
Hood (2006) find significant evidence of gaming. Bevan and Hamblin (2009) outline further 
issues with performance targets: There is an issue of selecting the correct or appropriate 
measures; the issue that indicators give an incomplete picture of the production process; there 
is information loss when aggregating; and that public targets risk workforce morale. Harrison 
and Appleby (2009) also note that targets were set against a backdrop of substantial funding 
increases, thus the attribution of success to targets in not entirely straightforward. Marquez et 
al. (2014) found substantial gaming. Further, they found no evidence of H&T-induced 
efficiency gains.  
Contrary to much criticism, there have been some positive aspects of these policies. Harrison 
and Appleby (2009) suggest that the sustained pressure on hospitals to improve performance 
has led to the avoidance of ‘quick-fix’ solutions and the development of longer term 
management strategies to meet the required gains. Oliver (2009) takes a longer term view, 
showing that the maximum inpatient waiting time target has reduced from 15 months 
(2002/03) to 3 months (2008/09) and is projected to be cut to 2 weeks (2022/23). Propper et 
al. (2010) take the general view that the targets have achieved their objectives. Crucially, they 





In this section, we have reviewed evidence on hospitals’ responses to several performance 
management regimes. There is, to our knowledge, no literature that assesses how NHS 
hospitals have responded to specific efficiency targets that have been set in recent years. 
However, given the links between the measures we have reviewed in this chapter and hospital 
                                            
37 They did find evidence of waiting list manipulation, but did not class this as gaming. 
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efficiency, there are likely generalizable features of applying targets that can be used in the 
context of setting the efficiency factor. There are some key themes that emerge from the 
literature. Firstly, hospitals have responded well under the following conditions, as shown in 
box 4.1 below. 
 
(i) Performance analysis that is widely disseminated; 
(ii) Targets that are easily understood; 
(iii) Targets that are prioritised; 
(iv) Targets that are clearly communicated; 
(v) Targets applied consistently between providers; 
(vi) Sanctions are applied for failure; 
(vii) Underlying increases in funding; 
(viii) The sustained application of measures (avoiding “quick-fixes”); 
(ix) Specific (disaggregate) targets; and 
(x) Measures that have staff engagement. 
 
Box 4.1: Features of Targets Associated with Favourable Responses 
 
There have also been a number of issues identified with certain performance improvement 
















(i) Gaming, e.g. misreporting; 
(ii) Flaws in the target itself38; 
(iii) The potential for information loss when aggregating measures; 
(iv) Diversion of resources from less ‘visible’ services (for indicator measures); 
(v) Disincentives to fund/promote quality amongst less ‘visible’ services (for 
indicator measures); 
(vi) Potentially damaging to morale; 
(vii) Tunnel vision – focusing on an indicator only; 
(viii) Myopia – short-term responses instead of measured, long term strategies; 
(ix) Bullying; 
(x) Erosion of public trust; and 
(xi) Multiple concurrent polices mean ascribing improvement to a single policy may 
be challenging. 
 
Box 4.2: Issues Encountered with Performance Management Schemes. 
 
We return to discuss the implications for Monitor in section 4.6.  
 
4.4 Price-Cap Regulation and the National Tariff Payment System 
 
4.4.1 Idiosyncrasies in Health Care Markets 
It is often suggested that health care markets differ from other markets. The underlying 
differences stem from uncertainty (Arrow, 1963). This uncertainty lies on both the demand 
and supply side, and surrounds the incidence of disease and the efficacy of treatment.  
In respect of regulating, our focus is on the implications for firm behaviour. The thrust of 
Arrow’s argument is that doctors do not behave as firms do in other markets. There is far less 
by way of competition; recommended courses of treatment should be based on need rather 
than profitability; and providers’ goals are more diverse than pure profit maximisation 
(Morris et al., 2007). At a more macro level, Mooney (1992) identifies a range of goals of 
health care systems: technological innovation, equity (both horizontal and vertical), 
effectiveness, efficiency, professional status, patients’ rights, clinicians’ rights, communities’ 
                                            
38 an 8 minute ambulance response time means that, in terms of the target, to reach a patient in 7 minutes who dies is better than to get to a 
patient in 9 minutes that lives.  
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preferences and medical ethics. For these reasons, it is argued some distinction should be 
made in the analysis of health care markets. 
Morris et al. (2007) make the point that whilst these issues hold for health care markets, they 
may also hold true for others. In fact, many of the aforementioned list may be argued as 
pursuits for regulators in other sectors, technological advance being an obvious example. To 
this extent, there may be some parallels between health care markets and other regulated 
industries. However, the authors also observe that across many of these features, health is an 
extreme case, which is not necessarily true for all other industries.  
We make this link in the following section when discussing the mechanics of pricing 
structures in regulated industries. Later in this chapter, we highlight these differences when 
discussing measuring efficiency.  
When budgets are limited, the concept of scarcity implies that it is necessary to assess cost 
effectiveness of health care interventions as a means of allocating resources optimally (Olsen, 
2009). Whilst this is not an issue specific to health care, an immediate issue arises at this 
juncture in health: for optimal allocation, there must be a measure of value. Individuals’ 
concept of value is distorted by many features in health care, e.g. monopolistic powers of 
firms, poor information, agents’ conflicts of interest, inter alia (McCabe et al., 2014). A 
consequence of this is that, in many analysis of cost effectiveness, value is quantified as 
‘health gains’, typically assessed via use of the Quality-Adjusted Life-Year (QALY) or 
Disability-Adjusted Life-Year (DALY). These measures comprise both measures of (changes 
in) health status, assessed using instruments such as the EQ-5D
39
, and the changes in length 
of life. Here, both the value (private or social) and the opportunity cost (gains of patients who 
do not receive treatment when another patient does) are expressed through the provider’s 
willingness to pay (McCabe et al., 2014).  
With these at hand, judgements can be made as to which treatments yield highest gains, can 
be used for health technology assessment, i.e. whether new treatments are preferable to 
existing technologies. Using QALYs and DALYs, a new technology’s value can be assessed, 
or, as McCabe et al. (2014), pp.4, note, 
“the value of the health displaced as the use of other technologies has to fall.”  
The concept of value in health care extends further to the measurement of output, which is 
directly relevant for the purposes of this thesis. Whilst in many regulated industries, 
                                            
39 The EuroQol 5-Dimension measure, which is a self-reported measure of health status across 5 dimensions 
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measuring output can be readily recorded, kilowatts of electricity, for example, this is not the 
case in health care. Whilst the volume of patients can be used as a health metric, there are 
aspects of the service that are neglected in so doing: health care is more than treating patients, 
the efficacy – or quality - of treatment (and thus its value) is critical. Many measures have 
been developed to embed service quality into output, or to measure it directly. We return to 
discuss this issue explicitly in following sections of this chapter. 
Before doing so, we turn to the pricing mechanism employed under NTPS, and its relation to 
comparable systems in other sectors.  
 
4.4.2 PCR and NTPS 
Regulatory need derives from market failure in the form of natural monopoly (as in, for 
example, the electricity transmission, overseen by Ofgem) or oligopolistic competition, 
where large firms are in a position to (potentially) exploit market power (as in airports, 
regulated by the CAA). Market failures of this nature have been observed in health markets 
(Dranove, 2012). In utilities markets, these failures have led regulators to develop strategies 
to mitigate their negative effects (Viscusi et al., 2005). One of these strategies is the control 
of prices, termed price-cap regulation (PCR; see Train (1991) for an exposition). We consider 
some fundamental differences between health economics and other industries below, before 
turning to PCR and its application to health care markets. 
Under NTPS (and PbR before it), there are two basic mechanisms to encourage efficiency 
improvements, namely average cost based HRG prices (enabling yardstick competition) and 
the efficiency factor of the national tariff (see equation 4.1). These are both considered “high-
powered” efficiency-inducing mechanisms (Shleifer, 1985; Viscusi et al., 2005). However, in 
practice, PbR looks to have moved costs toward their average rather than to have applied 
downward pressure (Maynard, 2012).  
Insofar as there are fixed prices and efficiency targets to incentivise efficiency improvements, 
PCR, as used by non-health regulators in Britain and internationally, has clear parallels with 
NTPS. PCR has been effective in reducing costs in regulated industries (Baldwin and Cave, 
1999; Viscusi et al., 2005; Hauge and Sappington, 2010; Sappington and Weisman, 2010). 
Distinguishing features of PCR include the length of control period, termed regulatory lag, 
and the review date being set and non-negotiable. When these conditions are breached, 
regulatory lag is endogenous (either party can request a review), and, importantly, efficiency 
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incentives are significantly weakened; the system becomes comparable to Rate-of-Return 
(ROR) regulation (cf. Armstrong et al., 1994; Viscusi et al., 2005).  
In general, setting the length of regulatory lag can be problematic for regulators, and there 
does not appear to be an optimal length (Liston, 1993). Regulators in non-health industries in 
Britain have commonly opted for a five year lag. In Monitor’s case, the lag is a single year, 
meaning, theoretically, efficiency incentives are eroded. Therefore, lengthening the lag is 
likely to induce efficiency improvements.  
Further advantages of longer control periods include that the regulator has ample time to 
consult with firms and the public to deliver comprehensive performance reviews over the 
price control periods
40
. It would also be possible to build specific policy objectives into the 
regulatory structure, such as the NHS’s five year forward view (NHS England, 2014a). 
Indeed, efficiency targets could be aligned to any policy target with a simple calculation, by 
deriving the savings requirement in secondary care from the total (based on the proportion of 
total expenditure on secondary care, for example), and setting the efficiency factor over the 
period to align with the requirement. 
One further consideration is that NHS England or the Department of Health may have 
minimum (or specific) service requirements for its budget. Here, Monitor may draw on the 
experience of the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR), which has developed a tripartite price-cap 
based model of regulation that incorporates policy directly, as follows.  
In this setting there are three bodies: the ORR (regulator), Department for Transport (DfT; 
the government) and Network Rail (owner/operator of rail infrastructure; public body). Here, 
the DfT sets out its requirements (e.g. improvement in trains running on time) and the amount 
of money it is willing to pay (has at its disposal). Then, Network Rail responds with a counter 
offer. Lastly, ORR defines a specification at an agreed cost by reconciling the two sides’ 
submissions – this is termed the ‘final determination’. At this point, prices are effectively 
fixed and Network Rail can increase profits through cost reductions over the period. This has 
been effective in both reducing costs and improving standards, e.g. operating costs have 
fallen 40% since 2004 (ORR, 2013). This system would be implementable in the health 
setting, with Department of Health specifications answered by trust estimations and central 
arbitration by Monitor. This system is important in the context of the NHS as follows. 
                                            
40 see Parker et al., 2006, pp. 124-133, for a history of benchmarking for price control across gas, electricity, water and telecommunications 
industries in Britain. 
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Historically, under public ownership, firms often lack adequate funding for capital 
investment. Privatisation coupled with independent economic regulation is a means to rectify 
this issue. In the case of rail, the issue is further complicated by the need for additional 
subsidy. This mechanism, in turn, ensures Network Rail has enough by way of funding for 
necessary levels of service and quality – assuming it is efficient. The key here is the 
regulator, as arbiter, prevents the political tussle between parties with competing interests. 
This has potential in health, particularly at present when trusts’ budgets are highly pressured 
whilst Monitor’s NTPS has been rejected and referred to the CMA. So, if trusts are struggling 
for funding, Monitor can call on the government to increase levels of funding. Equally, if 
Monitor’s decree is that hospitals are inefficient, it is difficult for them to seek additional 
funding.  
Economic theory predicts disincentives to quality under fixed prices (Spence, 1975)
41
. To 
counter this effect, quality standards must be upheld (Laffont and Tirole, 2000). This may be 
difficult due to measurement, ascribing costs/benefits or ascribing responsibility for quality 
(Sappington and Wiseman, 2010)
42
.   
In the context of the NHS, the Care Quality Commission (CQC) is responsible for controlling 
service quality. However, this was the case in the period 2005-2008 during which failures in 
service quality occurred (Francis, 2013). Therefore, Monitor need to ensure quality is 
maintained. Quality can be incorporated directly into efficiency analysis (see following 
section for details) as one solution. Another solution would be to have off-model quality 
control, perhaps with targets and sanctions for target failure. Quality requirements can readily 
be embedded into the tripartite approach (or derivative system) the ORR has implemented, 
where quality specifications are built in to HRG price determinations.  
Overall, an adjustment to the current pricing mechanism under NTPS which draws on PCR 
theory and practice is likely to have significant benefits to the status quo, both in terms of 
incentives and the pursuit of policy goals.  
 
4.5 Efficiency Measurement for National Health Service Price-Capping 
 
                                            
41 For balance, we note that this is also true of ROR. This is because the firm bears all costs of quality improvement, but has to share the 
rewards of the improvements (Sappington and Weisman, 2010) 
42 See section 5 for a discussion of quality in health 
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The final objective of this chapter is to examine the measurement of efficiency in health 
markets and regulated industries. We elaborate on the basic tools described in chapter 3 by 
identifying health-based issues that have arisen in the academic literature. These have been 
raised in the NHS context and beyond. We further complement this discussion with reference 
to wider regulatory and methodological literature, where appropriate.  
Efficiency measures are commonly, but not always, frontier-based, following Farrell (1957). 
The use of frontier-type techniques seems to have gained primacy amongst academics in 
health markets (Hollingsworth et al., 1999; Hollingsworth, 2003, 2008; Hollingsworth and 
Peacock, 2009; Rosko and Mutter, 2011; Mutter et al., 2011). There is significant potential 
for frontier-type efficiency measures in health (Lovell, 2006; Mutter et al., 2011). However, 
for a number of reasons, policy makers have, hitherto, found the results of these studies of 
limited use (Hollingsworth and Street, 2006; Hollingsworth, 2008; 2012). There have been 
developments in the literature – notably in econometrics - to these issues which may mean 
these techniques are of use to managers and policy makers, and specifically to Monitor.  
We further justify this framework by making reference to the ‘best practice’ criteria for 
judging regulators’ approaches to benchmarking developed in electricity distribution (Haney 
and Pollitt, 2009; 2011). We extend these criteria for health by including the health-based 
issues (and/or nuanced issues from regulated industries) that have been raised specifically in 
health markets. Table 4.3 shows the issues that have been encountered by analysts in health 
and non-health settings. We use this as the basis for the following discussion.  
For 2015/16 tariff, the efficiency factor was initially set at 3.8% which is based partly on 
benchmarking of hospitals (Deloitte, 2014b). Following a rejection from 75% of providers, 
there has been a referral to the CMA. Therefore, a question arises as to the methods used to 
calculate the efficiency factor. These are presented in Deloitte (2014b). In our discussion, we 
set out the methods used for benchmarking and contrast them with our review in this section. 
From this, we suggest how benchmarking could be improved. We then proceed to 
demonstrate a number of these improvements in our empirical chapters that follow.  
 
4.5.1 Large Data 
A low number of observations in data sets has been prohibitive for some regulators wishing 
to make use of a full set of analytical methods. In the case of NHS hospitals, sample size 
issues are unlikely to pose problems given that there are vast data collections available to the 
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regulator, namely Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) and Reference Costs (RC). In regulation, 
sample sizes are typically very small; see Appendix B in which all have fewer than 100 
observations save for an international comparison of 560. In contrast, Monitor used a sample 
of 750 observations (Deloitte, 2014b). If patient level data were used, there are 18.2 million 
admitted patient records in HES in 2013/14 alone (HSCIC, 2015). Moreover, these data can 
be mapped to national datasets such collections held by the Office for National Statistics 
(ONS). Thus in terms of size and potential information, Monitor are well equipped.   
 
4.5.2 Data Quality 
The quality of data may present a number of issues. Data may be collected in an inconsistent 
manner in both cross-sectional and time-series dimensions. This issue can stem from a 
number of factors, including, inter alia, firms’ interpretation of data guidance, changing 
definitions over time, gaming, allocation of capital costs, firms’ ability to learn how to record 
data (and regulators’ engagement with them), major shocks to the firm (e.g. board changes), 
the value placed in the data by the firm and the level of aggregation. These are germane 
issues in the health context: Updates to RC mean that comparisons over time are difficult – 
accounting regulation is set to fundamentally change costing from procedure-based to patient 
level costing (Mason et al., 2011); gaming is well known in health (Bevan and Hamblin, 
2009); and there is evidence to suggest variation in clinical coding
43
 (Joy et al., 2008; Pett & 
Clark, 2012). 
There have been initiatives to encourage higher quality data recording such as Ofgem’s 
Information Quality Incentive (IQI) which rewards firms for high-quality data reporting 
(Ofgem, 2011). In addition, Ofgem use a ‘fast-track‘ scheme whereby firms that produce 
business plans that are deemed of sufficient quality are agreed without further scrutiny 
(Ofgem, 2011).  
A major issue for regulators is the consistency of data over time. For example, OFWAT, 
although had access to panel data in the late 1990s, used only cross-sectional analyses (Parker 
et al., 2006). A solution to time series data inconsistency is to use a hierarchical approach 
(e.g., Smith and Wheat, 2012; Gutacker et al., 2013; Smith et al., 2015), which is based on 
panel data methods, but does not require data collected over time. If the data is hierarchical in 
structure, then observations of units in the lower tier can be used as repeat observations of the 
                                            




unit at the upper tier, thus a panel structure is contained in the data. Here, the benefits of 
panel data can be realised without the need to collect data over a period of years. Therefore, 
concerns about data consistency over time evaporate. This approach has also been referred to 
as the dual-level efficiency model (Smith and Wheat, 2012; Smith et al., 2015).   
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Issue Health Non-health Solutions available 
        
Large Data Jacobs et al., 2006 ORR, 2008; Ofgem, 2011;Haney & 
Pollitt, 2009, 2011 
Collect large data; dual-level efficiency; International 
comparison 
        
Data Quality Scott & Parkin, 1995; Joy et al., 2008; 
Pett & Clark, 2012 
Ofgem, 2011; Haney & Pollitt, 2009, 
2011 
Dual-level efficiency; Data quality incentives 
        
Allocating capital 
costs 
Drummond et al., 2005; Dranove, 2012; 
Buckell et al., 2015 
Parker et al., 2006; CEPA, 2014 OPEX/CAPEX modelling; Smoothing; Estimation of capital 
costs 
        
Engagement with 
industry 
Hollingsworth, 2008; Smith, 2015 CEPA, 2014 Consultation with end users 
        
Range of methods Jacobs et al., 2006 Haney & Pollitt, 2009, 2011 Triangulation; Model selection; Cross-checking 
        
Panel data and 
temporal efficiency 
Jacobs et al., 2006; Hollingsworth, 2008 Weyman-Jones et al., 2006; Haney & 
Pollitt, 2009, 2011 
Dual-level efficiency; Cross-sectional analysis; Model 
temporal change 
        
Heterogeneity: 
Organisational 
Dormont & Milcent, 2004; 
Hollingsworth, 2008 
Arocena et al. (2012); Haney & 
Pollitt, 2009, 2011 
Disaggregate level of analysis; Hierarchical modelling; Data to 
capture heterogeneity 
        
Heterogeneity: Patient 
level 
Dormont & Milcent, 2004; Iezzoni, 
2009 
  Data on patient characteristics: age, gender, ethnicity, 
deprivation, etc. 
        
Heterogeneity: 
Quality/Outcomes 
Hollingsworth, 2008; Smith & Street, 
2013 
Parker et al., 2006; Haney & Pollitt, 
2009, 2011 
Data on outcomes, waiting times, readmissions, cleanliness, 
etc. 
        
Unobservable 
Heterogeneity 
Greene, 2004; Farsi et al, 2005a   Statistical approaches for unobservable heterogeneity 
        
Uncertainty and 
sensitivity 
Newhouse, 1994; Street, 2003; 
Hollingsworth, 2008 
Weyman-Jones et al., 2006; Haney & 
Pollitt, 2009, 2011 
Statistical testing/specification; Efficiency prediction by 
interval; Distribution-free approaches 
        
Table 4.3: Issues for Measuring Efficiency in Health and for Economic Regulators 
94 
 
4.5.3 Allocating Capital Costs 
The allocation of capital costs is problematic for regulators. Ideally, capital costs are 
contained in firm cost data and regressions run on total expenditure, i.e. TOTEX modelling. 
This has been carried out by several regulators (Parker et al., 2006; NERA, 2008; CEPA, 
2014). In many cases, however, TOTEX modelling is inappropriate. Firstly, capital 
expenditure is often significant and sporadic: ‘lumpy’. This implies that there may be undue 
cost variation that is cast as inefficiency in TOTEX models for firms that invest heavily 
(Rossi and Ruzzier, 2000). An additional issue is how shared capital costs are allocated 
between services, which occurs in health markets (Drummond et al., 2005; Dranove, 2012). 
One solution is to smooth capital costs over time, although how to do this exactly poses 
issues (CEPA, 2014). Another is to model operating costs and capital costs separately, OPEX 
and CAPEX modelling. This, however, requires data to be available for both costs. As with 
TOTEX modelling, this has been carried out by several regulators (Parker et al., 2006; 
NERA, 2008; CEPA, 2014). OPEX-type patient level costing is being introduced amongst 
NHS hospitals, and may serve as a solution to the issue of CAPEX allocation (Monitor, 
2015). It is, of course, important to model both of these features to prevent gaming – 
focussing solely on OPEX modelling may encourage firms to ‘dump’ costs in CAPEX. It is 
for this reason that Ofwat used a TOTEX approach (CEPA, 2014). The final drawback with 
the separate approach is that modelling OPEX restricts conclusions on the scale properties of 
production and on Total Factor Productivity, which has been identified in the NHS context 
(Buckell et al., 2015).  
 
4.5.4 Engagement with Industry 
A key feature of the benchmarking process for regulators is engaging with the industry. For 
example, Ofwat’s approach involved consultations with its own engineers, company board 
directors and the industry research body, UK water industry research (UKWIR) on models 
(CEPA, 2013). In doing so, regulators seek guidance on features of the model to ascertain 
whether the model is a good reflection of reality. Features may include, amongst other things, 
the signs and magnitudes of model coefficients, the implied economies of scale properties 
and the rankings of firms. Not only does this process help to guide the process of modelling, 
it is a mechanism to both engage stakeholders in the regulatory process and to increase 
transparency. Engaging end users has been recognised as key in encouraging the uptake of 
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efficiency studies in health markets (Hollingsworth, 2008; Smith, 2015). Promisingly, 
engagement with providers is now mandated in Monitor’s NTPS process (Monitor, 2014). 
Indeed, the approach must be approved by at least half of the providers to be imposed; 
otherwise the proposal is referred to the CMA, as is currently the case.  
 
4.5.5 Range of Methods 
It is considered good practice for regulators to use a range of efficiency measures in making 
assessments of firms’ efficiency. Ofcom used both SFA and DEA in predicting British 
Telecom’s performance. In using a range of methods, the regulator presents themselves with 
a choice: either to choose a preferred model, as in Smith (2012), based on some predefined 
criteria (statistical tests, expected signs/magnitudes of coefficient values, the underlying 
assumptions, or other); or to use an approach based on averaging across the models, known 
as triangulation
44
. As suggested by Bauer et al. (1998), consistency between models’ 
predictions of efficiency, rankings of firms and common outliers denotes reliability. Studies 
in health markets have shown mixed results; in some studies using mixed methods efficiency 
estimates coalesce, elsewhere they do not (Hollingsworth and Peacock, 2009). In the case that 
different methods yield inconsistencies, the regulator may be faced with a difficult choice 
between models, particularly when they are subject to challenge by the regulated firms and/or 
the public.  
Haney and Pollitt (2013) take the view that the choice of technique should be made on the 
grounds of it being the most appropriate for the task at hand and the prevailing conditions 
(e.g. analytical problem, data availability, etc.). Other reasons are posited for choosing 
between techniques, such as the influence of peers’ (i.e. other regulators) methodological 
choices, that techniques were in the process of being implemented or human resource 
constraints (Haney & Pollitt, 2009).  
Non-frontier econometric methods have also been used in academic studies in the NHS 
context. These include multi-level modelling and seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
approaches (Jacobs et al., 2006) as well as multi-stage approaches (Laudicella et al., 2010) 
and difference-in-differences regression (Cooper et al., 2012). The SUR framework may be 
particularly useful in the context of NHS hospitals since there are often multiple departments 
within hospitals for which joint modelling is likely appropriate. The SUR framework has 
                                            
44 For example, Coelli and Perelman (1999) used the geometric mean of model predictions 
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been incorporated into frontier efficiency methods directly, although not in health (Lai and 
Huang, 2012). The multi-level method has been applied to decompose cost variation at 
various organisational levels to isolate the effect of the hospital on its costs (Dormont and 
Milcent, 2004; Gutacker et al., 2013a). Here, a hospital-specific effect is taken as the measure 
of hospital performance meaning there is parallel that can be drawn between this approach 
and panel data frontier approaches (e.g. Schmidt and Sickles, 1984). Of course, there is an 
issue around the composition of the hospital-specific effect – this effect comprises any 
unobserved, firm-specific, time-invariant factors, one of which could well be inefficiency, but 
could also be a number of other factors.   
The application of policy evaluation tools, e.g. difference-in-differences regression, to judge 
efficiency rests on the measure under analyses. In Cooper et al. (2012), the authors use the 
pre surgery length of stay for a single procedure. This approach has been criticised as 
performance may vary across various departments within a hospital, casting doubt over the 
reliability of measures of this kind as representative of the entire hospital (Bevan and 
Skellern, 2011). However, these methods do allow specific policy questions to be answered, 
as is important to policy makers (Hollingsworth, 2008). That is not to say, of course, that 
other efficiency techniques are unable to answer policy questions – Ferrari (2006) examines 
the effect of price competition on efficiency in Scottish NHS hospitals, for example.   
 
4.5.6 Panel Data and Temporal Efficiency 
The availability of panel data will, of course, be largely determined by the nature of the 
sector. Those sectors that have a limited number of firms, but perhaps have observed firms 
over a number of years, often look to international comparison to assemble a panel of data for 
analysis (NERA, 2008; Smith et al. 2010). Panel data is particularly useful in a regulatory 
environment, where advanced panel data techniques allow the decomposition of inefficiency 
and unobservable firm-specific heterogeneity (Kumbhakar et al., 2014). In addition, advanced 
methods are available to analyse firms’ efficiency over time (Coelli et al., 2005). These 
features of models can be statistically tested, making regulators’ efficiency predictions (and 
corresponding pricing determinations) defensible. Using more sophisticated modelling 
approaches requires large data. In some cases, sample sizes dictate that only the most basic 
panel data techniques can be used (Ofgem, 2011). In the literature, more sophisticated models 
have been found to be difficult to estimate on small datasets (Farsi et al., 2007, pp. 68).  
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As noted above, another approach to making use of panel data techniques is to exploit the 
hierarchical structure in organisations (Smith and Wheat, 2012; Smith et al., 2015). In doing 
so, it is possible to decompose efficiency into company and sub-company components (or 
equivalents in the NHS hospital context). This approach has a number of advantages for 
regulators. First, it allows the regulator to precisely locate the source of inefficiency within 
organisations. Second, efficiency estimates may be biased if the structure is not taken into 
account. Third, it allows the regulator to expand the size of the data set. Fourth, data need 
only be collected once. This also obviates issues with data consistency over time. See Smith 
and Wheat (2012) for an application to European rail network managers.  
 
4.5.7 Heterogeneity 
The incorporation of environmental, quality and input price variables into cost function 
analyses follows from production theory (Coelli et al., 2005; section 3.3.3). The extent to 
which regulators have managed to incorporate these into their respective analyses varies. The 
more comprehensive inclusion of these variables is Ofwat’s data, which has a number of 
variables for all three of these features. Indeed, Ofwat’s analysis includes these variables 
jointly in its modelling, whereas other regulators’ analyses have not, e.g. CAA for air traffic 
control, where each are considered in isolation as indicators. Of course, failure to include 
these variables brings into question the validity of analyses. Weyman-Jones (2012) is critical 
of Ofgem’s RIIO
45
 approach, in part, on the grounds of the omission of these variables.  
Heterogeneity has been identified as a major issue in the analysis of costs in health (Dormont 
and Milcent, 2004). Heterogeneity arises in several forms, we examine these in the health 
context according to three categories: organisational, patient level and quality/outcomes. We 
consider each in turn below. 
 
4.5.8 Heterogeneity: Organisational 
A common approach in academic studies to hospital efficiency analysis is at an aggregated 
level, such as whole hospitals. This is also the approach employed currently by Monitor 
(Deloitte, 2014b). There are a number of issues with analysis here which restrict the 
usefulness of the results. The first issue is that aggregate measures are of limited use to both 
                                            
45 Acronym that denotes the approach to regulation: Revenue = Incentives + Innovation + Outputs 
98 
 
managers and policy makers, who are interested in making gains at the level of individual 
services within hospitals (Hollingsworth and Street, 2006; Hollingsworth, 2008; Mutter et al., 
2011). Knowing whether a particular hospital is itself efficient is doubtless useful, but targets 
are more likely to be enforced if applied at disaggregate levels of activity, since managers can 
more ably respond at this level. Scott and Parkin (1995) used hospital-aggregate data to 
estimate cost functions. They did not draw conclusions on their results, partly due to 
aggregation issues. Indeed, aggregating outputs may cause downward bias for scale 
economies and likely overlook scope properties of production (Gaynor et al., 2015); a 
production index approach to estimating the hospital cost function is proposed as a solution. 
Alternatively, recent studies have been conducted at lower levels of aggregation, for example 
in specialised services (Diadone and Street, 2013), maternity services (Laudicella et al., 
2010), mental health (Moran and Jacobs, 2015) and pathology (Buckell et al., 2013; Buckell 
et al., 2015).  
To the extent that hospitals offer a range of services and specialisations, it is unlikely that two 
are the same. Indeed, hospitals are commonly in various stages of investment cycles, under 
differing ownership regimes, providing varying levels/types of teaching, and to varying 
extents are part of service networks, inter alia (Mutter et al., 2011). Unless these features are 
controlled for, assigning common cost or production functions is questionable. Thus 
capturing these differences is critical in making credible assessments of performance. Some 
features can be readily incorporated into efficiency analysis, ownership status for example 
(Tiemann et al., 2012) or teaching (Buckell et al., 2015).  
For other sources of heterogeneity, data are continually refined and developed for various 
aspects of service heterogeneity in health. For instance, the ways in which healthcare 




 coding – are subject to regular 
updates to reflect developments in practice (WHO, 2004; HSCIC, 2013a). However, even in 
the case that highly granular data are to hand, there are likely many differences that remain 
unobserved, the age of hospital buildings or their physical layout, for example. This implies 
controlling for unobservable heterogeneity is critical. 
 
 
                                            
46 International Classification of Diseases 
47 Office of Population Censuses and Surveys (the body from which the coding system is granted its name; its full name is “OPCS 
Classification of Interventions and Procedures) 
99 
 
4.5.9 Heterogeneity: Patient Level 
 
Patient level heterogeneity has long been an issue in comparative analysis of health care 
metrics. Going back, the following is aimed at Florence Nightingale’s comparison of hospital 
mortality rates in 1863,  
 
“Any comparison which ignores the difference between the apple-cheeked farm-labourers 
who seek relief at Stoke Pogis, and the wizzened, red-herring-like mechanics of Soho or 
Southwark, who came into a London Hospital, is fallacious.” (Anonymous, 1864) 
 
Patient-level heterogeneity is a clear issue when making cost comparisons between units in 
health (Iezzoni, 2010). Monitor is equipped with large, granular data on patient 
characteristics in HES. Diadone and Street (2013) used patient-level data in analysing costs 
of specialised care in the NHS, in part to make judgements on performance. Of course, there 
are many differences between patients for which data are unavailable. This implies 
controlling for unobservable heterogeneity is critical.  
 
4.5.10 Heterogeneity: Quality and Outcomes 
Capturing service quality in health efficiency analyses remains a vexing problem (Mutter et 
al., 2011). The fundamental issue is that service quality itself is both (a) multi-dimensional 
and (b) unobservable directly. Portrait et al., (2015) note that ‘it is surprising that a large 
proportion of literature on measuring healthcare quality neglects the multidimensional nature 
of quality’.  Indeed, the notion of quality may represent a range of aspects including waiting 
for services (access), the quality of the medical services, the quality of the environment in 
which the care is provided, any complimentary treatment, follow up treatment, etc. This issue 
is of particular focus in the context of the NHS, where, under policy pressure, Monitor had 
appeared to overlook aspects of service quality when granting foundation status to the Mid 
Staffordshire Trust (Francis, 2013). Within an econometric framework, service quality can be 
accommodated, either by direct incorporation of data or by appropriate treatment of 
unobserved heterogeneity.  
Proxy measures for hospital quality (e.g. mortality rates) have been incorporated into 
efficiency analyses, see Romano and Mutter (2004) and Carey and Stefos (2011). 
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Additionally, there are stated preference measures, such as the ‘Friends and Family Test’ 
(Appleby, 2013). Another attempt to measure quality is through patient outcomes
48
. Smith 
and Street (2013) argue that the NHS’s Patient Reported Outcome Measure (PROM) is a 
promising tool for capturing quality, albeit imperfect (there is no counterfactual, for 
example). Promisingly, this measure has been incorporated into efficiency analysis to distil 
out the effect of quality on costs for making efficiency comparisons between providers 
(Gutacker et al., 2013a). However, compressing quality into a single metric may cause a loss 
of information. Indeed, Gutacker et al. (2013b) found variation across different dimensions of 
outcomes. Further, recent research has begun to base analysis of performance on outcomes 
(Moran and Jacobs, 2015).  
 
To reiterate, this complex issue underlines the importance of making allowances for 
unobservable heterogeneity between providers. We turn to this issue below. 
 
4.5.11 Unobserved Heterogeneity 
The conceptual appeal of making an allowance for unobservable heterogeneity is to allay 
concerns about differences in production environments between providers, across a number 
of dimensions, which are not captured by a set of explanatory regressors. This point is of 
particular importance in health (Mutter et al., 2011). Significant developments in the recent 
literature have been made regarding methods to control for unobservable heterogeneity.  
In the frontier literature, much attention has been given to this topic, and a number of 
methods have been developed to accommodate unobservable heterogeneity. Approaches 
based on restrictions to the cost or production function have been applied in health. Simply 
adding dummy variables to account for unobserved characteristics is perhaps the simplest 
approach - Buckell et al. (2015) use regional dummies as one (of a range) control for 
unobserved heterogeneity. Next is to follow the approach of Mundlak (1978) and decompose 
a firm-specific (fixed or random) effect using group mean variables. This method has been 
applied in health markets to nursing homes (Farsi et al., 2005a).  
Specific models that can account for unobservable heterogeneity include the “true” models 
(Greene, 2005), four-component, or “generalised true” models (Columbi et al., 2014; 
                                            
48 We differentiate outcomes from output as follows. Output denotes the level of service provision, whereas outcomes refers to patients’ 
response to their treatment. Outcomes are considered a proxy for service quality where higher outcomes reflect higher service quality. 
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Kumbhakar et al., 2014; Tsionas and Kumbhakar, 2014; Filippini and Greene, 2015). Other 
approaches include those that take advantage of parameter heterogeneity – latent class or 
random parameters models (Besstremyannaya, 2011; Greene, 2012) and those that allow for 
correlation between joint production processes – SUR models (Jacobs et al., 2006; Lai and 
Huang, 2012). Finally, methodological approaches have been developed that can account for 
different  forms of unobserved heterogeneity (Mundlak, 1978; Kumbhakar et al., 2014) – we 
have developed a framework for examining these forms of unobserved heterogeneity in 
multi-level models in the empirical work in this thesis (Smith et al., 2015; chapter 6).  
 
4.5.12 Uncertainty and Sensitivity 
Dealing with uncertainty is an important facet of efficiency benchmarking. In regulated 
industries, the ORR were interested in capturing uncertainty around efficiency predictions in 
stochastic frontier models, leading academics to reconsider this issue (Wheat et al., 2014).  
In stochastic frontier models, to the extent that there is uncertainty surrounding the 
decomposition of inefficiency and noise, interval estimation is appropriate for inefficiency 
prediction (Wheat et al., 2014). A known property of cross-sectional models is that the 
variance of the conditional distribution of inefficiency does not tend to zero as the sample 
size increases. Here, the central intervals remain wide
4950
 (Street, 2003). This is a key aspect 
of efficiency analysis for policy makers, being one reason for which efficiency studies have 
not been widely used (Hollingsworth and Street, 2006; Hollingsworth, 2008). This is not the 
case, however, in the panel data setting, where the variance does tend to zero (Murillo-
Zamorano, 2004). However, this does not provide a perfect solution; there is always 
uncertainty in separating of inefficiency from noise. Moreover, the ultimate quantity of 
interest to the researcher is the interval itself, rather than the point estimate (Wheat et al., 
2014).  
In panel data Schmidt and Sickles (1984)-type approaches, firm-effects can be more precisely 
predicted as T increases. In the NHS setting, recently multi-level approaches have made use 
of patient level data, enabling precise estimates (Gutacker et al., 2013a).  
                                            
49 In addition, conventional intervals do not incorporate parameter uncertainty and are likely to be too narrow (Wheat et al., 2014). 
50 Conventional stochastic frontier prediction intervals (e.g. Horrace and Schmidt) are central, two sided intervals. Accordingly, they do not 




Regulators have also been interested in sensitivity analysis. For example, Ofwat considered a 
large range of model specifications, functional forms and efficiency specifications (CEPA, 
2014). Sensitivity analysis is also endorsed for efficiency measurement in health (Jacobs et 
al., 2006). Monitor made use of a number of specifications and variable definitions (Deloitte, 
2014b). To accompany sensitivity diagnostics, a range of statistical testing procedures can 




4.6.1 Efficiency analysis for the regulation of NHS hospitals 
As the existing economic regulator of foundation status hospitals – and therefore as financial 
arbiter –Monitor is well disposed to setting efficiency targets for NHS hospitals. Monitor has 
demonstrated its desire to take an approach to setting the efficiency factor which is in line 
with other regulators in Britain (based on econometric techniques), given that there is limited 
precedent in other health markets (Deloitte, 2014a).  
Following this, Monitor has conducted analysis to set its efficiency factor for 2015/16 using 
two approaches: an econometric benchmarking exercise and a bottom-up modelling exercise 
(Deloitte, 2014b). The efficiency factor proposed on this analysis was 3.8%. As noted above, 
this was rejected by 75% of providers, and is thus being referred to the CMA. Given this, we 
discuss Monitor’s modelling approach and how it accords with health-based efficiency 
measurement issues, given the issues raised in section 4.5. We derive an index of Monitor’s 
approach to benchmarking which is in keeping with that of Haney and Pollitt (2009). In turn, 
we use this as a basis for setting some empirical goals for subsequent chapters. In doing so, 
we return to the question we set out in section 4.2, 
(i) How to measure hospital efficiency whilst controlling for quality of care 
We have augmented the regulatory best practice criteria of Haney and Pollitt (2009; 2011) to 
capture health-specific issues raised in academic studies, see table 4.3. We now reconcile 
Monitor’s benchmarking against these issues to observe any potential areas for improving 




Monitor has made use of large data – their sample contains 832 observations. This is much 
larger than any other recent regulatory study, see Appendix B. Moreover, this was possible 
without making use of international comparison. The benefit of this is that assigning a 
common cost function across the sample is more defensible than would be the case in 
international comparison. Further, this could be expanded by making use of patient level data 
from HES. In this sense, Monitor can be seen as leading in regulatory terms. 
Data quality was accounted for in Monitor’s analysis by making use of a number of variables 
and through sensitivity analysis. Of course, there remain issues around data quality over time. 
For example, clinical codes are updated annually, casting doubt over the consistency of data 
over time (HSCIC, 2013b). However, there have been no major overhauls to the coding 
system in the period under analysis (e.g. from HRG-4 to HRG-5). As noted, hierarchical 
modelling is one possible solution to avoid data inconsistency over time. We examine this 
issue in detail in chapter 6 of this thesis. A further answer to this issue is to make allowances 
for unobserved heterogeneity to account for these inconsistencies. We examine this issue in 
both chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis. 
Allocating capital costs is not an issue for Monitor’s approach to modelling since the 
reference costs include capital costs. The disadvantage is that the allocation of capital costs is 
unknown from the data – Reference Costs – meaning that separate OPEX and TOTEX 
modelling would not be possible as it is for other regulators.  
As noted, Monitor has, by mandate, to engage with the industry, as set out in the Health and 
Social Care Act (2012). It does this via a series of workshops, consultations and through the 
final response of providers for its efficiency factor determination. In this sense, Monitor is in 
keeping with this criterion of best practice.  
Monitor has also adopted a range of methods to its analysis. It has considered the full 
spectrum of economic tools (Deloitte, 2014a), and from recommendations of the report, opted 
for a combination of econometric benchmarking and bottom-up modelling. Within its 
econometric benchmarking, it has further used a range of methods, namely a random effects 
model as per Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000), a Pitt and Lee (1981) time-invariant stochastic 
frontier model and a Battesse and Coelli (1992) time-varying stochastic frontier model
51
. In 
this sense, it can be said that Monitor has fulfilled this aspect of best practice. However, 
given its large sample size, it has the potential to use a more sophisticated range of models. 
                                            
51 For specification see chapter 3 
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We see this as a useful extension to Monitor’s analysis. We pursue this issue in chapters 5 
and 6 of this thesis by using a wider set of inefficiency models in our analysis. 
As noted above, Monitor has used panel data and has estimated a model which allows 
temporal variation in efficiency. However, it is possible for Monitor to make greater use of 
both of these aspects of its data to enhance its analysis. Panel data techniques can be used to 
account for unobserved heterogeneity, to which we turn below. Next, the issue of time-
varying efficiency is very important in this setting, and in regulatory settings more widely 
(see for example Smith (2012)). The assumption of time-invariant efficiency over a 5 year 
period – especially in light of policy pushes for efficiency and productivity gains over the 
period (see chapter 2; fig 4.1) – is unpalatable in the context of NHS hospitals. Monitor’s 
approach makes use of one model, that of Battesse and Coelli (1992), which does allow for 
temporal change. However, the treatment of temporal change is fairly limited, for example it 
applies the same direction of change to all hospitals in the sample, which is unrealistic.  
There are a number of models available that allow a more sophisticated approach to 
modelling temporal efficiency change. Given the large sample size, it would be possible to 
estimate more advanced models. Moreover, change in efficiency over time is an aspect of 
efficiency analysis that NHS staff have indicated as being useful (Hollingsworth and 
Peacock, 2008). For these reasons, we have paid close attention to this topic both in our 
methodological discussion (chapter 3) and our empirical work (chapter 5).  
Organisational heterogeneity is again a key issue in health efficiency measurement and has 
featured in the analysis of Monitor. Monitor’s approach is to maintain a whole hospital level 
approach and use case-mix variables to account for organisational heterogeneity. This 
introduces a number of issues.  
First, that having to index outputs requires that data are available for all outputs in order to 
capture them in the index. It is not clear that this is the case (Deloitte, 2014b, pp.7). The 
construction of the index itself may have bearing on the index value, the corresponding 
parameter estimates and therefore the estimates of efficiency. It is not clear that Monitor have 
checked for sensitivity to their method of case-mix adjustment. As noted in the academic 
literature, aggregate measures at the hospital level are of limited use to local management 
seeking to identify service-specific inefficiency. Lastly, there may well be unobserved 
heterogeneity that may influence estimates of efficiency.  
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The other major drawback of this approach to efficiency analysis is that it does not provide 
insights into the way in which services drive costs, which is useful information to managers 
and to policy makers.  
We propose two major rectifications. First, to model at a disaggregate level of service. We 
take this approach in both chapters 5 and 6. Further, a multi-level approach could be used to 
disentangle the effect of upper tier hospital management on service-level efficiency. 
Moreover, this has been identified as a key way in which to extend efficiency analysis in 
health (Hollingsworth and Peacock, 2008). We adopt this approach in chapter 6. Secondly, 
we reiterate the importance of making allowances for unobserved heterogeneity. This is a 
central theme in chapters 5 and 6.  
Other aspects of organisational heterogeneity have been included into Monitor’s analysis. A 
set of dummy variables are included into the cost function to control for the size of the 
hospital, whether it provides specialist services, whether teaching services are provided and 
whether the hospital is a multiservice
52
 provider. These help to account for heterogeneity, but 
may still be somewhat lacking. For example, in Buckell et al. (2015), foundation status was 
important. There may be other sources of provider heterogeneity, competition for example, 
that are important for the analysis of costs. Again, this motivates making allowances for 
unobserved heterogeneity is key when data are limited. We address these issues in chapters 5 
and 6 with appropriate modelling approaches. 
In terms of patient level heterogeneity, the story is similar. Monitor have partially captured 
this heterogeneity in their analysis via the use of variables age, gender, ethnicity and 
deprivation. However, there are arguably patient characteristics omitted; multimorbidity, for 
example. There are approaches which can make use of patient data, which allow the full 
information available to be used for analysis (Olsen and Street, 2008; Gutacker et al., 2013a). 
Equally, using controls for unobserved heterogeneity can mitigate concerns over bias in 
efficiency prediction.  
For quality and outcomes, a specific quality variable was constructed by Monitor based on 
the NHS staff survey, entailing 15 questions of staff perceptions of their own level of quality. 
Therefore it can be considered that this aspect of benchmarking has been addressed. Of 
course, there are several other dimensions of quality, namely outcomes, access, etc. that are 
overlooked here. This approach is similar to that we have taken in our empirical chapters, 
                                            
52 Provide a wider range of service than secondary care, e.g. community services 
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except that, in recognising we have incompletely captured this feature, we have gone on to 
model unobserved heterogeneity. We discuss this issue in chapter 5. 
We have already considered unobserved heterogeneity as it has emerged when considering 
other aspects of regulatory best practice. We have noted that we have sought to control for 
this in our empirical chapters, particularly in our latter chapter, 6.  
For uncertainty and sensitivity, Monitor use a range of sensitivity analyses including testing 
the coefficients to different specifications of the dependent variable (using different deflators 
for costs over time); using random effects and stochastic frontier models; using samples that 
have extreme observations removed; and models with and without insignificant variables. 
Coefficient values appeared to be robust to these specifications. Thus, Monitor has captured 
some of the features identified for sensitivity in their analysis. However, we propose several 
extensions.  
First, to test whether the imposed Cobb-Douglas functional form is the most appropriate in 
statistical terms (the best fit of the data). Using more sophisticated functional forms helps to 
capture unobserved heterogeneity and may have appealing economic properties – for 
example the translog allows economies of scale to vary across the output range (see chapter 
3; chapter 5; Buckell et al., 2015). Second, although some statistical testing of individual 
variables was conducted, this process can be improved by testing inefficiency models against 
each other. This helps to justify model selection. We adopt this approach in chapters 5 and 6.  
A summary of Monitor’s approach is given below in table 4.4 as a Haney and Pollitt (2009)-












Issue Score Reasoning 
      
Large Data 1 data set large 
      
Data Quality 0.5 issues around consistency of collection 
      
Allocating capital costs 1 capital costs allocated in reference costs 
      
Engagement with 
industry 1 in a number of ways 
      
Range of methods 1 econometric benchmarking and bottom-up modelling 
      
Panel methods and 
temporal efficiency 0.5 panel data used; time dynamics could be explored further 
      
Heterogeneity: 
Organisational 0.5 
aggregate measure of output used; could disaggregate, could adopt 
multi-level approach 
      
Heterogeneity: Patient 
level 0.5 some controls but not comprehensive coverage 
      
Heterogeneity: 
Quality/Outcomes 0.5 some controls but not comprehensive coverage 
      
Unobservable 
Heterogeneity 0 no controls for unobserved heterogeneity 
      
Uncertainty and 
sensitivity 0.5 some sensitivity; little by way of uncertainty 
      
Total 7 of 11   
      
Table 4.4: Benchmarking Index for Monitor’s 2015/16 NTPS Analysis. 0 indicates that the issue is not 
addressed in the analysis; 0.5 means that some control for the issue has been made; 1 denotes the issue is 
captured in the analysis. The scores are the author’s judgements, based on the preceding section.  
 
An index value of 7 from a possible 11 (table 4.4) indicates that there are many satisfactory 
elements of the approach, but also that there are some areas in which improvements could be 
made.  
In Haney and Pollitt (2009), international regulators’ benchmarking index values ranged from 
0 to 7 on a scale of 8; there was a mass of regulators with 0 score. Regulators in the UK 
obtained scores in the range of 3 to 6, with an average of 4.5. If Monitor’s benchmarking was 




However, given that (a) its current analysis has been soundly rejected by providers; (b) there 
are health-specific issues that require specific attention (e.g. patient level heterogeneity), 
there is a clear need to tailor the index for health care markets
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. In so doing, this index may 
be of use to health regulators around the world who are engaged in benchmarking in health. 
These form the basis of our empirical analysis, as indicated below.  
 
(i) Analysis at a disaggregate level of service (Ch 5 & 6); 
(ii) Dual-level efficiency analysis (Ch 6); 
(iii) Accounting for unobserved heterogeneity (Ch 5 & 6); 
(iv) Extending the analysis of temporal efficiency change (Ch 5); 
(v) Functional form (Ch 5 & 6); and 
(vi) Statistical testing (Ch 5 & 6). 
 
4.6.2 Encouraging Efficiency in NHS Hospitals 
Efficiency measurement is an important first step for Monitor. On this, to a greater or lesser 
extent (depending on regulatory judgement), Monitor will set the efficiency factor. The next 
stage is to ensure that corresponding savings are achieved. NHS hospitals appear to have, in 
general, responded well to various targets that they have been set. This is in contrast to the 
savings set out by the efficiency factor during the same period, which have not been met. We 
have reviewed evidence to draw out lessons for Monitor, to which we now turn.  
We have identified from the literature features of hospital targets which appear to effective 
(box 4.1); and symptoms of regime failure (box 4.2).  
As regards box 4.1, many features of the revised system are conducive to Monitor 
successfully implementing efficiency savings amongst NHS hospitals. Monitor, the existing 
economic regulator, will have good knowledge of hospitals’ data and financial performance, 
given that this is already within its remit. Moreover, Monitor has a much narrower agenda 
than that the Department of Health; they do not have to provide and maintain health services 
as well as to regulate them. This means that they are able to assign greater priority and focus 
to the efficiency factor. In order for targets to be met effectively, it appears important features 
include ensuring targets are effectively communicated, prioritised and applied consistently; 
                                            




that the results are widely disseminated; and that comprehensibility is key (Mannion et al., 
2005; Bevan, 2006). Further, Monitor has the authority to impose sanctions for failure to 
meet targets; having sanctions for failure is effective for improving performance (Smith and 
Sutton, 2013). 
As regards box 4.2, using an econometric approach has key advantages with regard to some 
of the issues encountered in applying other targets such as ambulance response times. They 
are easily interpreted (bounded by zero and one); they allow ranking of providers; and can be 
used in a time series dimension. Modelling based on cost functions can help to obviate 
gaming, unintended consequences, partial measures of performance and diversion of 
resources from elsewhere, since the entire production process is modelled (Buckell et al., 
2015). However, the extent to which this is possible in reality is unclear; cost (and other 
forms of) data can be gamed (e.g. Moran and Jacobs, 2015). They do not require aggregation 
of several indicators and multiple measures can be included in the analysis as variables. Some 
performance indicators, for example readmission rates, may themselves give misleading 
accounts of provider performance (Laudicella et al., 2013). Persistence can assuage concerns 
over myopia and tunnel vision (Mannion et al., 2005).  
From our review of regulatory pricing mechanisms (section 4.4), an important step is to 
lengthen the current regulatory lag in line with regulatory theory. Regulatory theory suggests 
that when regulatory lag is short, the incentives to improve efficiency via reducing costs are 
reversed from being high powered to low powered. Whilst it is not clear what an optimal lag 
would be, the current lag of a single year appears too short based on current performance
54
. 
To follow the regulatory norm would be to set the lag at 5 years; alternatively, Monitor may 
wish to align the regulatory lag to specific policies such as the five year forward view (NHS 
England, 2014a). Moreover, the price-cap mechanism can be incorporated into a more 
complicated system which embeds service level requirements from the Department of Health. 
We gave an example of the ORR’s tripartite approach. This may be particularly useful given 
the current stand-off between Monitor and NHS providers.  
 
4.7 Conclusions 
The responsibility for setting the efficiency target has recently changed from the Department 
of Health to the economic regulator, Monitor. Monitor has sought a more evidence-based 
                                            
54 Whilst it would be surprising if this was the only reason for missed targets, we submit that it is a contributory factor 
110 
 
approach to setting the efficiency target (Deloitte, 2014a). Monitor has used econometric 
benchmarking as part of a series of methods to estimate the efficiency factor for NHS 
hospitals. This determination has been rejected by hospitals and is currently being reviewed 
by the CMA.  
We have reviewed recent methodological advances in efficiency measurement in health and 
beyond. We recommended the extension of econometric techniques to assess NHS hospitals’ 
efficiency. We have identified particular features of the analysis that may be used to enhance 
Monitor’s approach, based on practical and statistical issues.  
In addition, we have reviewed the application of alternative policies for performance 
management, and observed features of these policies that were effective; and those that 
proved problematic. This should be useful information for Monitor in seeking to reduce 
leakage. We have further reviewed regulatory pricing and suggested alterations to the current 
pricing mechanism to foster efficiency. 
Having paid attention to features of and issues with efficiency analysis in the NHS setting 
(and in health more generally), we move to our empirical analysis. Here, we seek to estimate 
efficiency within NHS hospitals. Specific focus is given to pathology laboratories within 
NHS hospitals. Therefore, we move to the next two chapters which present empirical work in 
NHS pathology.  
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5. Efficiency over time, economies of scale, multi-factor productivity and mergers in 
National Health Service Pathology 
In our introductory chapters, we noted that on account of the scale of savings required, there 
is a need to examine new areas of hospital services to identify areas in which efficiency 
savings can be derived. This chapter, based on Buckell et al. (2015), represents such work. 
In the previous chapter, we reviewed the regulation of efficiency amongst NHS hospitals. A 
central aspect of this process is the measurement of efficiency itself, as a guide to setting 
efficiency targets. We described how the measurement of inefficiency had been problematic 
in health markets, for a variety of reasons, both technical and practical. Therefore, our 
methodological approach has been designed to factor in these issues.  
This chapter is one of two empirical studies of hospital efficiency in this thesis. There is 
evolution in our analysis, across the two studies, as follows. The focus of this study is on 
describing pathology services and on primal economic issues regarding the level of 
inefficiency in pathology services, the drivers of laboratory costs, scale and so on. In the next 
study, we move to more sophisticated methodological questions by considering multi-level 
organisational structures and the nature of unobserved heterogeneity.  
The main features of this analysis are in keeping with issues raised for health-based 
efficiency analyses in prior chapters. First, the study picks up on several technical themes 
identified: using an econometric approach based on the cost function, the use of panel data, 
analysis at an appropriate level of disaggregation, sensitivity analysis and statistical testing, 
allowing for unobserved heterogeneity and allowing for service quality. Further, we answer 
several pathology-based policy questions pertaining to: the extent of potential efficiency 
savings, economies of scale, the cost implications of mergers, change in efficiency over time, 
reconciling technological progress and efficiency change.  
This study demonstrates the challenging trade-off that regulators face as regards disaggregate 
analysis. On the one hand, as has been argued in the literature, concerns around heterogeneity 
are abated with disaggregate studies, and, data permitting, a more granular approach to 
characterising heterogeneity can be taken (see chapter 4). The downside, on the contrary, is 
that estimates of inefficiency are limited to the service themselves, in this case pathology 
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services (this again has been noted in the literature, see chapter 4). Whilst the goal of this 
study is not to reconcile this issue, it is important to make note of it. Of course, the regulator, 
having access to a wealth of data, is able to conduct similar studies across a range of hospital 
services.  
We begin in section 5.1 by describing pathology services and their impact on wider NHS 
services. We then consider how pathology services have been measured and detail the 
advantages of taking an econometric approach (section 5.2). In the following section, 5.3, we 
discuss the methods and data used in detail. We then present and discuss various aspects of 
our results, in sections 5.4 and 5.5, respectively. Finally, in section 5.6, we conclude.  
 
5.1 Introduction 
Pathology services account for an estimated 3-5% of the overall NHS budget, costing an 
estimated £2.5bn in 2005 (Department of Health, 2006). Although relatively small as a 
proportion of total health care spend, potential efficiency gains in these services are not 
confined to pathology itself. Pathology activity supports many front-line services and so 
savings in pathology services promote further gains elsewhere in the healthcare system 
(Veronesi et al., 1997; Buckell et al., 2013). The Carter Review (Department of Health, 2006) 
estimates 70-80% of all clinical decisions are affected by pathology analyses; thus good 
pathology practice can lead to cost savings along a patient’s treatment pathway (Department 
of Health, 2006). There is evidence of unnecessary repeat testing (Department of Health, 
2006), suggesting that inefficient practice is present in these services. Lastly, there is 
variation in the uptake of lean practice initiatives
55
 meaning that there is likely variation in 
the magnitudes of efficiency in these services. Therefore, there are likely significant gains to 
be made by encouraging best practice in pathology services to contribute to the policy 
objective of achieving efficiency savings. This study aims specifically to identify the level of 
inefficiency in pathology services in order to measure the extent of savings possible in this 
area.  
The current approach to measuring inefficiency in pathology in the NHS is performance 
indicator analysis (such as cost per test carried out); (Healthcare Commission, 2007; 
                                            




Department of Health, 2008; Liebmann, 2011; Holland et al., 2012). These are partial 
measures which do not fully reflect all the factors affecting the costs of provision under 
different circumstances (for example, scale properties or sources of operational heterogeneity 
between providers). This point has been established in the wider health context (Goddard and 
Jacobs, 2009; Street et al., 2011). We use the data collected and analysed by the Keele 
University Benchmarking Unit (Holland et al., 2012), but extend the analysis by utilising an 
econometric framework to give a single measure that captures the overall efficiency of 
pathology services. Our model takes account of a range of factors influencing costs, whilst 
controlling for unobservable heterogeneity. 
We use stochastic frontiers which have been applied widely in health at the micro level 
(Street, 2003; Farsi et al., 2005a, 2008; Herr, 2008; Hollingsworth, 2008; Olsen and Street, 
2008; Rosko & Mutter, 2008; Sorensen et al., 2009; Herr et al., 2011). We adopt a particular 
stochastic frontier method with attractive properties in respect of analysing efficiency change 
over time; this method has been applied by economic regulators outside health for that reason 
(Smith, 2012). To our knowledge, no stochastic frontier (or other efficiency measurement 
tool such as DEA) work has been conducted on pathology laboratories, meaning that our 




5.2 Performance Measurement in Pathology 
Pathology services are increasingly recognised as key support for a range of services across 
the NHS. As demand for NHS services increases in general, demand for pathology services 
increases (as derived demand). Faced with increasing demand and falling income 
(Department of Health, 2006), the performance of pathology services is coming under ever-
increasing scrutiny. Therefore, rigorously measuring the performance of laboratories is 
critical. Typically, pathology laboratories are situated within NHS trusts (see below).  
                                            
56 If pathology is classed as diagnostic medicine, then there exists some stochastic frontier work in this area (Dismuke & Sena, 1999). 
However, this study concerns patient-based, in-hospital activity such as computerised axial tomography (CAT) scans, whereas our study 
involves pathology laboratories – which are independent of their host hospitals and do not have direct patient contact – conducting blood 




Figure 5.1: Schematic of Pathology Services 
As can be seen from Fig. 5.1, as patients move around the healthcare system, diagnostic 
services are requested and performed. As activity occurs, information is recorded and used 
for analysis of these services.  
Major reviews of NHS pathology services include the Carter Report (Department of Health, 
2006), and the associated follow up report which included pilot studies of services 
(Department of Health, 2008); the Healthcare Commission’s study (2007); the NHS 
confederation (2010); and the Keele University Benchmarking project (Holland et al., 2010; 
2011; 2012)
57
. There is a growing body of evidence on these services, and good quality data 
available; a summary of these studies’ analyses is provided in Table 5.1. 
                                            






Type of study Summary of Key Points 
     
Department of 
Health 
2006 163 Qualitative 
Full qualitative analysis of pathology services. Identified key areas for performance improvement - 
workforce balance, economies of scale, information systems adoption, out of hours working, network 
activity. Recommended pilot studies conducted. Noted that geographical location may be a source of cost 
heterogeneity. 
     
Healthcare 
Commission 
2007 163 Quantitative 
Breakdown by pathology discipline comparative cost per test analysis; requests:staff and tests:staff ratios 
used; descriptive statistics for out of hours operation, information systems adoption, use of automated 
services, network activity; recognised that tests for primary care may be cheaper than for secondary care; 
noted the issue of tests:requests as a potential source of performance variation. Foundation trusts may take 
a commercial approach to service provision. 
     
Department of 
Health 
2008 12 Quantitative 
Breakdown by pathology discipline (e.g. biochemistry) comparative cost analysis; some economies of 
scale observation; little control for heterogeneity; savings estimate £250m (extrapolated results nationally 
from 12 pilot studies). 
     




2010 163 Qualitative 
Identifies variation in practice; difficulty in monitoring staff leads to variation in practice; workforce 
balance, IT systems adoption, leadership and network activity as key areas for performance improvement. 
     
Keele 
Benchmarking 
2012 84 Quantitative 
Breakdown by pathology discipline (e.g. biochemistry, hystocytology); test volumes descriptive statistics; 
productivity indicators; 5 year trend analysis of outputs and productivity indicators; expenditure of 
laboratories; quality indicators (e.g. turnaround times) 
     
Table 5.1: Pathology Studies 
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Table 5.1 describes the outcomes of each of the studies. The quantitative analyses above use 
performance indicators to judge the performance of NHS pathology laboratories (e.g. cost per 
test ratios, staff per test, turnaround times, test to request ratios). The use of these indicators is 
widespread in NHS pathology and across the world (Valenstein et al., 2001; Kiechle and 
Main, 2002; Price, 2005; France and Francis, 2005), but there are limits to their ability to 
reflect the entire operation of a laboratory. Moreover, in health markets, indicators can be 
targeted for gaming (Propper and Wilson, 2003; Propper et al., 2008; Mutter et al., 2008; 
Palangkaraya and Yong, 2013), or relying solely on indicators can lead to unintended 
consequences (Bird et al., 2004; Cots et al., 2011). Lastly, judging a single unit’s 
performance across several indicators may be difficult if the values conflict. 
An econometric framework is proposed to overcome these issues. Our measure of cost 
efficiency yields a single efficiency score capturing overall performance which is easily 
interpreted (bounded by zero and one). Gaming is no longer an issue since the entire 
production process is modelled
58
 .  
A further key advantage of the econometric approach is that it is underpinned by economic 
theory and stochastic frontier analysis is used widely across many sectors, including health 
(Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000; Hollingsworth, 2008). In addition, we can analyse the 
temporal pattern of laboratory inefficiency, which NHS staff have indicated as a desirable 
feature of performance analysis (Hollingsworth and Peacock, 2008). Finally, econometric 
analysis allows us to value the impact of some of the issues noted in the qualitative studies 
(Table 5.1), such as the ratio of primary care tests on costs – as raised in the Healthcare 
Commission study (2007), which is useful information in the policy context. 
 
5.3 Methods 
Stochastic frontiers (Aigner et al., 1977; Meeusen and van Den Broeck, 1977) are 
econometric tools used to estimate the level of inefficiency of firms or decision making units 
(DMU) in a sample. Laboratory costs are our metric of interest. Our economic stochastic 
                                            
58 We use operating costs rather than total costs (including charges), meaning the production process is not strictly entirely modelled. Capital 
costs are budgeted centrally at trust (hospital) level, rather than laboratory level, meaning assigning specific capital charges to laboratories 
can only be estimated. We note that this has been found in pathology elsewhere, e.g. New Zealand (France and Francis, 2005). Moreover, 
this is not particular to pathology (Drummond et al., 2005, pp. 64). 
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frontier model for pathology, derived from a basic cost function (see chapter 3), takes the 
form,  
𝑐 = 𝑓(𝑦, 𝑤, 𝑡, 𝑧, 𝑞) + 𝑢 + 𝑣                                                                                                              (5.1) 
Where c are costs, y represents output, w represents input prices, z represents the observable 
heterogeneity, q represents quality and t represents time. As standard for stochastic frontiers, 
u represents the inefficiency and v represents random statistical noise.  
As standard in the literature, output and input prices are considered exogenous, which is 
obvious for input prices and reasonable for output levels given that the laboratories do not 
choose their level of output. In the case of pathology, using the work of previous studies (see 
table 5.1), the operational characteristics of the pathology operating environment can be 
identified and variables are used to capture these where data are available (the z vector). 
Otherwise, methods for capturing unobservable heterogeneity are employed.  
For service quality, although measures of quality in pathology services are not as complex as 
in the treatment of patients (Smith and Street (2013) note the multi-dimensional nature of 
patient treatment quality), this remains an issue for our study. Each of the laboratories in our 
sample has acquired quality accreditation
59
. Our understanding of accreditation is that it 
represents a baseline level of quality. Therefore, we recognise that there may well be 
laboratory-specific variation in quality over and above this baseline level. This is one reason 
for which we apply empirical controls for unobserved heterogeneity; that is, quality that is 
not captured in the accreditation is absorbed into the control for unobserved heterogeneity 
rather than absorbed by the inefficiency component of the model.  
A set of five models stochastic frontier is used to model inefficiency. These include a 
generalised least squares random effects model
60
, see Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000). We 
refer to this as REM. We use a Pitt and Lee (1981) stochastic frontier with time invariant 
inefficiency, which we refer to as P&L. Next, we use a Battesse and Coelli (1992) stochastic 
frontier with time varying inefficiency. We refer to this as BC92. Our penultimate model is 
that of Cuesta (2000), which is a stochastic frontier with firm-specific (or in our case, lab-
specific) time-varying inefficiency. We refer to this as Cuesta. Finally, we use a true random 
                                            
59 Clinical Pathology Accreditation: http://www.cpa-uk.co.uk/ 
60 Hausman tests (1978) consistently favoured RE over FE estimation; we are also interest in examining time-invariant variables which we 
are unable to do in a FE framework. 
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effects model (Greene, 2005). We refer to this as TRE. See table 5.2 for econometric 
specification; see section 3.5.4 for discussion of the models. 
The REM is used to give ‘baseline’ values for both parameter estimates and for inefficiency 
(using the GLS procedure outlined in Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000)). Parameter estimates 
from these models do not rely on the distributional assumptions of the stochastic frontiers
61
 
and so parameter estimates are used to validate those derived from the frontiers.  
The P&L model assumes time-invariant inefficiency. The BC92 fits a time trend to the 
inefficiency - the η parameter (table 5.2) - which subjects all firms’ efficiency scores to a 
common direction of change over time. The Cuesta model is a generalisation of this, allowing 
estimation of independent firm efficiency time trends: individual ηs for each laboratory
62
. 
This means firms can ‘catch up’ relative to others over time and the efficiency rankings of the 
laboratories can change over time, which are realistic features. This point is particularly 
relevant in a policy context, and this model has been used by regulators in other sectors, e.g. 
rail (Smith, 2012). Alvarez et al. (2006) further note that a key advantage of this model is that 
it enables the unrealistic assumption of independence in inefficiency over time (a problem 
that plagues many comparator models) to be relaxed.  
The TRE model claims to delineate efficiency from unobservable heterogeneity by including 
a time-invariant, firm-specific term in the model to capture unobserved factors, in addition to 
the inefficiency term (Greene, 2005). A potential drawback of this model is that efficiency 
scores are independent over time, meaning that time trends of firms cannot be tested 
statistically. Additionally, this model assumes that all the time-invariant variation in the cost 
function that is not explained by the regressors is unit-specific heterogeneity and not 
inefficiency; this is not necessarily the case as some time invariant persistent inefficiency 
may also be present.  
To these models, we test three alternative specifications to examine heterogeneity. First, a 
basic cost function with output, input prices and time is estimated. By including a time trend 
in the cost function, we separate exogenous change in costs over time from cost inefficiency 
(Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000).  
                                            
61 Due to an unbalanced panel, a Baltagi & Li (1990) adaptation of the Breusch-Pagan (1980) test has been used and confirms the use of 
panel methods. 
62 Within this framework, the temporal pattern of inefficiency can be tested statistically, which is a key advantage over alternative 
approaches such as Cornwell et al. (1990). 
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In the second, we add the vector, z, of observable heterogeneity variables. These include the 
number of primary care tests (which are thought to be less costly than other tests), and the test 
to request ratio which captures the variation in the number of tests per request, which varies 
between laboratories, and is therefore a source of heterogeneity. Another source is the 
geographical setting of the laboratory: metropolitan, urban or rural (following Department of 
Health, 2006, see table 5.1). This will be referred to as the TYPE of laboratory. It has been 
suggested that pathology demands of inner city laboratories are much different to those in 
rural areas. Further, the foundation status
63
 of a trust is seen to motivate it to act more 
commercially (Healthcare Commission, 2007, see table 5.1; Marini et al., 2008), which is 
expected to be extended to their pathology services. Lastly, data are available on whether the 
laboratories provide teaching services.  
The third specification finally adds dummy variables to capture unobservable heterogeneity 
(e.g. IT infrastructure/maturity, network activity) (Arocena et al., 2012). We use the strategic 
health authority dummy variables and then group them by region for parsimony.  
We refer to the specifications as s(i), s(ii) and s(iii).  
Finally, after having used this testing process to select a model, we exploit the fact that the 
stochastic frontier framework is based on a cost function to examine the cost elasticity 
properties across the output range and derive average and marginal costs in pathology 
production (AC and MC hereafter). We note that this is a key advantage of this method over 
DEA as an alternative. Focus is given to this aspect of production because this is a popular 
theme of interest throughout the literature (table 5.1), because there is little empirical 
evidence on this issue, and because of the growing membership of laboratories to local 
networks, which is encouraging the pooling of output); see Department of Health (2011). 
5.3.1 Empirical Specification 
First, for functional form, we test between a Cobb-Douglas and a translog specification to 
approximate our economic model in eqn. (5.1). A translog nests a Cobb-Douglas and we can 
readily test down. A translog has some appealing empirical and economic features: its 
flexible nature means it provides a second-order differential approximation to any unknown 
                                            
63 Foundation status of a NHS trust (a trust is a hospital or small group of hospitals) means that it operates under an independent, not-for-
profit regime, allowing it financial autonomy which it does not have without having foundation status (Marini et al., 2008). Trusts apply for 
foundation status, which is granted by the regulator, monitor, if the trust has satisfied the regulator of its financial competence. Foundation 
status has not been awarded to all NHS trusts.  
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function 𝑓(. ) (as in Equation (5.1)) (Kumbhakar and Hjalmarsson, 1995); it does not impose 
restrictions on substitution possibilities; and allows economies of scale to vary with output 
levels (Christensen and Greene, 1976).  
Logarithms are taken to give Farrell (1957)-type radial measures of inefficiency
64
. The 
translog representation is estimated for each model, 
𝑙𝑛 𝑐𝑖𝑡







































+ 𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                                                        (5.2) 
Where cit are operating costs; yit is output; wlit are labour input prices; zit are exogenous 
variables including tests for primary care and the test to request ratio; zi are laboratory-
specific, time-invariant dummy variables for the following: foundation status, teaching status 
and laboratory type
65
; ωr are regional dummy variables to capture unobservable 
heterogeneity; and t is a time trend capturing real cost changes over time (in this sample). 
Then, εit is decomposed into uit and vit which are inefficiency and statistical noise, 
respectively (see table 5.2 below for detailed specifications of each model).  
To decide on a preferred model, a number of statistical tests are applied
66
. We test functional 
form using a Wald test
67
.  
Next, we test between the three specifications from above, by which we mean either no 
heterogeneity variables s(i); observable heterogeneity variables only s(ii); and observable and 
unobservable heterogeneity variables
68
 s(iii).  We use LR tests for this. We refer to this as 
TEST 1.  
                                            
64 Variables are mean-scaled to allow direct interpretation of the first order terms; see Appendix A for derivation. 
65 Types of laboratory include rural, urban and metropolitan; rural is the reference case for modelling. 
66 Lai and Huang (2010), pp. 3, lament that “there are only limited systematic treatments of tests or model selection criteria in the existing 
stochastic frontier literatures.” 
67 H0: additional translog terms (squared and cross terms) are jointly equal to zero.  
68 H0: observable or unobservable heterogeneity variables are jointly equal to zero. 
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We then test between each efficiency model, by which we mean one of the 5 different 
efficiency models (REM, P&L, BC92, Cuesta, TRE), using a LR test
69
 for nested models 
(which we refer to as TEST 2)  and a Vuong test (1989) for non-nested models
70
 (which we 
refer to as TEST 3).  
In total, there are 30 models to be estimated
71
. 15 models are reported for comparison which 
represents our full set of models once the test for functional form has been applied. LIMDEP 
software (Greene, 2012a) is used for estimation. 
5.3.2 Inefficiency Models 
Table 5.2 below shows the econometric specifications of our range of models estimated.  
 
REM P&L BC92 CUESTA TRE 
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Inefficiency ?̂?𝑖 − 𝑚𝑖𝑛{?̂?𝑖} 𝐸[𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡] 𝐸[𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡] 𝐸[𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡] 𝐸[𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝛼𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡] 
      
Time Trend 
  
𝑢𝑖𝑡 = exp [𝜂(𝑡 − 𝑇)]. 𝑢𝑖 𝑢𝑖𝑡 = exp [𝜂𝑖(𝑡 − 𝑇)]. 𝑢𝑖 
 
      
Table 5.2: Econometric Specifications of Models 
 
5.3.3 Merging Laboratories 
A feature of recent pathology services is that, following recommendations from the Carter 
Review, laboratories in close proximity are increasingly beginning to pool their production 
(Department of Health, 2006; 2009). A natural question arises as to what happens to the costs 
of production when laboratories merge. This is, of course, tied closely to the issue of 
                                            
69 H0: log likelihood model (a) is equal to log likelihood model (b) 
70 H0: model (a) is equal to model (b) 
71 2 (functional forms) x 3 (heterogeneity variable specifications) x 5 (types of efficiency model) 
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economies of scale, which is of great interest to NHS policy makers and policy makers more 
widely.  
In our data, there are no examples of laboratory mergers. However, it is possible to use the 
model to simulate the effects of laboratories merging to shed some light on this issue: we can 
simply compare the sum of the predicted merged laboratory costs and the sum of the 
predicted unmerged laboratory costs. We do this for laboratories in the final year of the 
dataset. 
To operationalise the merged scenario, we merge the smaller laboratories with each other. 
We define a “small laboratory” as one whose output (number of requests) is lower than the 
sample median. We then merge the largest “small laboratory” with the smallest “small 
laboratory”, the second largest with the second smallest, and so on. We assume the larger 
laboratory absorbs the smaller; we thus assume the characteristics (i.e. foundation status, 
teaching status, region, etc.) of the larger laboratory for computing merged cost estimates. 
We are interested in the proportional change in total costs that would occur if small 
laboratories were to merge, thus we compute the following ratio, 
∑ 𝐸(𝑐𝑖,𝑇|𝑥𝑖𝑡′𝛽)
𝐼
𝑖=1 − ∑ 𝐸(𝑐𝑗,𝑇|𝑥𝑖𝑡




                                                                                (5.3) 
where 𝐸(𝑐𝑖,𝑇|𝑥𝑖𝑡′𝛽) is the conditional expectation of costs for laboratory i in its final year, T. 
The 𝑥𝑖𝑡′𝛽 is the estimated cost function, 𝑦 is output and 𝑦 > ?̃? denotes all output is greater 
than the (original) sample median, that is, laboratories with output lower than the median 
have merged. ∑ 𝐸(𝑐𝑖,𝑇|𝑥𝑖𝑡′𝛽)
𝐼
𝑖=1  is the sum of the predicted costs across all unmerged 
laboratories and ∑ 𝐸(𝑐𝑗,𝑇|𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽, 𝑦 > ?̃?)𝐽𝑗=1  is the sum of predicted costs across all merged 
laboratories. As a result of simulation, of the full sample of 57 laboratories, 28 “small” 
laboratories are merged into 14, thus reducing the number of laboratories from 57 to 43. 
Therefore, I, the number of unmerged laboratories, is 57 and J, the number of merged 
laboratories, is 43. 
Given the specification of our model (see equation (5.2)), there is an issue around 
retransformation of logged (predicted) costs (Manning, 1998). When the disturbance of the 
error term is normal, ̂~𝑁(0, 𝜎2(𝑥)), then  a straightforward correction can be made, 
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𝐸(𝑐𝑖,𝑇|𝑥𝑖𝑡′𝛽) =  𝑒
𝑥𝑖𝑡
′𝛽+0.5𝜎2(𝑥)                                                                                                        (5.4) 
where the uncorrected estimate is an underestimate since, 
𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡
′𝛽+0.5𝜎2(𝑥) > 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡
′𝛽                                                                                                                      (5.5) 
However, normality is an invalid assumption in our case as the stochastic frontier model does 
not, by definition, assume a normally distributed disturbance. Thus, an approach is required 
that can account for non-normally distributed errors. Therefore, as suggested by Greene 
(2012c, pp. 123), we use the smearing estimator proposed by Duan (1983). Thus our 
predictions of laboratory costs are, 
𝐸(𝑐𝑖,𝑇|𝑥𝑖𝑡′𝛽) =  ℎ
0𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡
′𝛽                                                                                                                  (5.6) 
where, 






                                                                                                                                (5.7) 
where n denotes the number of observations and ?̂? are the fitted residuals.  
5.3.4 Data 
Annual pathology benchmarking data (Keele Benchmarking) is used to compile an 
unbalanced panel of 57 English NHS pathology laboratories during a 5 year period from 
2006/7 to 2010/11
72
 (187 observations); accordingly we use maximum likelihood estimation 
(Baltagi, 2008) (except the REM which uses GLS and the TRE which uses simulated 
maximum likelihood). The sample represents approximately one third of the 163 NHS 
pathology laboratories in England. From table 5.3, there is considerable variation in the range 
and standard deviation of the costs, tests and requests variables, giving us confidence that we 
have a broad sample of laboratories. There is an almost even spread of laboratories amongst 
strategic health authorities (and therefore across England).  
Our data is for biochemistry services only. Biochemistry is one of five disciplines of 
pathology (the other four being haematology, hystocytology, immunology and microbiology). 
                                            
72 In our sample, 27 laboratories are observed twice, 7 are observed 3 times, 2 are observed 4 times and 21 are observed in every year – 5 
times.   
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Biochemistry is chosen because it is highly mechanised thus diminishing the issue of 
heterogeneity for modelling. It is the largest area of pathology (around 70% total activity 
(Holland et al., 2011)) and all laboratories run biochemistry services. A three stage process of 
data validation between the laboratories and Keele Benchmarking Unit is applied to ensure 
the data is accurate.  
Variables include total operating costs (net of capital charges), output (for which two 
measures are available: the number of tests and the number of requests), input prices of 
labour (from the UK labour force survey) and exogenous variables including the number of 
tests for general practice (primary care) and dummy variables for the foundation status of the 
host trust, for the pathology service providing teaching, for the laboratory type (metropolitan, 
urban, rural) and for the strategic health authority in which the pathology service is located. 
Service quality is assumed given that laboratories have been accredited as noted earlier.   
Costs and wage data are in real terms (2007 prices) using the consumer prices index. Labour 
force survey data is chosen over other sources (NHS staff census data, for example). This is 
firstly to ensure the exogeneity of the data: because the labour force survey data is collected 
and constructed independently from our study data, which would not be the case using the 
NHS-based data
73
. In addition, this data is a reflection of the true labour market conditions, 
which is not necessarily the case with the NHS data. Lastly, the NHS equivalent data is 
constructed using staff numbers which implies the measure may be correlated with output, 
which may lead to undesirable statistical issues such as collinearity. Secondly we aim to 
better reflect the regional variation in labour input prices than would be possible using 
alternative data. The ratio of tests to requests is calculated from the data
74
. Strategic health 
authorities are, following initial modelling, combined to form regional dummy variables for 
London, the South, the Midlands and the North using a Wald test procedure (Greene, 2012b).  
One available measure of clinical quality was available for analysis: turnaround times of 
tests. We did not use this for three major reasons. First, as an indicator, this is an incomplete 
measure of clinical quality (i.e. there are other dimensions of quality which may vary). This 
may induce measurement error if used to capture quality in our cost function. Second, some 
laboratories, although recording turnaround times, do not make efforts to reach targets as they 
                                            
73 Mutter et al. (2013) demonstrate using healthcare data that endogeneity can bias efficiency scores. 
74 As this variable is constructed using a variable that is also in the models, we check the correlation of the two variables for collinearity 
concerns. The correlation between the two variables is -0.34. We therefore do not see this as an issue. In any case, we note that collinearity 
is less an issue in panel data models than in cross-sectional or time series alternatives (Baltagi, 2008).  
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are not enforced. This means that this measure is likely to give a skewed reflection of this 
(partial) measure of quality. Third, the data completeness and validity is much lower than for 
the remainder of collected data (partly as some labs do not pay a great deal of attention to 
turnaround times).   
We note that we could have also used Reference Costs data for this analysis. For two major 
reasons we have not. First, we do not have the allocation of capital costs in Reference Costs 
data. We therefore do not know if inefficiency derives from inconsistencies in the allocation 
of capital costs or inefficiency itself. Secondly, the only output variable available is the 
number of tests; this, as explained, means that inefficiency estimates are vulnerable to 
gaming. 
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max 
     Operating costs (adjusted) 3617320 2058358 963875 11741895 
Number of tests 5037362 2990846 1380384 30199502 
Number of requests 714125 465535 191078 4423531 
Input prices (Labour) (adjusted) 24551 4160 15834 49955 
Number of primary care tests 2059689 932794 380790 5480395 
TYPE: Metropolitan 0.27  
TYPE: Urban 0.36  
TYPE: Rural 0.37  
Foundation Trusts 0.32    
Teaching Laboratories 0.46    
REGION: London 0.17  
REGION: South 0.25  
REGION: Midlands 0.29  
REGION: North 0.29  








5.4.1 Cost Function Parameters 
Across the range of models estimated (table 5.4), a number of general observations can be 
made. Cost elasticity with respect to output implies economies of scale (which we refer to as 
size – see later section) in pathology production (the first order parameters are elasticities at 
the sample mean; we go on to explore how these vary with output later in this section). Real 
operating costs appear to be decreasing over time as indicated by the negative coefficient on 
the time trend variable. Operating costs in pathology laboratories are higher for those which 
have high test to request ratios, are located in metropolitan and urban locations (relative to 
rural laboratories), provide teaching services and are in the Midlands (relative to the Northern 
laboratories). Operating costs are lower for foundation trust laboratories and for those located 
in London or the South (relative to the North). There was no clear finding as to the effect of 
GP tests on laboratory operating costs, where the effect appears negative in two models, 
positive in another and not statistically significant in any other.  
 
5.4.2 Statistical Testing and Inefficiency Model Selection 
Wald tests strongly and consistently favoured the translog functional form (the null being the 
Cobb-Douglas). Test 1 finds the s(ii) and s(iii) heterogeneity variables jointly significant 
additions to the models in all cases (table 5.5). Test 2 strongly favours the Cuesta model over 
the BC92 and P&L. Test 3 favours the Cuesta model over the TRE model
75
. Therefore our 
preferred inefficiency model is Cuesta s(iii) based on statistical criteria. Indeed, this model is 
preferred a priori because of how it deals with efficiency change over time (see section III for 
details). A significant lambda value (table 5.4) confirms the presence of inefficiency
76
. 
                                            
75 We are aware that the Vuong test has no degrees of freedom restriction, meaning that it imposes no penalty for additional parameters 
estimated and so is likely to, in this case, favour the Cuesta model which has more parameters than the TRE model. Therefore, as a 
robustness check, we have also tested the P&L (which has fewer parameters than the TRE) against the TRE, and the test favours the P&L. 
Because our LR test preferred the Cuesta to the P&L, and the Vuong preferred the P&L to the TRE, we prefer the Cuesta to the TRE.  
76 In addition, we have tested the presence of inefficiency using the LR test procedure outlined in Coelli et al. (2005) pp.258, which also 
confirms our result, but we do not report the test results here. 
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Dependent Variable: OPEX Specification                   
  s(i) c = y, w, t         s(ii) c = y, w, t,  z – observable     s(iii) c = y, w, t, z - observable, z - unobservable   
  Model                             
  REM P+L BC92 CUESTA TRE REM P+L BC92 CUESTA TRE REM P+L BC92 CUESTA TRE 
                                
PARAMETER VALUES                               
CONSTANT 6.55*** 6.32*** 6.31*** 6.31*** 6.60*** 6.55*** 6.40*** 6.39*** 6.39*** 6.61 6.53*** 6.42*** 6.42*** 6.35*** 6.54*** 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (9.11) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.00) 
OUTPUT 0.43*** 0.29*** 0.31*** 0.30*** 0.74*** 0.67*** 0.55*** 0.62*** 0.35*** 0.99*** 0.67*** 0.58*** 0.64*** 0.44*** 0.93*** 
  (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.10) (0.09) (0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.00) 
INPUT PRICES 0.61*** 0.52** 0.54** 0.68*** 0.64*** 0.64*** 0.53*** 0.49** 0.59*** 0.84*** 0.83*** 0.80*** 0.89*** 1.30*** 1.04*** 
  (0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.14) (0.14) (0.21) (0.20) (0.22) (0.13) (0.09) (0.22) (0.23) (0.24) (0.21) (0.01) 
YEAR -0.01** -0.01 -0.01 -0.01** -0.02*** -0.01** -0.01* 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01** -0.01* 0.01 -0.01*** -0.01*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
GP_TESTS           0.01 0.03 0.02 0.07* -0.14*** 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.06 -0.08*** 
            (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.00) 
TES:REQ           0.23*** 0.19** 0.21*** 0.02 0.47*** 0.24*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.12** 0.48*** 
            (0.07) (0.09) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.05) (0.00) 
TYPE: METROPOLITAN           0.13*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.09*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.10*** 
            (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.00) 
TYPE: URBAN           0.03 0.04* 0.04 0.05* 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01*** 
            (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.00) 
FOUNDATION           -0.06** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.11*** -0.06*** -0.04 -0.06** -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.04*** 
            (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.00) 
TEACHING           0.03 0.04* 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.05** 0.03 0.02 0.03*** 
            (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) 
REGION: LONDON                     -0.02 -0.05 -0.07** -0.16*** -0.02*** 
                      (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.00) 
REGION: SOUTH                     -0.03 -0.04 -0.05* -0.01 -0.01*** 
                      (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.00) 
REGION: MIDLANDS                     0.08** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.08*** 
                      (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.00) 
Table 5.4: Estimation Outputs. Standard errors in parentheses. Notes: *,** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 





  REM P+L BC92 CUESTA TRE REM P+L BC92 CUESTA TRE REM P+L BC92 CUESTA TRE 
EFFICEINCY FIGURES                               
mean 0.71 0.81 0.81 0.79 0.99 0.76 0.87 0.88 0.82 1 0.77 0.9 0.9 0.87 1 
s.d. 0.1 0.11 0.11 0.12 0 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.11 0 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.1 0 
lambda   5.11*** 5.17*** 13.01*** 3974.52   3.15*** 3.33*** 11.97*** 0   2.67*** 3.04*** 8.38*** 552028 
    (1.64) (0.03) (0.01) (5.71*10^7)   (0.94) (0.05) (0.01) (205.77)   (0.71) (0.05) (0.02) (5.69*10^7) 
eta     -0.01         -0.07*         -0.11**     
      (0.02)         (0.04)         (0.05)     
                                
Table 5.4 (cont.): Estimation Outputs. Standard errors in parentheses. Notes: *,** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 


















     
LR Statistic Tests for Heterogeneity Variables: TEST 1  
     
 
 
     
Model   P&L BC92 CUESTA TRE 
       
Restriction of S(ii) to S(i): Observable heterogeneity variables (d.f.: 13,13,13,12)  44.6*** 48.00*** 44.82*** 91.04*** 
Restriction of S(iii) to S(ii): Unobservable heterogeneity variables (d.f.:  3,3,3,4)  14.86*** 17.70*** 8.38*** 38.60*** 
       
       
LR Statistic Tests for Model Selection (nested models only): TEST 2       





       
Specification (i): Basic Cost function    (d.f.: 57, 56) 166.84*** 166.70*** 
Specification (ii): Observable Heterogeneity    (d.f.: 57, 56) 167.00*** 163.32*** 
Specification (iii): Regional Dummies for Unobserved Heterogeneity    (d.f.: 57, 56) 160.52*** 154.00*** 
 
 
     
Vuong Test Statistic: TEST 3       
 
 
     
TRE specification (iii) vs. Cuesta model specification (iii)     V = -9.066***  
       
Model Log Likelihood Function Values and degrees of freedom (K)  
     
 
 
     
Model   P&L BC92 CUESTA TRE 
 
  
    
Specification (i): Basic Cost function   198.80 198.97 282.22 135.81 
K   9 10 66 10 
Specification (ii): Observable Heterogeneity   221.13 222.97 304.63 181.33 
K   22 23 79 23 
Specification (iii): Regional Dummies for Unobserved Heterogeneity   228.56 231.82 308.82 200.63 
K   25 26 82 26 
 
 
     
 
 
     
Table 5.5: LR Specification and Model Selection 
Notes: *,** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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5.4.3 Inefficiency Predictions 
From table 5.4, the mean efficiency estimate from our preferred model is 0.87. On average, 
efficiency is computed as decreasing slightly amongst pathology laboratories over time 
(which is in agreement with the BC92 s(iii) model
77
 in table 5.4, given their eta coefficients) 
from 0.87 in 2007 to 0.86 in 2011. Fig 5.2 shows the cost efficiency estimates of laboratories 
over time. The bar in Fig. 5.2 is at efficiency = 1, i.e. full efficiency. Groups of points 
correspond to each individual laboratory, e.g. observations 1-5 are the efficiency estimates 
for laboratory 1 in years 1 to 5, observations 6 to 10 are laboratory 2 in years 1-5, and so on. 
We do not find the problem of efficiency scores dropping off the frontier in the final year of 
the sample, which has been a concern for other applications of this model (Wheat and Smith, 
2012). In addition, we find that many of the laboratory-specific etas are statistically 
significant. Those that were not tended to be the firms that are on the frontier (and thus have 
little or no inefficiency change over time), which can be seen in figure 5.2.   




                                            
77 Which is preferred of the three candidate BC92 models, see table 5.5 
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5.4.4 Elasticity of cost, Average and Marginal Costs 
Our set of models give estimates of the elasticity of cost with respect to output at the sample 
mean in the range of 0.29-1.04 (table 5.4) and is 0.44 in the preferred model. However, a 
more informative approach is to examine how this elasticity changes with the scale of the 
operation, proxied by output (Fig. 5.3), using our preferred model. Using this elasticity, we 
are able to further estimate AC and MC per request using fitted values from the model (see 
Wheat and Smith, 2008, for details) (Figs 5.4 and 5.5).  
Figure 5.3: Elasticity of Cost with respect to Output for Cuesta s(iii) Model 
Note to Figure 5.3: LCB – lower confidence bound, UCB – upper confidence bound. Requests are varied, all 
other variables are held at the sample mean. 
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Figure 5.4: Marginal cost (MC) for Cuesta s(iii) Model 






5.5.1 Cost Function Parameters 
This section draws on all models to examine the parameters of the cost function. The 
parameter estimates in the frontier models show reasonable concordance with each other and 
with the REM model, giving us confidence in our models. 
The coefficient on input prices appears to be highly significant and in the range of 0.52-0.89, 
aside from two models, the Cuesta s(iii) and the TRE s(iii), which have values of 1.30 and 
1.04, respectively. These estimates appear to be out of line with the remaining estimates. If 
the value of this coefficient was truly greater than 1, it would imply that operating costs were 
rising more quickly than input prices. However, we note that the 95% confidence intervals for 
both of these estimates include 1, meaning that we are unable to confirm that estimate of the 
coefficient, based on either of these models, exceeds 1. Of course, we only have data for 
labour input prices, and are thus unable to impose linear homogeneity of degree one on input 
prices, which gives rise to the possibility of beta estimates in excess of 1. We emphasise that 
the remaining models, including our benchmark REMs (which do not impose the 
distributional assumptions of the stochastic frontier models), all appear to have estimates of 
the coefficient on labour input prices within a plausible range. Lastly, we note that other 
studies have shown large labour cost shares for biochemistry operating costs - approximately 
80-90% (Department of Health, 2008 pp.44). This may explain the reported coefficients.  
The time trend coefficients suggest a reduction in real laboratory operating costs of 0-2% per 
year. The 0-2% figure can then be seen as the shifting of the frontier over time. The frontier 
may exhibit downward shift if, for example, productivity in pathology production is 
increasing, which would support the findings of Holland et al., (2012). 
Moving to the observable heterogeneity parameter coefficients (s(ii) variables), there was no 
clear finding of the impact of GP tests (the parameter was not statistically significant). From 
the healthcare commission (2007), a negative coefficient value was expected because primary 
care tests are thought to be cheaper than other tests.  
The tests to requests ratio coefficients are in line with a priori expectations (positive and less 
than 1) from the literature (table 5.1). The estimated elasticity from this sample is in the range 
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0.12-0.48. The implications depend on the interpretation of this practice – it may be 
considered gaming by laboratories to inflate their performance figures; on the other hand it 
may be a reflection of a better quality of service since more patient information is being 
supplied per request. 
The type of laboratory is found to be a source of cost heterogeneity, which matches previous 
literature (table 5.1). In our analysis, we were able to investigate this issue further. 
Laboratories situated in metropolitan areas are on average 9-17%
78
 more costly than 
laboratories in rural areas. The findings for urban-based laboratories are that on average they 
are 0-5% more costly than rural laboratories. We caveat this finding by noting that the 
coefficient was significant in only three of fifteen models. 
The foundation status of the host trust appears to be associated with a 4-10% reduction in 
operating costs for pathology laboratories. From the literature, profit incentives motivate 
hospitals to reduce costs to a greater extent than non-profit hospitals (Sloan, 2000), which is 
the aim of granting foundation status to a trust and should mean pathology services act 
commercially (Healthcare Commission, 2007).  
Lastly, laboratories which provide teaching activities are found to have higher operating 
costs, in the range 0-5%, to those which do not; coefficients in only three of ten models were 
statistically significant. This is in line with expectations, firstly because of the activity itself, 
but also because pathology services which are more specialised (and generally more 
expensive) tend to be associated with teaching activities, which may also be driving costs up 
(Department of Health, 2006). Moreover, this finding is in line with other health care studies 
(Gutacker et al., 2013). 
The unobservable heterogeneity variable parameters (s(iii)) suggest that laboratories in 
London and the South are in the range 0-15% (statistically significant in 3 of 5 models) and 
0-5% (statistically significant in 2 of 5 models), respectively, less expensive than laboratories 
from the North (the omitted dummy); and that operating costs of laboratories in the Midlands 
are on average 8-11% higher than those of laboratories in the North. From the literature, 
unobservable heterogeneity amongst these laboratories likely derives from information 
                                            
78 Because our model is estimated in logarithms, we have applied an exponential retransformation to recover our estimate of the effect on 
costs. To illustrate, for the Cuesta s(iii) model, exp(0.16) = 1.17, meaning that the beta on TYPE: Metropolitan from this model implies that 




systems adoption, network activity and peer contact (Department of Health, 2006; Healthcare 
Commission, 2007; Eijkenaar, 2013)
79
.  
5.5.2 Inefficiency Predictions 
Our efficiency estimates are based on results from our preferred efficiency model: Cuesta 
s(iii). 
To calculate our estimates of the potential savings we use laboratories’ efficiency estimates in 
their final observed year. We calculate the potential cost of production if each laboratory 
adopted best practice (of that observed in the sample, denoted by each laboratory’s efficiency 
estimate). Then, we subtract this estimate from the observed costs of laboratories to yield the 
potential available savings. We find potential savings of £32.8m in our sample (average cost 
efficiency in final year = 0.86).  
We extrapolate to NHS pathology services (that is, all laboratories outside this sample and all 
other remaining pathology disciplines), giving an estimate of £390m per year of potential 
savings available to contribute to the Nicholson Challenge. This is around double the savings 
estimate that was proposed in the grey literature based on a much smaller sample – 
extrapolated comparably - of around £250m (Department of Health, 2008).  Recalling that 
this data is for biochemistry services - the most mechanised of the five major pathology 
disciplines - we envisage that our estimates may well underestimate the true level of 
inefficiency, since mechanised pathology services are more homogenous than other 
disciplines (Kiechle and Main, 2002). We thus conclude that this is more likely a minimum 
efficiency saving than a maximum, which underlines the importance of pathology services 
for policy makers if expenditure reduction is high on their agenda.  
However, driving out inefficiency may be more of a challenge amongst the more 
heterogeneous disciplines, such as hystocytology. First, not all laboratories conduct these 
services, meaning that there are fewer opportunities to compare practice and share 
knowledge. Second, that there is a paucity of available data in these disciplines means that 
measuring inefficiency may be more challenging (Buckell et al., 2013).  
                                            
79 According to anecdotal evidence from pathologists, these features are more prevalent in London and the South and thus are likely driving 
this variation in costs. 
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The average efficiency score over time is decreasing slightly. However, we find that 
individual etas imply that some laboratories are becoming more efficient over time, some are 
constant over time, and some are becoming less efficient over time (Fig. 5.2); many of the 
laboratory-specific etas were found to be statistically significant. Information on the 
efficiency profiles of the individual laboratories is a powerful output of this type of top-down 
benchmarking as it indicates where further attention needs to be focused to drive out 
efficiency improvements. As noted earlier, the approach used to model efficiency change 
over time has been applied in economic regulation in other sectors. We do not identify 
individual laboratories for confidentiality reasons. 
5.5.3 Multi-Factor Productivity 
Given that we have reduced efficiency over time and technical change (falling costs) as per 
the time trend coefficient in our preferred model (i.e. frontier shift), it is informative to 
compute the Total Factor Productivity (TFP) Index (Coelli et al., 2005) to give an overall 
account of pathology performance (chapter 3.6). However, we do not observe costs which 
include capital, nor an output mix effect, meaning that it would be inappropriate to describe 
our measure as a TFP index. We therefore define a Multi-factor Productivity (MFP) Index as 
our measure of overall pathology performance. 










      
2007 0.868 1 1 1 0 
2008 0.839 0.967 1.014 0.981 -1.9% 
2009 0.857 0.987 1.029 1.016 3.5% 
2010 0.847 0.976 1.044 1.020 0.3% 
2011 0.858 0.989 1.059 1.048 2.8% 
      
Table 5.6: Multi-Factor Productivity Pathology Laboratories 
As can be seen in table 5.6, the overall MFP for pathology is increasing over time, from 
1.000 in 2007 to 1.048 in 2011. The annual change is positive for three of the years and 
negative for one year. Overall, MFP increases by 4.8% over the period of study. Thus, the 
small reduction in the efficiencies of laboratories away from the frontier is more than offset 
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by the gains in costs by the efficient firms (the frontier shift), yielding the overall MFP 
increase.   
5.5.4 Economies of Size in Pathology 
Due to our measure of costs not incorporating capital charges, we are, strictly speaking, 
unable to interpret changes in the relationship between output and costs as economies of 
scale. Accordingly, we refer to ‘economies of size’, and interpret this as the way in which 
operating costs change across the output range.  
The cost elasticity estimates with respect to output indicate economies of size properties in 
pathology production (Fig. 5.3). Further, MC is falling faster than AC (Figs 5.4 and 5.5), 
meaning that the elasticity is falling (Fig 5.3), so the extent of economies of size is increasing 
as the scale of production increases; this will continue as long as MC falls faster than AC. 
This suggests that the growing formation of local pathology networks may help to lower costs 
for laboratories where production is pooled, which corresponds to pathology analysis 
elsewhere (Kiechle and Main, 2002). Encouragingly, this is being recognised by policy 
makers at the top level (Department of Health, 2011). It is of course possible that the 




With regard to comparisons with previous studies, a direct comparison with the economies of 
scale finding in the Department of Health study (Department of Health, 2008) is difficult 
given that our measure does not incorporate capital costs. However, it is not clear that their 
measure did either, given that no empirical results on this issue are presented. Although 
capital cost information is collected (Department of Health, 2008, pp. 37) their only analysis 
(of unit costs) presented does not include these costs (Department of Health, 2008, pp. 44, 46, 




                                            
80 We note that the AC curve appears to be flattening towards the extreme of the sample (Figure 5.5). However, given that MC remains 
lower than AC at this point, this must be being driven by factors other than size which are associated with higher costs when size increases. 




Using our preferred model, Cuesta specification (iii), and equation (5.3), we were able to 
simulate the effects of mergers between small laboratories. We find that, if the smaller 
laboratories in the sample merged, the sum of the implied predicted costs would be 
approximately 17% lower than those previously incurred by these laboratories separately. 
This suggests that there are potential considerable cost savings available via laboratories 
pooling production. Indeed, this estimate suggests that these potential savings are greater than 
those available through efficiency improvements.  
While we consider this to be a useful indicative valuation of the effect of potential pooling, 
we attach a number of caveats to this estimate; this exercise is ultimately a stylised scenario. 
Firstly, we note that there is no consideration to the additional costs incurred through merging 
(e.g. the costs to transport samples, the costs of service delays, etc.). Second, we do not take 
into account any effect on the quality of the service, the effect of specialisation or the 
interaction with other hospital services. Thirdly, we do not consider whether these 
laboratories are contiguous, which could potentially be limiting to mergers. On the other 
hand, this estimate is based on a small number of laboratories merging, in practice there is no 
limit to the number that can merge. In addition, we have assumed pairwise mergers; it is, of 
course, possible that multiple laboratories will merge. Thus, based on the last two caveats, the 
potential savings could be even larger than estimated here (as long as the subadditivity of 
costs continues).  
 
5.6 Conclusions 
We have applied econometric efficiency estimation techniques to an under-researched area in 
health care literature: pathology. In doing so, we have developed performance measurement 
in this field beyond existing indicators benchmarking techniques. We have found, having 
controlled for cross-unit heterogeneity, 13% inefficiency in pathology services in the NHS in 
England. If this is indicative of NHS pathology as a whole, there could be £390m per year of 
available savings from pathology to contribute to the Nicholson Challenge of NHS efficiency 
savings. In addition, we found that the pooling of production looks to induce substantial gains 
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in pathology cost savings. If smaller laboratories merged their production, they could save 
around 17% in their operating costs. 
We have found that overall efficiency in pathology has decreased over time. The particular 
method that we have adopted also allows the time paths of efficiency for individual 
laboratories to be studied. We have also found frontier shift which decreases costs over time. 
Overall, MFP for the laboratories in our sample has increased by around 5% between 2007 
and 2011.   
We have estimated the magnitudes of various drivers of laboratory costs which were 
identified from previous pathology studies. Some of these drivers have not previously been 
quantified (e.g. the costs of teaching or the effect of the host trust having foundation status). 
We have paid particular attention to the elasticity of cost with respect to output. We have 
found economies of size, which is encouraging from a policy perspective because local 
networks are being formed in pathology services which increase the scale of production. We 
note, however, that our measure of costs does not include a component of capital, and thus 
are findings are limited to this extent. We also note that, although discussed in previous 
studies, no empirical evidence has been presented in previous literature on this issue 
(Department of Health, 2006; 2008). Therefore, on this issue, our study appears to be the first 
to present empirical evidence. 
We believe these findings are important to policy makers because it provides them with the 
evidence needed to make informed decisions on the allocation of resources and on the 
management of pathology services. The method that we have adopted highlights performance 
variation both between decision making units (in our case, pathology laboratories) and over 
time. It has been applied by economic regulators outside health as a means of driving out 
efficiency improvements and we consider that it also has the potential to be applied much 
more widely in the health sector. 
We now turn to our second empirical study in which we proceed to examine some further 





6. Dual-level inefficiency and unobserved heterogeneity in NHS pathology 
This chapter is based on Smith et al. (2015). In keeping with chapter 4, we focus on 
pathology for a number of practical reasons: first, focussing on a speciality within health 
services (as opposed to broader entities such as whole hospitals or regions as the unit(s) of 
analysis) is more likely to be useful to policy makers and thus likely to encourage the use of 
efficiency predictions; and second, efficiency studies in health should target specific policy 
objectives: this study feeds into the policy of promoting pathology efficiency (Department of 
Health, 2006: and more generally, as discussed at length in opening chapters of this thesis, 
the NHS’s ‘a call to action’ for efficiency improvements (NHS England, 2013).  
This is the second empirical study of this thesis, and the second that is focussed on pathology 
services. In the first application (chapter 5), we examined several features of pathology 
production, including efficiency and how it changed over time; the drivers of pathology costs, 
including a particular focus on economies of scale in pathology; and we took an overall 
account of pathology performance by estimating MFP change in pathology.  
This study builds on the prior chapter by examining two further aspects of pathology 
production, and the estimation of efficiency. These are the location of inefficiency in 
hierarchical organisational structures; and the incorporation of unobservable heterogeneity of 
varying forms into models. These issues are not confined to pathology, findings and 
methodological advances here are relevant more widely in health and to other sectors beyond 
that; indeed, the model on which our study is based was developed in transport markets 
(Smith and Wheat, 2012). Further, the identification of efficiency within organisational 
hierarchies has been identified as a key area for advancing health-based efficiency analysis 
(Hollingsworth and Peacock, 2008).  
The remainder of this chapter is as follows. 6.1 establishes the policy context, the structure of 
pathology services and our economic rationale. In 6.2, our models, model features, statistical 
testing and estimation strategy are discussed. 6.3 details the data set used to estimate the 
models. 6.4 presents our results in terms of the estimated model parameters, model selection, 
predictions of inefficiency, implications for health policy and the implications for modelling 





An important aspect of measuring performance is being able to locate the source of 
inefficiency. This allows initiatives to adopt best practice to be targeted effectively. In health 
markets, organisations – particularly the NHS - are typified by hierarchical managerial 
structures where inefficiency may arise at different points within the (vertical) hierarchy as 
well as horizontally between organisational units at the same organisational level.  
Recent health literature has begun to recognise that organisational structure should be 
incorporated into performance analysis (Adams et al., 2003; Olsen and Street, 2008; Sorensen 
et al., 2009; Castelli et al., 2013; Zhang et al., 2013). However, the previous health efficiency 
literature focuses its attention on horizontal comparisons, albeit at different levels of 
aggregation depending on the study (see Murillo-Zamorano et al., 2011; D’Amico et al., 
2012; Felder et al., 2013).  
In this chapter, we carry out a multi-level efficiency analysis that seeks to identify where 
inefficiency resides within a vertical organisational hierarchy in NHS pathology services. 
Pathology services are conducted in laboratories providing diagnostic medicine to primary 
care (local GPs) and secondary care (hospitals) within the NHS.  
Pathology services are organised hierarchically, where groups of laboratories are under the 
direction of Strategic Health Authorities
81
 (SHAs hereafter). SHAs dictate central policy, 
corporate culture and have some degree of control over pathology services (e.g. the 
configuration of services) (Department of Health, 2006); leaving some managerial autonomy 
at laboratory level. Thus, there is a component of overall inefficiency attributable to each 
SHA (which is persistent across laboratories within the SHA). Lower down in the 
organisation, inefficiency is likely to vary according to the relative ability of laboratory-level 
management. From a policy and management perspective, it is important to understand both 
sources of inefficiency so that appropriate incentives can be offered to drive improvements in 
efficiency. By combining the inefficiency estimates from the two hierarchical levels 
(persistent and lab-varying), an overall measure of inefficiency for the higher level (SHA) 
can be computed.  
                                            
81 The NHS has recently undergone a substantial reorganisation under which the SHAs have been abolished. However, they were in place 
during the period under study. 
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Measuring multi-level performance may be of greater practical use than single level 
measures, which should encourage their uptake amongst policy makers, which has hitherto 
been limited in health markets (Hollingsworth, 2012). Moreover, multi-level performance has 
been identified as a key future direction for health care-based efficiency analysis 
(Hollingsworth and Peacock, 2008).  
To obtain inefficiency measures at these different organisational levels, and an overall 
inefficiency measure, we adopt the dual-level stochastic frontier model (DLSF; see Smith and 
Wheat (2012)), which has been applied in other sectors to measure multi-level firm 
inefficiency. The advantage of this model is firstly that it enables inefficiency at different 
organisational levels to be identified. Smith and Wheat (2012) use the terminology sub-
company, or internal inefficiency, which in our case corresponds to inefficiency at the 
laboratory level; and persistent or external inefficiency, which in our case refers to persistent 
inefficiency at the SHA level. A further key finding of their paper is that, when the 
organisational structure is not accounted for, inefficiency predictions can exhibit a downward 
bias. Thus there is motivation in adopting a DLSF model both to yield insight into the level of 
inefficiency variation at different levels and to eliminate bias in the overall prediction. 
Another form of bias, which is particularly problematic in health, results from the failure to 
appropriately model unobservable heterogeneity (Greene, 2004; Smith et al., 2012). In the 
case of pathology services, there are significant differences in laboratories’ production 
processes. These may include factors typically studied by economists such as outputs and 
input prices; but also specificities such as patient mix or service quality, inter alia 
(Department of Health, 2006; Buckell et al., 2013; NHS England, 2014b; Buckell et al., 
2015). Some of these features are difficult or even impossible to measure directly, and so 
accounting for unobservable heterogeneity is of paramount importance.  
Smith and Wheat (2012) recognise that persistent inefficiency at the higher level of 
aggregation (which corresponds, in our case, to SHA level inefficiency) could also reflect 
time and laboratory invariant unobserved heterogeneity. However, they leave that issue for 
future research. At the same there has been considerable interest in the wider panel data 
stochastic frontier literature (Farsi et al., 2005a; Kumbhakar et al., 2014) on how to separate 
inefficiency from unobserved, time invariant heterogeneity. We therefore augment the Smith 
and Wheat (2012) DLSF approach to reflect developments in the wider panel data efficiency 
literature with regard to the vexing problem of disentangling inefficiency from unobserved 
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heterogeneity. We compare our findings to a model without any attempt to separate 
inefficiency and unobservable heterogeneity, to demonstrate the importance of accounting for 
the latter case of multi-level data structures.  
This chapter therefore contributes to the literature in two ways. It is the first application of the 
Smith and Wheat (2012) DLSF inefficiency model in a health context. It is also the first time 
the approaches set out in Farsi et al. (2005a) and Kumbhakar et al. (2014) have been applied 
to a multi-level data structure. We thus apply and develop state-of-the-art models to draw 
policy conclusions on pathology services within the NHS in England, and also offer insights 
on the relative merits of different approaches to separating inefficiency and unobserved 
heterogeneity when applied to multi-level data structures. 
 
6.2 Methods 
We begin our methodological discussion with the general form of the dual-level stochastic 
frontier proposed by Smith and Wheat (2012). We next discuss the issue of unobservable 
heterogeneity and its relevance to efficiency estimation in our application. We then outline 
two further models, each of which adds a component to the model to distil out the 
unobservable heterogeneity from the efficiency prediction, though with differing 
assumptions. We finally consider a fully generalised model comprising the features of the 
preceding models. In total, four models are considered. Estimation, econometric specification 
and statistical testing are described. 
Our starting point is the dual-level stochastic frontier (DLSF) model proposed by Smith and 
Wheat (2012). This model is derived from panel data stochastic frontier models, with the 
exception that the structure of the panel is amended from firm and time to firm and sub-
company, where the sub-company units are repeat observations of their respective firms. In 
this way, the structure of the organisation is embodied in the model. This allows the 
decomposition of inefficiency at the two organisational levels in the hierarchy. In this 




Smith and Wheat (2012) outline the advantages of this model and its application to multi-
level data structures. First, multi-level data structures increase the number of observations for 
analysis, which can be a major benefit for economic regulators who often have to work with 
small cross-sections and limited time periods. Second, it permits a clearer understanding of 
where inefficiency resides in the vertical hierarchy, allowing regulators to target the 
elimination of persistent differences between SHAs (external inefficiency) and differences in 
performance of laboratories within the same SHA (internal inefficiency). Finally, it is 
beneficial to conduct performance analysis at the level of disaggregation that relates to how 
SHAs/laboratories actually organise themselves, in particular allowing the true scale 
properties of the cost function to be established.  
The imposed form of inefficiency is well suited to the multi-level model. Smith and Wheat 
(2012) note that, in traditional panels, having an overall inefficiency comprising a component 
of SHA inefficiency that is time-invariant and a component that varies randomly over time 
may not accurately capture the natural temporal evolution of inefficiency. In contrast, 
imposing a SHA-invariant component and a laboratory-varying component to the structure of 
inefficiency befits the aim of vertically decomposing inefficiency.  
The DLSF model takes the general form, 
𝐶𝑖,𝑠 =  𝑋𝑖,𝑠′𝛽 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝑖,𝑠                                                                                                                   (6.1) 
𝑖,𝑠 = 𝜏𝑖,𝑠 + 𝑣𝑖,𝑠                                                                                                                                   (6.2)  
𝜏𝑖,𝑠~𝑁
+(0, 𝜎𝜏
2)                                                                                                                                    (6.3)  
𝑣𝑖,𝑠~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣
2)                                                                                                                                      (6.4)  
Where Ci,s is the cost of laboratory s in SHA i. 𝑋𝑖,𝑠is a vector of outputs, input prices and 
environmental variables; 𝛽  is a vector of parameters to be estimated. 𝛿𝑖 is the SHA-specific 
effect. 𝜏𝑖𝑠 is laboratory-specific inefficiency and 𝑣𝑖𝑠 is random statistical noise. The notation 
in (6.1) highlights the tiered structure of the data only; in the empirical work presented below, 
there is also a time dimension to the data.  
Estimation proceeds via estimation of a SHA-stratified random effects model (REM) by 
Generalised Least Squares (GLS) (as in equation (6.1)), yielding estimates of 𝛽 (?̂?), predicted 
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values of SHA effects (to which we turn our attention in the following sections), and 
residuals, ?̂?,𝑠.  
The prediction of laboratory-specific inefficiency is conducted in a second stage. It is 
common for all four models. We take the model residuals from the first stage (which have 
had the SHA effect removed), stratify by laboratory and apply the Jondrow et al. (1982) 
procedure to retrieve laboratory-specific predictions of inefficiency, 
?̂?𝑖,𝑠 = 𝐸[𝜏𝑖,𝑠|𝜏𝑖,𝑠 + 𝑣𝑖,𝑠]                                                                                                                      (6.5) 
We assume time-invariance for the predicted efficiency at laboratory level, given that our 
panel is both short in its time dimension and unbalanced.  The competing models are then 
distinguished according to the treatment of the SHA-specific effect, 𝛿𝑖.  
 
6.2.1 The Dual-Level Stochastic Frontier (Model 1) 
The DLSF treats the SHA-specific effect as inefficiency, which in the case of GLS estimation 
yields, 
𝛿𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝜇𝑖                                                                                                                                         (6.6) 
𝜇𝑖~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜇
2)                                                                                                                                         (6.7) 
Where the prediction of SHA inefficiency is a Schmidt and Sickles (1984)-type correction, 
?̂?𝑖 = ?̂?𝑖 − min (?̂?𝑖). 
 
6.2.2 Accounting for Unobservable Heterogeneity 
A simplifying assumption of the DLSF proposed by Smith and Wheat (2012) was that the 
SHA effect is interpreted as the SHA inefficiency. This is consistent with the received 
literature such as Kumbhakar and Heshmati (1996). However, Smith and Wheat (2012) 
acknowledged that this interpretation may not be appropriate in all cases. In particular, any 
heterogeneity that is not captured by the regressors is incorporated into this effect, which 
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biases inefficiency estimates (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). Ultimately, the SHA effect is a 
mixture of unobservable effects, one of which being SHA invariant inefficiency. 
In the case of pathology production, there are features of laboratories’ production 
environments for which no data are available, e.g. the service quality (which is known to vary 
between laboratories and SHAs), implying the DLSF may be an inappropriate specification. 
As such, the DLSF model is extended to examine two approaches to incorporate the influence 
of unobservable heterogeneity, namely the use of the Mundlak (1978) transformation and the 
residual decomposition approach of Kumbhakar et al. (2014). In addition, we estimate a 
model which incorporates both of these approaches. We utilise statistical testing to determine 
an appropriate approach. Results are compared between models to demonstrate differences.  
6.2.3 The Mundlak-Transformed DLSF (Model 2) 
One way to introduce a control for unobservable heterogeneity into the DLSF model follows 
Farsi et al. (2005a), which was first extended to the DLSF by Wheat (2014) and subsequently 
implemented on a railways dataset in Smith and Wheat (2014). The approach makes use of 
Mundlak’s (1978) recognition of the link between random and fixed effects in panel data 
models. This approach is operationalised via a direct insertion of group means of the 
regressors into the random effects model
82
. In this way, this model nests model 1. 
This model assumes that inefficiency is uncorrelated with the regressors whilst unobserved 
heterogeneity is assumed to be correlated with the regressors. Correlation between the SHA 
effects and the regressors is modelled explicitly by using the variable group means. Under the 
assumption that this correlation represents unobservable heterogeneity, it is removed from the 
SHA effects. Then the SHA effects that remain are treated as before and efficiency 
predictions are derived. 
𝛿𝑖 =  𝛼0 + ?̅?𝑖
′𝜌 + 𝜇𝑖                                                                                                                            (6.8) 
𝜇𝑖~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜇
2)                                                                                                                                         (6.9) 
 
                                            
82 There is an alternative approach using a fixed effects model and an auxiliary regression on the SHA effects (Farsi et al., 2005a). In linear 
models, this method returns identical parameter estimates, but underestimates standard errors in the auxiliary stage, so the random effects 




′𝜌 captures unobservable heterogeneity that is correlated with the regressors. SHA 
inefficiency predictions, ?̂?𝑖,  are: ?̂?𝑖 = ?̂?𝑖 − min (?̂?𝑖). 
Model 2 has a number of appealing features. First, the separation of inefficiency from 
unobservable heterogeneity (that is correlated with the regressors) is achieved. Second, 
consistent, unbiased within estimators for the frontier parameters are recovered through 
application of GLS to this model
83
. Third, it is possible to examine the relationship between 
the unobservable heterogeneity and the variables via the group mean coefficients (?̂?𝐺𝐿𝑆) 
(Farsi et al., 2005a; Farsi et al., 2005b). Fourth, this model does not require any additional 
stages; the model is estimated exactly as the DLSF with the addition of the group mean 
variables. Fifth, the restriction (no correlation between the regressors and unobserved 
heterogeneity) can be readily tested using a Wald test on the joint hypothesis: 𝜌 = 0 ∀ ?̅?𝑖 
(which is referred to as the Wu test (Greene, 2008)).   
There are some drawbacks to using this method. First, the model relies on the assumption that 
the unobservable heterogeneity is correlated with the regressors while inefficiency is assumed 
to be completely uncorrelated with regressors. Thus any unobservable heterogeneity that is 
uncorrelated with regressors is interpreted as inefficiency and, conversely, any inefficiency 
correlated with regressors (but firm invariant) is interpreted as unobserved heterogeneity. 
Finally, relative to the simpler DLSF, the Mundlak transformation proliferates parameters, 
which will reduce the precision of parameter estimates.  
6.2.4 The Four-Component DLSF (Model 3) 
A second approach to amend the DLSF to account for unobservable heterogeneity is to 
follow the approach of Kumbhakar et al. (2014) based on their four-component model. The 
application to our hierarchical data is similar to model 1, except for an additional stage to 
separate the firm inefficiency from the unobservable heterogeneity (the latter now assumed 
uncorrelated with the regressors). In this way, model 3 nests model 1.  
In this additional stage, the SHA effects are decomposed by imposing distributional 
assumptions and applying a stochastic frontier to them. Thus, unobservable heterogeneity is 
assumed to embody the features of statistical noise in traditional stochastic frontiers (SFs) 
(equations (10)-(13) below). Unobservable heterogeneity is assumed to be uncorrelated with 
                                            
83 We note that within estimators are in some cases imprecise, which to some extent diminishes their appeal  
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the regressors. This is in direct contrast to the Mundlak approach (Wheat, 2014). Here, SHA 
inefficiency is computed using the Jondrow et al. (1982) method, rather than the Schmidt and 
Sickles (1984) approach used in models 1 and 2. 
𝛿𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝜇𝑖                                                                                                                                       (6.10) 
𝜇𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑤𝑖                                                                                                                                      (6.11) 
𝛼𝑖~𝑁
+(0, 𝜎𝛼
2)                                                                                                                                   (6.12) 
𝑤𝑖~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑤
2 )                                                                                                                                     (6.13) 
Where 𝑤𝑖 represents unobserved heterogeneity that is uncorrelated with the regressors and 
inefficiency is calculated as: ?̂?𝑖 = 𝐸[𝛼𝑖|𝛼𝑖 + 𝑤𝑖]. 
The benefits of this model are that, firstly, it is possible to control for unobservable 
heterogeneity. Second, it is possible to test the decomposition of the inefficiency and the 
unobserved heterogeneity by applying routine tests in the SF literature. Third, although full 
distributional assumptions are made to predict inefficiency, the parameter estimates of the 
frontier are estimated using much weaker (and thus robust) assumptions in the first stage, 
which is a noteworthy advantage over a single stage alternative (Smith and Wheat (2012)).  
There are disadvantages to implementing this model. First, relative to the simple DLSF, there 
are additional assumptions on the error components necessary to enable separation of 
inefficiency from unobserved heterogeneity, and these are arbitrary. Second, the SF 
procedure to obtain SHA persistent inefficiency predictions is conducted on the number of 
SHAs, which may be small in empirical applications (in our case 10); and, in turn, may yield 
imprecise parameter estimates, particularly with respect to the variances of the SHA invariant 
error components. In traditional panels it is also the case that this part of the procedure faces 
limitations if the cross-section is small. In addition, the multi-stage approach yields standard 
errors of second stage parameter estimates smaller than their true magnitude owing to the use 
of first stage residuals in the second stage (Kumbhakar et al. (2014) note that this issue is 
routinely disregarded). However the fundamental limitation of this approach is the 
assumption that unobserved heterogeneity is uncorrelated with the regressors, which in turn 




6.2.5 The Mundlak-Transformed Four-Component DLSF (Model 4) 
Our final model is a DLSF that is augmented for unobservable heterogeneity by combining 
the three approaches above. In this model, inefficiency is purged of both types of unobserved 
heterogeneity, that is, unobserved heterogeneity that is correlated with the regressors, and that 
which is not. Thus the appeal of this specification is that the somewhat restrictive 
assumptions about the correlation between unobservable heterogeneity and the regressors in 
the two prior approaches can be (a) relaxed and (b) tested. We therefore specify the 
following, 
𝛿𝑖 = 𝛼0 + ?̅?𝑖
′𝜌 + 𝜇𝑖                                                                                                                           (6.14) 
𝜇𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑤𝑖                                                                                                                                      (6.15) 
𝛼𝑖~𝑁
+(0, 𝜎𝛼
2)                                                                                                                                    (6.16) 
𝑤𝑖~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑤
2 )                                                                                                                                      (6.17) 
Where ?̅?𝑖
′𝜌 captures unobservable heterogeneity that is correlated with the regressors and 
𝑤𝑖represents unobserved heterogeneity that is uncorrelated with the regressors. Inefficiency is 
calculated as: ?̂?𝑖 = 𝐸[𝛼𝑖|𝛼𝑖 + 𝑤𝑖]. 
Model 4 nests its component models - it is possible to test down to arrive at a preferred 
model. In particular, it is possible to test each of the components individually, and examine 
the presence and/or form of unobservable heterogeneity, and to remove it from the estimates 
of inefficiency.  
Overall, four models are estimated and tested: the dual-level stochastic frontier (DLSF) of 
Smith and Wheat (2012) (Model 1); the DLSF with the Mundlak adjustment applied (Model 
2); the four-component DLSF model based on Kumbhakar et al. (2014) (Model 3); and the 
Kumbhakar-DLSF model with the Mundlak adjustment applied (Model 4). Table 6.1 below 





Model Stage 1: RE GLS SHA inefficiency 
Laboratory (sub-company) 
Inefficiency 
    
(1) 𝐶𝑖,𝑠 =  𝛼0 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑠′𝛽 + 𝑖,𝑠 
?̂?𝑖 = ?̂?𝑖 − min(?̂?𝑖) 
 
?̂?𝑖,𝑠 = 𝐸[𝜏𝑖,𝑠|𝜏𝑖,𝑠 + 𝑣𝑖,𝑠] 
 
(2) 𝐶𝑖,𝑠 = 𝛼0 + ?̅?𝑖
′𝜌 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑠′𝛽 + 𝑖,𝑠 
?̂?𝑖 = ?̂?𝑖 − min(?̂?𝑖) 
 
?̂?𝑖,𝑠 = 𝐸[𝜏𝑖,𝑠|𝜏𝑖,𝑠 + 𝑣𝑖,𝑠] 
 
(3) 𝐶𝑖,𝑠 =  𝛼0 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑠′𝛽 + 𝑖,𝑠 
?̂?𝑖 = 𝐸[𝛼𝑖|𝛼𝑖 + 𝜔𝑖] 
 
?̂?𝑖,𝑠 = 𝐸[𝜏𝑖,𝑠|𝜏𝑖,𝑠 + 𝑣𝑖,𝑠] 
 
(4) 𝐶𝑖,𝑠 = 𝛼0 + ?̅?𝑖
′𝜌 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑠′𝛽 + 𝑖,𝑠 
?̂?𝑖 = 𝐸[𝛼𝑖|𝛼𝑖 + 𝜔𝑖] 
 
?̂?𝑖,𝑠 = 𝐸[𝜏𝑖,𝑠|𝜏𝑖,𝑠 + 𝑣𝑖,𝑠] 
 
    
Table 6.1: Econometric Specifications of Models 1-4 
From table 6.1, we note that stage 1 is identical for models 1 and 3; and for models 2 and 4. 
In model 1 and model 2, the predicted SHA inefficiencies are derived from ?̂?𝑖. In models 3 
and 4, the SHA effects are decomposed  to yield inefficiency predictions according to the 
distributional assumptions specified.  
Laboratory inefficiency predictions for models 1 and 3 are identical as a corollary of the 
common first stage. Similarly, models 2 and 4 have identical predicted laboratory 
inefficiencies.  
We now turn the choice between models 1-4. We are able to use statistical tests to guide 
model selection. Table 6.2 summarises our model testing. We first test the SHA effects using 
a Moulton-Randolph test (a Standardised Lagrange Multiplier test (SLM)), which is better 
suited to unbalanced panels (as in our panel) than the standard LM test (Moulton and 
Randolph, 1989). We then move to testing the decomposition of inefficiency and 
unobservable heterogeneity. The unobservable heterogeneity that is correlated with the 
regressors is testing using a Wald test on the group mean variables jointly. This test is applied 
to models 2 and 4. To test unobservable heterogeneity that is uncorrelated with the regressors, 
we use a LR test on the SHA SF. These tests apply to models 3 and 4. Finally, the test of the 
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presence of inefficiency at the laboratory level is tested using a LR test on the laboratory 
level SF. 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
          
Test of firm effects     
     
Firm effects (vs. pooled model) 
Moulton-
Randolph 












H0: no firm 
effects 
          
Decomposition     
     
Inefficiency and UOH correlated 
with regressors   
Wald test on ?̅?𝑖 
H0: 𝜌 = 0 ∀ ?̅?𝑖    
Wald test on ?̅?𝑖 
H0: 𝜌 = 0 ∀ ?̅?𝑖   
     
Inefficiency and UOH uncorrelated 
with regressors     








          
Test of laboratory inefficiency     
     

















     






6.2.6 Overall Inefficiency 
Finally, having retrieved the two efficiency predictions at the separate hierarchical levels, it is 
necessary to compute an overall efficiency for the SHA – our persistent, top-level 
inefficiency measure - which is the sum of its SHA-specific inefficiency and the (cost) 
weighted average of its constituent laboratories’ inefficiencies. We use this measure to 
compute our overall savings estimates. Taking model 1 as an example, 
?̅?𝑖 = ?̂̂?𝑖 +
∑ 𝐶𝑖,𝑠 ∙ ?̂?𝑖,𝑠∀𝑠
∑ 𝐶𝑖,𝑠∀𝑠
                                                                                                                   (6.18) 
 
6.3 Data 
Annual pathology benchmarking data is used to compile an unbalanced panel of 57 English 
NHS pathology laboratories amongst 10 Strategic Authorities during the 5 year period from 
2006/7 to 2010/11. The sample represents approximately one third of the 163 NHS pathology 
laboratories in England. 
Our dependent variable is the laboratory’s total operating costs (net of capital charges).  
Output is measured by the number of requests for tests. We could, of course, use the number 
of tests actually carried out as our output measure. However, laboratories are known to 
conduct varying numbers of tests per request, which may distort the measure of output if it is 
based on tests. We further capture this variation by including a variable defined as the ratio of 
tests to requests (variable name Tests:Requests), in addition to our output measure. Input 
prices for labour are based on data from the UK labour force survey. Labour force survey 
data is chosen over other sources (NHS staff census data, for example) to ensure the 
exogeneity of the data
84
. In the absence of other input prices data, this variable is considered a 
proxy for labour and materials.  
Variables capturing exogenous characteristics include: a binary variable for the foundation 
status of the host trust
85
, meaning that it has financial autonomy (variable name Foundation). 
                                            
84 Mutter et al. (2013) demonstrate using healthcare data that endogeneity can bias efficiency scores. 
85 The term ‘trust’ in the NHS refers to a single hospital or a small group of hospitals in close proximity (e.g. in an urban area) which operate 
as a single entity. 
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It is expected that foundation status trusts will have lower operating costs than their non-
foundation counterparts owing to a more commercial outlook towards service provision 
(Healthcare commission, 2007).  We also include a binary variable (variable name 
Metropolitan) denoting within an urban area or city; the null case is rural. This is to capture 
the differences in service provision between rural and urban patient populations and their 
differing pathology demands, e.g. a broader range of diseases in larger cities (Department of 
Health, 2006). 
As in chapter 5, we neglect the use of Reference Costs data for reasons of capital cost 
allocation and lack of key variables.  
Descriptive statistics are presented in table 6.3. Costs and wage data are in real terms (2007 
prices), adjusted using the consumer prices index (CPI). The ratio of tests to requests is 
calculated from the data, as are variable group means for the Mundlak transformation. For 
estimation, natural logarithms of variables are taken. We use a Cobb-Douglas functional 
form
86
. LIMDEP software is used for estimation (Greene, 2012).  
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max 
     
Operating costs (adjusted) 3617320 2058358 963875 11741895 
Number of tests 5037362 2990846 1380384 30199502 
Number of requests 714125 465535 191078 4423531 
Input prices (Labour) (adjusted) 24551 4160 15834 49955 






                                            
86 We tested a Translog specification, however, the coefficients on some key variables were not significant. Therefore, we prefer a Cobb-





In this section our results are summarised and discussed. We begin with our parameter 
estimates from the first stage of models 1-4. Next, we discuss model selection and select our 
preferred model. We then move to the efficiency predictions and our savings estimates. 
Finally, we comment on the health policy and wider modelling implications of our empirical 
results. 
6.4.1 Cost Function Parameters 
Models 1-4 use a random effects model as the first stage in estimation. Models 2 and 4 extend 
the model with the Mundlak group mean variables. Therefore, two model outputs are 
reported: one with a Mundlak adjustment (models 2 and 4), and one without a Mundlak 
adjustment (models 1 and 3).  Table 6.4 reports the model outputs. 
 
REM with Mundlak REM without Mundlak 
Model 2 || Model 4 Model 1 || Model 3 
Beta s.e. Sig Beta s.e. Sig 
              
Constant  1.285 5.497    -5.833 1.712 *** 
Output (requests) 0.897 0.043 *** 0.897 0.043 *** 
Input prices 0.892 0.161 *** 0.774 0.153 *** 
Tests:Requests 0.549 0.066 *** 0.547 0.069 *** 
Metropolitan 0.196 0.046 *** 0.198 0.047 *** 
Foundation -0.065 0.041   -0.081 0.041 ** 
Time -0.021 0.012 * -0.019 0.013   
              
REQBAR -0.334 0.194 *       
INPBAR -0.287 0.451         
TESBAR -1.070 0.552 *       
METBAR 0.097 0.203         
FOUBAR 0.222 0.169         
TIMBAR 0.234 0.130 *        
              
Table 6.4: Model Outputs for Mundlak Adjusted and non-Mundlak Adjusted Random Effects Models. *, **, 
*** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. s.e. – standard errors. The 
Mundlak group mean variables are denoted “XXXBAR” and correspond to their respective variables above.  
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Table 6.4 shows the parameter estimates from both of the first stage models. The ?̂? are 
similar between models and similar to findings in other studies of pathology services 
(Buckell et al., 2013; Buckell et al., 2015)
87
. The within estimators do not appear to exhibit 
imprecision (which was a concern of adopting this approach, see section 6.2). 
In both models the output coefficients are positive and significant, suggesting, at the sample 
mean, increasing returns to scale (RTS) properties in pathology production (since RTS = 
1/?̂?𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 = 1/0.897 = 1.115). This corresponds to results and/or predictions from other 
pathology studies (Department of Health, 2006; 2008; Healthcare Commission, 2007; 
Holland et al., 2011; Buckell et al., 2013).  
We find that laboratories facing higher input prices have higher costs; that laboratories with 
higher tests-to-requests ratios have higher operating costs; and that laboratories in urban 
settings have higher operating costs (coefficient on the Metropolitan variable), which is in 
agreement with other pathology studies (Department of Health, 2006). The within estimator 
suggests that the foundation variable is not significant, whilst this variable is found to be 
statistically significant at the 5% level in the REM without Mundlak. The study of the 
Healthcare Commission (2007) suggested that the foundation of the host trust may lead to 
lower operating costs, although no empirical results were presented. 
The coefficient on the time variable, representing technical change (frontier shift), is 
significant only in the REM with Mundlak (the within estimator). The coefficient suggests 
that pathology costs are, on average across the market, decreasing annually by around 2% 
owing to technical change. This finding is in keeping with the empirical findings of Holland 
et al. (2011). Moreover, this result is intuitively sound, as a heavily mechanised industry such 
as pathology is likely to be characterised by technological change over time, leading to cost 
reductions, even in the short run (as in this data).  
We now discuss the Mundlak group mean coefficients. There appears to be divided opinion 
in the literature as to their interpretation individually, although most authors do not comment 
on them in isolation. Of those that do, Farsi et al. (2005a) and Farsi et al. (2005b) take the 
view that the group means indicate correlation between the variable and unobservable 
heterogeneity. Conversely, Filippini and Hunt (2012) state that the interpretation of these 
variables is not straightforward, and do not assign any interpretation to these coefficients. In 
                                            
87 We note that similar data is used for these studies so this result is not surprising 
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our application, we are interested in the decomposition of efficiency and unobservable 
heterogeneity, thus the interpretation of these variables is of no specific interest to us.  
Overall, the Mundlak-transformed model is considered a better reflection of the economic 
reality than its non-transformed counterpart on a priori grounds as it permits inefficiency 
estimates to be purged of unobserved heterogeneity that is correlated with the regressors. We 
discuss model selection based on appropriate statistical testing below. 
6.4.2 Model Selection 
We now move to our discussion on model selection. To begin, we consider the testing 
procedure outlined in table 6.2. We discuss the results from these tests, which are reported in 
table 6.7. We also draw on the model efficiency predictions, which are presented in table 6.5. 
The first issue is whether the multi-level structure is appropriate. From the significant 
Moulton-Randloph statistic, the panel specification of the first stage formulation is preferred 
to the pooled model, supporting the presence of SHA effects. Of course, as noted above, we 
then need to consider the interpretation and decomposition of these SHA effects. 
For all models, the LR statistic on the laboratory level SF is significant, supporting the 
presence of inefficiency at laboratory level.  
We now turn to the unobservable heterogeneity test statistics. The Wald test of 6 linear 
restrictions – the Wu test - indicates that the variable group means are jointly statistically 
significant additions to the model
88
.  There is thus evidence to support the correlation 
between the SHA effects and the regressors, which we interpret as unobservable 
heterogeneity. On this basis, we prefer model 2 to model 1 and model 4 to model 3.  
As expected, model 1 appears to confound unobservable heterogeneity with inefficiency. 
This issue is well known in the health context (Greene, 2004; Farsi et al., 2005a).When the 
Mundlak adjustment is applied, the average predicted efficiency increases significantly from 
0.625 to 0.715 (table 6.5). This finding, combined with the results of the Wu test, suggests 
that there is a substantial amount of unobservable heterogeneity that is correlated with the 
regressors.  
                                            
88 We have also used the more familiar Hausman test. In this case, however, the test statistic could not be computed because the variance-
covariance matrix is not positive definite. We thus revert to the Wu test (Greene, 2012b) and note that, in any case, reliance on the Hausman 
statistic alone is discouraged (Baltagi, 2008). 
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Model 3 is unable to detect any inefficiency at the SHA level (table 6.5) – the SHA effects 
exhibited wrong skew. As noted, the Wu test result suggests that there is a high amount of 
unobservable heterogeneity that is correlated with the regressors, which model 3 does not 
allow for. Therefore, the finding of zero inefficiency is likely more a matter of model 
misspecification than of economic reality. This finding suggests that controlling for 
unobservable heterogeneity that is correlated with the regressors is vital: had we estimated 
only models 1 and 3, we might have concluded that there is no inefficiency at the SHA level 
and that SHA effects were driven by heterogeneity. We therefore prefer model 2 to models 1 
and 3.   
The final model selection decision is then a choice between model 2 and model 4. This 
choice hinges on the result of the attempt to decompose the SHA effect into inefficiency and 
unobserved heterogeneity that is correlated with the regressors (stage 2 in model 4). Although 
inefficiency was detected at the SHA level in model 4 (which was not the case in model 3), 
the result was not statistically significant (table 6.7). The conclusion, at face value then, is 
that once purged of unobserved heterogeneity (correlated and uncorrelated with the 
regressors) there is no statistically significant SHA-level inefficiency.   
However, we note that stage 2 of the multi-stage approach is based on only 10 observations 
(as we have only 10 SHAs). As a result, the failure to find inefficiency in this model is 
unsurprising (this is likely to be an issue for this model on any dataset, like ours, where the 
number of firm observations is low).  
We further note a striking concordance between the predicted SHA efficiencies of models 2 
and 4 with respect to rank (Kendall’s tau = 0.600**, see table 6.5 for ranks), absolute 
correlation (=0.92
89
) and mean predicted efficiency (model 2 = 0.921; model 4 = 0.944, see 
table 6.5). So, although the inefficiency effects are not statistically significant when making 
the final decomposition of inefficiency and unobserved heterogeneity (uncorrelated with the 
regressors), the inefficiency predictions and ranks are scarcely affected. It appears that much 
of the unobservable heterogeneity is correlated with the regressors and it is then difficult to 
disentangle the remaining effect.  
Overall, we conclude that there is some remaining inefficiency at the SHA level and in the 
discussion that follows, we use model 4 as our preferred model. This is on the grounds that it 
                                            
89 Farsi et al (2005a) suggest, as a rule of thumb, any score greater than 0.9 can be considered as similar; our result is well in excess of this. 
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takes account of unobserved heterogeneity that is uncorrelated with the regressors, noting that 
results are very similar if we were to revert to model 2. 
6.4.3 SHA, Laboratory level and Overall Efficiency Predictions 
Table 6.5 shows the efficiency predictions from the four models. For each model there are 
four columns corresponding to the SHA-specific efficiency, the laboratory-specific 
efficiency, the overall efficiency and the rank of the SHA in terms of its overall efficiency. 
For the first three columns, the means of the predicted efficiencies and corresponding 
standards deviations are provided.  
Table 6.6 shows the rank correlations between the predicted overall efficiencies for models 1-
4
90
. As can be seen, there is very little concordance between almost all of the models’ 
predicted ranks. This is not entirely surprising given that model 1 makes significantly 
different assumptions to the remaining models and that model 3 failed to recognise any 
inefficiency at the SHA level. The exception to the trend is that the predicted ranks of model 
2 and model 4 are statistically significantly correlated.  
Model 1 exhibits the lowest predicted efficiency with a mean overall efficiency of 0.625. This 
is as expected given that, by construction, this model makes no allowance for the effect of 
unobservable heterogeneity on efficiency prediction. Thus, the unobservable heterogeneity is 
encompassed in the inefficiency component of the model. This issue is well known in the 
health context (Greene, 2004; Farsi et al., 2005a). 
In model 2, it is assumed that unobservable heterogeneity is correlated with the regressors. As 
such, we are able to use the procedure outlined in section 2 to remove it from the SHA 
effects. Here, the mean overall efficiency increases significantly to 0.715.  
In model 3, the unobservable heterogeneity is assumed to be uncorrelated with the regressors 
and assumed to embody a set of assumptions (section 6.2). In this application, the SHA 
effects that had a SF applied to them (stage 2 of the multi-stage approach) exhibited wrong 
skew. Thus, no inefficiency was detected at the SHA level; that is, the firm effect is entirely 
composed of unobservable heterogeneity. In this sense, model 3 predicts the highest SHA 
efficiency. As noted, we believe this model to be misspecified.  
                                            
90 We use Kendall’s tau to measure rank correlation, which is well suited to small samples (Kendall & Gibbons, 1990). 
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Model 4 combines both the assumptions and procedures of the preceding three models: 
unobservable heterogeneity is assumed to be, in part, correlated with regressors and, in part, 
uncorrelated with the regressors.  
As can be seen, as expected, the predicted mean overall efficiency in model 4, 0.732, is 
higher than that of model 2, 0.715. The difference is slight in contrast to the predictions of 
model 1 versus the predictions of model 2, suggesting that there is less unobservable 
heterogeneity that is uncorrelated with the regressors than that which is correlated with the 
regressors. This indicates that the Mundlak adjustment appears to capture almost the full 
extent of the unobservable heterogeneity. However, there was a small difference between the 
predicted efficiency ranks and SHA efficiencies, suggesting that the additional control is 
worth retaining.  
There is a more fundamental point when comparing model 3 with models 2 and 4, which is 
that there is potential for model misspecification, which may have serious implications for 
findings. In our case, this could lead to what we believe to be an incorrect conclusion about 
the performance of the SHAs: zero inefficiency. This underlines the importance of 
accounting for both forms of unobservable heterogeneity discussed here.  
As discussed in section 2, the predicted laboratory efficiencies are identical in pairs: the 
laboratory efficiency predictions of models 1 and 3 are one pair; and of models 2 and 4 are 
the other pair. That is, there are two ‘sets’ of laboratory efficiency predictions. These two sets 
of efficiency predictions are very similar with regard to their averages, 0.771 and 0.776 (table 
6.5), their absolute correlation (=0.98) and their rank correlation (Kendall’s tau = 0.956***). 
This suggests that efficiency predictions at the laboratory level are robust to the specification 
of unobservable heterogeneity (or indeed whether it is assumed away, as in model 1). This 
result likely arises from the similarity between the estimated model parameters in the first 
stage(s).   
We note in passing that there may be a residual amount of unobservable heterogeneity 
between laboratories within SHAs; we did not investigate this issue and are not aware of 




6.4.4 Implications for Health Policy 
To begin, the overall inefficiency predicted by our model for pathology services in the NHS 
is around 27% (see table 6.5). Therefore, through appropriate target setting, it should be 
possible to make substantial efficiency gains in services as a whole (that is, even the best 
performing SHAs can improve). By overall region, the most efficient SHA is B
91
 with an 
overall inefficiency of around 20% (see equation (18) for derivation); and the least efficient 
region in SHA H with an overall inefficiency of 30%. It should be noted that even the most 
efficient SHAs have room to improve because of variations in the laboratory performance 
within them (discussed below). The efficiency gap between the best and worst performing 
regions is around 10%. SHAs I and J are also close to the SHA H level of inefficiency. Thus, 
pathology policy makers should look to these SHAs for maximum gains. 
To calculate potential monetary savings, we take the efficiency prediction of each laboratory 
in its final year, apply its cost weight and compute the potential saving per laboratory. When 
this is aggregated across all of the laboratories, we find £54m of potential annual savings in 
the sample. If this is applied to all NHS pathology services, this would suggest potential 
savings of around £675m per annum
92
. This is significantly more than found in other 
empirical studies (£250-500m in Department of Health, 2008; £390m in Buckell et al., 2015).  
Next, our model enables policy makers to look within SHAs to locate the source of overall 
inefficiency. As envisaged at the outset, we find inefficiency at both levels, but laboratory 
inefficiency dominates. The mean inefficiency at the SHA level is relatively low at 6%, 
where the least well performing SHA has 12% inefficiency. In contrast, the mean inefficiency 
at the laboratory level is much greater at 22%, and the least well performing group of 
laboratories appears to be 27% inefficient. Thus targets and policy mechanisms would appear 
to be better aimed at reducing or exploring differences in performance between laboratories 
within SHAs, rather than looking at persistent efficiency differences between different SHAs. 
A further advantage of this model is that it allows policy makers to observe inefficiency 
differences between individual laboratories; variation that is concealed when considering 
average laboratory inefficiency for each of the SHAs (which can be seen from table 6.5 do 
                                            
91 Due to data confidentiality we are unable to reveal the identity of SHAs. 
92 In our sample, we have only one third of English laboratories, none of the laboratories in Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland and one of 




not vary enormously). In figure 6.1, we see that two laboratories have inefficiency that >40%: 
laboratories 12 and 38. Laboratory 38 in particular should be singled out by policy makers to 
improve its performance given an inefficiency of 56%. We note that these predictions do not 
encompass the effects of the SHAs, which have been removed. Of course, as noted earlier, 
further examination of those laboratories would be needed as it may be that part of the 
efficiency gap is explained by other factors not taken account of in our model.  
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SHA SHA  Lab  Overall  Rank   SHA Lab  Overall  Rank   SHA Lab  Overall Rank   SHA Lab Overall Rank 
                                        
A 0.902 0.726 0.655 2 
 
0.907 0.734 0.666 9 
 
1.000 0.726 0.726 9 
 
0.983 0.734 0.721 5 
B 1.000 0.827 0.827 1 
 
1.000 0.814 0.814 1 
 
1.000 0.827 0.827 1 
 
0.987 0.814 0.803 1 
C 0.800 0.785 0.628 3 
 
0.888 0.791 0.703 5 
 
1.000 0.785 0.785 5 
 
0.905 0.791 0.716 6 
D 0.797 0.772 0.615 6 
 
0.974 0.782 0.762 2 
 
1.000 0.772 0.772 6 
 
0.978 0.782 0.765 2 
E 0.669 0.805 0.538 10 
 
0.813 0.808 0.657 10 
 
1.000 0.805 0.805 2 
 
0.882 0.808 0.712 7 
F 0.755 0.767 0.579 8 
 
0.952 0.772 0.735 4 
 
1.000 0.767 0.767 7 
 
0.964 0.772 0.744 4 
G 0.727 0.786 0.571 9 
 
0.920 0.799 0.735 3 
 
1.000 0.786 0.786 4 
 
0.935 0.799 0.748 3 
H 0.841 0.736 0.619 5 
 
0.936 0.739 0.691 7 
 
1.000 0.736 0.736 8 
 
0.951 0.739 0.702 10 
I 0.792 0.786 0.622 4 
 
0.871 0.793 0.691 8 
 
1.000 0.786 0.786 3 
 
0.889 0.793 0.705 8 
J 0.825 0.719 0.593 7 
 
0.952 0.730 0.695 6 
 
1.000 0.719 0.719 10 
 
0.964 0.730 0.704 9 
  
                   
Mean 0.811 0.771 0.625 
  
0.921 0.776 0.715 
  
1.000 0.771 0.771 
  
0.944 0.776 0.732 
 
s.d. 0.092 0.035 0.078 
  
0.054 0.031 0.047 
  
0.000 0.035 0.035 
  
0.039 0.031 0.033 
 
                                        
Table 6.5: Efficiency Predictions at SHA Level, Laboratory Level and Overall Efficiency with Overall Ranks. Models 1-4. 
  Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 
Model 1         
Model 2  0.022 
  
  
Model 3 -0.022 0.156 
 
  
Model 4 0.156 0.600** 0.289   




Table 6.7: Test Statistics, models 1-4. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. 
For several reasons, the use of efficiency studies by health policy makers, despite their 
prevalence, has been limited (cf. Hollingsworth 2008; Hollingsworth, 2012). We have 
addressed three of these issues in this study. First, as is clear from our analysis, this 
modelling framework gives a complete top-to-bottom view of pathology services. In doing 
so, we are able to indicate the precise location of the inefficiency in these services, which is 
not possible with single level approaches, making our results of greater use in a practical 
sense. Second, we have purposefully focussed on a speciality of health services (as opposed 
to more aggregated entities such as whole hospitals or health regions) – pathology - again to 
make our findings of use to policy makers. Third, we have targeted a specific policy: the 
NHS’s “A Call To Action” to make efficiency gains (NHS England, 2013).  
6.4.5 Implications for Modelling multi-Level Data Structures 
We now turn to the wider modelling implications of our work. We have already noted the 
advantages of adopting the multi-level model as it is possible for policy makers to observe 
inefficiency at different levels (Smith and Wheat, 2012). The alternatives, namely pooling 
laboratory level data, or modelling at the SHA level of aggregation do not (by construction) 
allow this decomposition (Smith and Wheat, 2012). In preliminary analysis we estimated 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
          
Firm effects (vs. pooled model)         
          
Moulton-Randolph 2.696*** 4.168*** 2.969*** 4.168*** 
          
Decomposition of inefficiency and unobserved 
heterogeneity         
          
Wald test of 6 linear restrictions,  𝜌 = 0 ∀?̅?𝑖   12.89**   12.89** 
LR of firm effect SF (vs OLS)     0 1.147 
          
Test of sub-company inefficiency         
          
LR of laboratory SF (vs OLS) 64.689*** 58.170*** 64.689*** 58.170*** 
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both of these alternatives and found that overall inefficiency was underestimated, which is in 
keeping with Smith and Wheat (2012). This is likely contributing to the differences in 
efficiency savings between our findings and other pathology studies (section 6.4.4).  
However, the contribution of this analysis – apart from being the first health application of 
the Smith and Wheat (2012) DLSF – is to augment that model to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity in a multi-level context. We have shown the importance of accounting for 
unobserved heterogeneity in our study. This has clear implications for policy. Of course, we 
found that inefficiency is overestimated when unobservable heterogeneity is disregarded 
(which is well known in the health literature). We also found that unobservable heterogeneity 
arises in various forms; specifically, we find that it is important to take account of unobserved 
heterogeneity that is correlated with the regressors as well as that which is not. Indeed,  we 
find that models that do not take account of the former, such as the recently developed 
approach by Kumbhakar et al. (2014) (model 3 in this chapter), may lead to unrealistic 
predictions and erroneous conclusions.  
Further, in the context of multi-level structures, we noted that it may be hard to distinguish 
inefficiency from unobserved heterogeneity that is uncorrelated with regressors. This is 
because this part of the decomposition is based on the number of observations at the SHA 
level, which in our case is only 10. Thus there may be limits to the degree to which 
unobserved heterogeneity can be separated from inefficiency in data structures of this nature. 
As a caveat to this statement, a finding of no inefficiency when applying the Kumbhakar et 
al. (2014) model could be a reflection of underlying economic reality, and not necessarily 
because of misspecification or lack of data points (though we believe the latter to be the case 
in our example). Of course, the same problem, namely lack of observations to decompose 
inefficiency and unobserved heterogeneity that is uncorrelated with the regressors, also arises 




Figure 6.1: Laboratory Efficiency Predictions from Model 4. NB – to preserve the anonymity 
of the SHAs and laboratories, we do not assign the laboratories to their SHAs in this graph. 
 
6.5 Conclusions 
The study in this chapter is the first application of the Smith and Wheat DLSF (2012) in a 
health context and the first time vertically distinct measures of inefficiency have been 
simultaneously estimated in health markets. It is also the first time the approaches set out in 
Farsi et al. (2005a) and Kumbhakar et al. (2014), to control for unobserved heterogeneity, 
have been applied to a multi-level data structure.  
Our results suggest overall inefficiency in pathology services in England of around 27%. This 
would correspond to annual savings of approximately £675m if applied to all NHS pathology 
services. This estimate exceeds previous studies’ savings estimates, thus suggesting the scope 
for further improvements than have previously been envisaged (which is a conclusion in 
keeping with that of other application of this model; see Smith and Wheat (2012)).  
The source of the inefficiency is visible in our study, which was not the case in previous 
studies. The results show that the dominant source of inefficiency is variation at the 
laboratory level inefficiency within SHAs, though the SHA-level persistent inefficiency 























Laboratory-specific efficiecny predictions from model 4 
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useful guide for policy makers. Our results further show that some individual laboratories 
have particularly high inefficiency, which is worthy of further investigation.  
With respect to the method, we find that it is important to consider both sources of 
unobservable heterogeneity (correlated and uncorrelated with the regressors). In our case, 
unobserved heterogeneity that is correlated with the regressors dominates. We note that the 
Kumbhakar et al. (2014) model (model 3 in this study) did not detect SHA-level inefficiency 
(wrong skew), which we attribute to model misspecification given that it neglects an 
important source of unobserved heterogeneity. Model 4, which takes account of both sources 
of unobserved heterogeneity, struggled to disentangle inefficiency from unobserved 
heterogeneity that is uncorrelated with the regressors. We attribute this problem to the fact 
that this stage of the decomposition relied on only 10 observations (as we have 10 SHAs). 
This could be a limitation to the degree to which unobserved heterogeneity can be separated 
from inefficiency in data structures of this nature, where there may be a small number of 
observations for the top-level of the hierarchy. Of course, the same problem would occur in 
traditional panel models with a small cross-section. We do note, however, that failure to 
separate inefficiency from unobserved heterogeneity that is uncorrelated with the regressors 
could simply reflect economic reality rather than caused by model misspecification and/or 
lack of data points (though we believe the latter to be true in our example). 
Whilst the different approaches produced different results for SHA-level inefficiency, the 
inefficiency predictions at the laboratory level were largely the same across all models. It 
appears, then, that the inefficiency estimates at this lower level are robust to the treatment of 
unobserved heterogeneity. This is likely due to the estimated parameters being similar 
between models. However, we consider that further research might incorporate how 
unobserved heterogeneity at the lower level might be incorporated into the modelling 
framework.  
With this, we conclude our empirical work in this thesis. We therefore turn, in the following 









In this chapter we draw together the findings from our introductory and empirical chapters. In 
7.1 we summarise the NHS policy context in which this thesis resides. In 7.2 we review the 
objectives that were set out in the introduction, and consider the extent to which our chapters 
have answered these issues. In 7.3 we take a synoptic view of our contribution. In section 7.4 
we evaluate our empirical work. Finally, in section 7.5, we set a research agenda for future 
work.  
 
7.1 Policy Context 
 
We have argued that there is long- and short-run pressure on the health care budget in 
England. We identified efficiency as one possible way to relieve budgetary pressure. Noting 
that the majority of expenditure is on secondary care in England, we have paid particular 
attention to this area. Under a revised governance structure, NHS hospitals are now subject to 
efficiency targets set by the sector regulator, Monitor, as opposed to the Department of 
Health before it; Monitor are thus tasked with promoting efficiency amongst NHS hospitals.  
 
We have reviewed the process of setting efficiency targets from an economic perspective: we 
have examined how to measure efficiency; and how to incentivise hospitals to reach those 
targets set. This is likely to be key information going forward, not least due to the current 
contention surrounding the proposed efficiency target. In this sense, we feel we have made a 
valuable contribution to current policy issues. 
 
Of course, we are also interested in the academic contribution of our endeavours. We 
therefore turn to look in detail at the findings from our empirical chapters, and reconcile these 
against our research objectives to demonstrate the contribution to the literature of this thesis. 
 
7.2 Revisiting the Research Objectives 
 
In chapter 1 (section 1.3), the objectives of this thesis were set out. In this section, we revisit 




(i) To inform the process of setting efficiency targets for NHS hospitals, by 
reviewing germane literature and conducting efficiency analysis; and to set out 
some empirical issues to which we are able to provide solutions. 
 
In chapter 4, this objective was achieved in several ways.  
 
First, we reviewed a number of policies that have been applied to NHS hospitals 
across its recent history. These policies were applied with the intention of 
improving hospitals’ performance. They had varying degrees of success. We used 
the available evidence to identify features of performance management regimes 
that were effective, and those that were not. In doing so, we provided some 
lessons on what appears to be effective when looking to induce improved 
performance. This is likely useful for Monitor who is responsible for enforcing 
hospital efficiency targets.  
 
Second, we reviewed the pricing mechanism for hospital reimbursement. We 
established the link between the National Tariff Payment System (NTPS) and 
Price-Cap regulation. We focussed our discussion on the incentives around price-
control periods. We observed that price-cap regulation had been effective in a 
number of industries, but required a longer regulatory lag than is in place under 
NTPS. We therefore concluded that by lengthening regulator lag for the NTPS, 
Monitor could encourage efficiency amongst hospitals. Further, we considered the 
regulatory mechanism that is employed in the rail industry as an example of 
alternative pricing models when there are multiple parties involved in financing 
and delivering services. We drew the parallel to health services.  
 
Finally, we reviewed efficiency studies in the health sector and in other regulated 
industries. We identified health-based issues with efficiency analysis. There were 
both methodological issues and practical issues that have hindered the use of these 
studies at the policy level. We therefore set out some ways in which these might 





In chapters 5 and 6, we conducted econometric efficiency analysis in NHS 
hospitals. In particular, we studied pathology laboratories. In doing so, we 
identified the level of inefficiency within pathology services. Although useful, 
efficiency analysis at this level provides information in a limited sense in that it 
would be difficult to justify setting targets based on efficiency analysis at the 
individual service level. However, it is perfectly possible – and data are available 
– to conduct several such studies across a number of services, to enable a more 
detailed picture of how efficiency varies across areas of services within hospitals. 
This approach, although more involved, has two major advantages. First, a more 
detailed level of analysis, compared to a whole hospitals approach, means that 
targeting managerial effort to for capturing the gains identified is a 
straightforward process. Secondly, analysis at a more detailed level of service 
enables the researcher to better control for service and patient level heterogeneity. 
This is in keeping with contemporary thought in the academic literature. 
 
 
(ii) To provide new economic evidence for an area of NHS hospital activity for which 
empirical evidence is scant: pathology laboratories. This is, in turn, to feed into 
the top-level policy goal of making efficiency savings across the NHS. 
 
In chapters 5 and 6 this objective was achieved. In a first analysis, we analysed 
fundamental economic issues pertaining to costs and efficiency in pathology 
laboratories. We estimated the level of inefficiency in pathology services, and 
estimated that around £390m savings annually would be possible if all 
laboratories improved performance in line with best practice. We used a flexible 
model which allowed us to estimate how individual laboratories’ efficiency 
changed over time. We found that this was important, as some laboratories were 
making efficiency gains over time, some losses and others were unchanged over 
the observed period. On average, laboratories became less efficient over time.  
 
Next, we conducted a simulation exercise to estimate the cost implications of 
merged laboratories. We found potential savings of a similar magnitude to 
potential gains from inefficiency reduction. We also examined a number of factors 
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that drive costs which have been raised in policy discourse. We paid particular 
attention to economies of scale, which is of significant interest to policy makers.   
 
Lastly, we took an overall account of pathology production by combing the 
various aspects of the cost function into an estimate of multi-factor productivity 
and its change in over time. We found an improvement of around 5% over the 
period studied, driven largely by technical change.  
 
In chapter 6, we developed our analysis to consider the way in which pathology 
services are organised hierarchically. Indeed, we found that were components of 
inefficiency at vertically separate organisational levels in pathology services. We 
found the majority of inefficiency resided at the lower tier of the organisation and 
a smaller amount at the upper tier. Further, we found that accounting for this 
structure was important for overall estimates of inefficiency. We therefore revised 
our potential savings estimate for pathology services to £675m, which is 




(iii) To advance the measurement of efficiency in health markets and beyond 
 
This objective has been achieved across chapters 4, 5 and 6.  
 
In terms of efficiency analysis in health markets, we have made several steps. 
Firstly, the literature review of methods in chapter 4 provides a review of the 
literature based on current issues in the estimation of efficiency in health markets. 
In addition, focus is given to policy-based issues that have been raised. We also 
contrasted the methodological issues in health with those of other regulated 
industries, providing richer insights into efficiency measurement for regulatory 
practice in health care. We extended the regulatory best practice criteria for 
benchmarking to health markets. In these regards, we conclude that we have made 




We then, based on our review, conducted empirical work on NHS hospitals. In 
doing so, we introduced a number of new empirical efficiency models in the 
health context. In chapter 5, we, for the first time, adopted the model of Cuesta 
(2000) to examine efficiency change over time of individual laboratories. This is 
of particular use as NHS staff have indicated that knowing how performance 
changes over time is of use to them (Hollingsworth and Peacock, 2008).  
 
In chapter 6, we, for the first time, employed the dual-level stochastic frontier 
(DLSF) of Smith and Wheat (2012) to make a vertical decomposition of 
inefficiency. We note that modelling hierarchical efficiency has been identified as 
a key area for empirical development in health care (Hollingsworth and Peacock, 
2008).  
 
These models are of use in the wider health context, and allow both researchers 
and policy makers/regulators important insights into inefficiency variation. 
 
In chapter 6, we were able to go beyond the health context in our methodology. 
We have extended the DLSF model of Smith and Wheat (2012) to allow for the 
presence of unobserved heterogeneity. In particular, we have presented a 
modelling approach that can account for unobserved heterogeneity that can 
manifest in several forms. In doing so, we have derived a model that is of general 
use. This is approach is particularly of use in the health context, where unobserved 
heterogeneity – as argued - is a significant concern.  
 
 
7.3 Synopsis of Empirical Research 
 
We have commented on how each of the individual chapters contributes in both policy and 
academic senses, we now discuss potential holistic benefits of the thesis combined. 
 
Our central theme is NHS hospital efficiency. We have conducted analysis in an intense 
fashion, applying due academic rigour to our analysis. Whilst this is, naturally, of high 
importance in the academic setting, there is a question as to the application of our findings in 
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the practical setting: we ran complex econometric methods, does it matter? Our view is, 
broadly, yes. 
 
There are some distinct advantages to the approach that we adopted, relative to Monitor’s, 
which we have already noted – disaggregate analysis, efficiency of individual units over time, 
multi-level efficiency analysis and unobserved heterogeneity. The multi-level analysis was of 
particular significance: when the structure was taken into consideration, there appeared to be 
substantially more available savings than in the single-level setting (see section 6.4). 
 
Further, our multi-factor productivity index allowed us valuable insights into how other 
aspects of productivity changed. In our prediction of merging laboratories, we demonstrated 
significant potential in scale benefits – comparable in magnitude to potential efficiency gains. 
These analyses enrich the information available on hospital performance. As such, they are 
worth pursuing in the regulatory setting. Incorporating these features into future efficiency 
analyses may help resistance from providers, at least in methodological terms. For these 
reasons, our view is that a more involved methodological approach by Monitor is likely to 
yield significant benefits.  
 
These benefits, however, come at the cost of resource: more complex models are difficult to 
construct and run, require expertise, require testing/sensitivity diagnostics, etc. In a single 
year when resources are constrained, these more complicated approaches become 
increasingly difficult to adopt. To take an approach which incorporates these features would 
be more realistic in a longer period. Lengthening the control period would enable deeper 
engagement with providers, in particular with regard to methods. Moreover, these changes 
could be cost effective if the estimated additional cost savings in our empirical work are in 
excess of the likely cost of employing extra resources to enable a more sophisticated 
approach. (Whether or not this is true in reality is unknown without data to support it.) 
  
In terms of the pricing mechanism, we suggested lengthening the regulatory lag as theory and 
empirical evidence suggest that doing so enhances efficiency incentives. Suppose this was 
brought in line with other regulators in England to five years. It might reasonably be expected 
that, due to the strengthened incentives mentioned, efficiency gains are realised. This would 
fit neatly with adopting a more sophisticated approach to econometric benchmarking. Of 
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course this may be complicated by policy change, which has been common throughout the 
lifetime of the NHS.  
 
In addition, if the lag is lengthened, it would be easier to introduce adjustments to the 
mechanism to allow arbitration by a central body. This would help with the matter of 
disputes, as are ongoing at the time of writing. We suggested adopting the tripartite system as 
in the rail industry. A useful piece of academic research in this regard would be an economic 
model to predict the potential effects of making changes. We discuss this in the following 
section. 
 
With regard to other incentives, lengthening regulatory lag would allow Monitor to take 
advantage of the beneficial features of target setting as set out in box 4.1. For example, it 
would allow targets to be clearly set and communicated; to be applied over longer periods 
avoiding short-term quick-fixes; targets would be prioritised; and sanctions for failure could 
readily be imposed. Importantly, it would allow the regulator to engage with providers on a 
long-term basis and have greater interaction with the process of efficiency factor setting; the 
current rejection of the 2015/16 NTPS determination suggests discontent amongst providers 
with the current approach.  
 
Whilst helpful for promoting positive aspects of performance management schemes, 
lengthening lag would, equally, be conducive to avoiding some of the potential pitfalls in 
setting targets, as presented in box 4.2. In chapter 5, we discussed that an econometric 
approach based on a cost function avoids a number of potential issues such as gaming. A five 
year lag relative to a single year’s lag has two clear advantages in relation to box 4.2. First, 
the issue of myopia is mitigated by lengthening the lag.  
 
Second, given that multiple policies are still imposed (such as waiting times targets), it is 
difficult to delineate the specific effect of each. Lengthening the lag would give a clearer idea 
as to what drives performance change - the pricing system or the other targets in place. That 
is, if there was a significant change to the pricing system and changes to performance, it is 
likely that these were driven through the change. On the other hand, if no discernible 
difference in performance was observed, it could be argued that performance was scarcely 




Whilst we have proposed a number of advances for Monitor, we have also identified some 
areas for useful future research. We therefore move to evaluate our approach before 
discussing directions for research in the future. 
 
7.4 Reconciliation of Empirical Results 
7.4.1 Reconciliation Against NHS Hospital Efficiency Studies 
In chapter 3, we reviewed efficiency studies in health and focussed on applications of 
econometric efficiency analysis techniques to NHS hospitals. We reported results in table 3.3. 
We noted that not all studies explicitly measured levels of inefficiency or indeed reported 
results. However, for those that did, it is a useful exercise to compare and contrast the results 
of prior studies to the results of the empirical work in this thesis.  
Of the studies which explicitly report efficiency estimates for NHS hospitals, of which there 
are 4, there is a range of efficiency reported. SFA studies report inefficiency in the range of 
8% to 39%; in our empirical work, we report average inefficiency of 13% and 27%. This 
appears, then, to be in keeping with the findings of prior studies. In terms of technical change, 
one study (Ferrari, 2006) reports that hospitals experienced technical progress of around 3% a 
year. In our analysis, we found comparable progress of around 2%.  
In terms of efficiency change over time, the results are mixed. In one study (Ferrari, 2006), 
whilst some analysis of efficiency over time was conducted, there was no temporal change 
found, which is in direct contrast to our findings. However, we note that the model employed 
is rather restrictive – that of Battesse and Coelli (1992) - which may be an explanation as to 
why. Elsewhere, results indicate that, across a number of specifications, efficiency appears to 
be decreasing over time (Jacobs et al., 2006). This is consistent with our results, however the 
authors note some issues with sensitivity (pp. 86-9). We did not find such issues. 
Overall, our results appear to be in line with the received literature in terms of efficiency 
predictions, technological change and temporal change.  
7.4.2 Reconciliation of Efficiency Predictions in Chapters 5 and 6 
In chapter 5, the average prediction of inefficiency was 13% which implied cost savings of 
£390m p.a. in pathology services. Using the same data, the average of predicted inefficiency 
175 
 
was 27%, which, in turn, implies potential cost savings of £675m in NHS pathology. There is 
thus fairly sizeable discrepancy between the two chapters’ estimates of efficiency (and 
therefore the corresponding policy implications) which bears comment. 
 First is to highlight the differences in approach - and therefore the models - applied to the 
data. In chapter 5, our preferred model allowed inefficiency to vary between laboratories over 
time; in chapter 6 time-invariant efficiency was assumed. Second is the stratification. In 
chapter 5, the data was stratified by laboratory and time. In chapter 6, the first stratification 
was by SHA and laboratory; and in the second stage by laboratory. Further, the two studies’ 
specifications varied in terms of both variables and functional form. In chapter 5 there were 
additional variables in the cost function and a translog functional form was adopted. In 
chapter 6, some of these variables were not significant (and so dropped) and the stratification 
did not support a translog form, and we thus reverted to a Cobb-Douglas form. For these 
reasons, efficiency predictions are likely to vary which may explain the observed 
discrepancy. 
However, the most likely driver of the difference stems from the organisational structure and 
the differing economic interpretations between the two analyses. Considering this issue 
highlights the link between the two approaches. In chapter 5, we used a set of regional 
dummies to control for unobserved differences between laboratories. These are SHA 
dummies that have been collapsed for parsimony. Our economic interpretation of these 
variables was that they represented regional differences that are unobserved between 
pathology laboratories. In chapter 6, we used this structure in the data, but adopted both a 
different approach and structure. First, we stratified by SHA and laboratory to identify the 
effect of SHA. Here, our interpretation of these effects was that they were partly, as per 
chapter 5, comprising unobserved heterogeneity but also that there was SHA-specific 
inefficiency present in these effects. We duly applied a number of specifications and tests to 
determine if this was the case, concluding that it was. Therefore, this effect is likely 
contributing to the observed difference. 
In passing, we note that and alternative, indeed simpler, strategy for the analysis in chapter 6 
would be to estimate a model that is stratified by laboratory and time and use SHA dummies 
to estimate the SHA effects. In this sense, the framework is akin to a true fixed effects 
formulation (Greene, 2005). We did not adopt this approach for two reasons. First, TFE are 
known to suffer from the incidental parameters problem, particularly when the panel length, t, 
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is small, as is the case in our application. The second follows from the findings of chapter 5. 
Whilst we could estimate this model, we are unable to identify the SHA effects (i.e. not all of 
them are statistically significantly different from zero). This is not the case in our approach. 
For this reason, we retained the methodology detailed in chapter 6.  
7.4.3 Reconciliation Against NHS Policy 
In the opening chapters of this thesis, we identified that, under current policy, an efficiency 
savings target of £30bn p.a. by 2020 has been established, following from the NHS’s “A Call 
to Action” (NHS England, 2013). Of this, central government has made a commitment of 
£8bn. The remaining £22bn is to be found across NHS services. The “Five Year Forward 
View”, or is as known elsewhere as the “Stevens Plan” after the NHS chief executive Simon 
Stevens, has identified that 2-3% annual productivity improvements across the NHS will 
ensure that the gap is met.  
As regards the findings of this thesis, we have estimated that productivity in pathology 
services has increased by, on average, 1.18% per year over the period studied. This is, in 
crude terms, rather behind the required savings. However, we note that our MFP measure did 
not encompass scale change, which was estimated to be a powerful element of cost reduction 
and so, by extension, productivity change. In light of this, it may well be possible that the 
required productivity gains are delivered. We further note that the disaggregate approach we 
have adopted allows us to identify where these gains can be, or at least have been, made – in 
this case technological and scale change – and so where additional gains can be made. That 
is, given our estimates of efficiency, the productivity gains can be boosted if managerial 
focus is given to capturing the efficiency gains identified.   
Of course, looking at crude figures, whilst useful, is only part of the issue. There is, of course, 
the issue of what is possible in reality. Whilst we have identified the potential for efficiency 
gains, a question arises as to how much of these can be realised. This may limit the potential 
gains available. There may be an acceptable level of inefficiency that is achievable, beyond 
which seeking further gains may be extremely difficult. It is, of course virtually impossible to 
make such a judgement on empirical evidence; this is an issue for the regulator to resolve 
itself. This may be guided by prevailing policy – the global NHS and/or specific hospital 
efficiency targets are clear candidates for ‘satisfactory’ levels of performance.  
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The other issue is the interactive element of pathology service provision. This is important in 
terms of both the formation of pathology networks and pathology’s interaction with other 
NHS services. There may be a joint effect here – does the formation of laboratory networks – 
whilst helping to make gains in scale – jeopardise the service provided to primary or 
secondary care? This is a clear issue for future research. 
Overall, given that technological progress has improved productivity substantially, that 
efficiency gains are possible to drive further gains and that the formation of local networks 
appears to be inducing scale gains, our view is that the 2-3% productivity challenge for NHS 
pathology laboratories is perfectly possible. Whether it is achieved, which it has not been in 
recent years, depends on managerial performance.  
7.5 Evaluation of Empirical Research 
 
We have argued that this thesis has made a number of advances for measuring efficiency in 
health care and applied techniques to hospitals in the NHS. Of course, there are outstanding 
issues that remain. By way of evaluation, we highlight areas in which our analysis was not 
able to provide answers. In addition, we offer some general remarks around how we 
conducted the research. We go on to discuss future directions for research in the following 
section. 
 
One issue is sample size. The data set used here, as noted, contains 187 observations. In 
health terms, where HES data contains 18.2 million patient records annually, this data would 
not be considered as large. In regulatory terms, this number, although not as large as some, 
will be much larger than others. Appendix B shows a table of regulators’ efficiency analyses 
and sample sizes used, which range from 5 to 560 observations. Here, 187 would be the 
second largest of the data sets, and at the higher end of the scale. So whether this is 
considered large appears to be a largely contextual matter.  
 
One important aspect of sample size is the ability or otherwise to estimate models. In our 
empirical work, with the exception of the true random effects model in section 5.4.2, which 
although did estimate, gave questionable efficiency predictions, 187 observations was 
sufficiently large to allow estimation. Moreover, there were difficulties in using the 
Kumbhakar et al. (2014) approach to making the decomposition of SHA-level inefficiency 
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and unobserved heterogeneity (section 6.4). We ascribed this to sample size issues where the 
small cross-section of SHAs appeared to cause difficulties in estimating the model. A larger 
sample size (in terms of the cross section of firms, or as in our case, SHAs) may have helped 
to estimate the models.  
 
In chapter 4, we identified patient-level cost heterogeneity as a key aspect of health care 
efficiency analysis. By analysing pathology services which do not deal directly with patients, 
there is less concern around patient-level heterogeneity. We were therefore unable to deal 
directly with this issue.  
 
In addition, in chapter 4, we identified quality and outcomes as a key aspect of health care 
efficiency analysis. We addressed the issue of pathology quality in chapter 5.3. Laboratories 
in our sample have obtained a base level of quality by virtue of having been accredited; 
excess variation in quality is absorbed in our controls for unobserved heterogeneity. 
However, we were not satisfied that the quality of available data to include this feature 
directly into our analysis. Therefore, again, we were unable to deal directly with this issue. 
 
On account of both of these features, and the organisation of pathology laboratories, there is a 
question around whether pathology can be considered as a department of a hospital, or 
whether the practice of pathology in laboratories is a separate area of health care services 
entirely. This has implications for the generalizability of the results from our empirical 
analysis. Certainty, that there is in no direct patient contact brings in to question that 
pathology laboratories are indeed a hospital department. On the other hand, that they are 
situated in hospital trusts, that they provide direct secondary care services and are integrated 
with other hospital services makes the case for their inclusion. It would be useful to survey 
trust managers to seek their opinion on this matter.  
 
Lastly, we feel that this work was conducted in a manner that engaged the pathology 
industry. First, the data collection is based on long running relationships with laboratories. As 
noted in section 5.2, our work is an extension of existing indicator benchmarking; that 
benchmarking occurs at all suggests that laboratories are interested in their efficiency. Next, 
we have presented the work at a number of pathology conferences, for example the National 
Pathology Benchmarking Conference in Birmingham, 30
th
 November 2012. Lastly, we have 
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published preliminary analyses of this work in pathology journals, with pathologists as co-
authors (see Buckell et al., 2013).  
 
We now turn to discuss some potential areas for future research.  
 
7.6 Directions for future research 
 
Following from the discussion in the empirical chapters, the following directions for future 
research are set forth.  
 
7.6.1 Single Stage Estimation Dual-Level Stochastic Frontier for Unobserved Heterogeneity 
 
In chapter 3, we described the recently developed four component models. These models 
have the capacity to separate out time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, time-invariant 
efficiency, time-varying inefficiency and random statistical noise. We noted several 
approaches to estimating these models, including single- and multi-stage approaches.  
 
In chapter 6, we adapted the four component model for use in a dual-level efficiency 
capacity. In this setting, we employed only the multi-stage approach to estimation. There may 
be advantages to estimating a single stage equivalent.  
 
Firstly, using the approach of Filippini and Greene (2015), there is the benefit of 
computational ease (although, we note that, in small samples, this model may be difficult to 
estimate). It would further serve as a robustness check for estimates of inefficiency and/or 
bias in the estimates of parameters, given differing estimation procedures.  
 
Additionally, it has the advantage that it is easier to test against other models. That is, 
although we demonstrated that each of the components can be individually tested in the 
multi-stage approach, we would not be able to test the multi-stage model against non-nested 
alternatives, such as a latent class stochastic frontier model. This would be possible with a 
single stage approach. Indeed, in chapter 5 we made use of such a test, the Vuong test, for 
non-nested models. There are of course, other approaches to testing non-nested models, for 




Another advantage is around prediction intervals of lower tier inefficiency.  In a multi-stage 
approach, one could naively estimate prediction intervals in the lower tier SF stage (e.g. 
standard Horrace and Schmidt (1996) central intervals that are built into most modern 
software packages). However, doing so would be to neglect that the dependent variable – the 
adjusted residual from the first stage – is itself uncertain. Then, these intervals underestimate 
the true uncertainty around the inefficiency predictions. Therefore, a correction would need to 
be made to introduce the additional uncertainty. In doing so, it would be likely that the 
intervals would be rather wider than the naïve intervals. This is not the case in the single 
stage approach, where intervals around single stage lower tier estimates capture this 
uncertainty. 
 
For these reasons, in our view the application of the single-stage generalised true random 
effects model to the dual-level stochastic frontier is of significant empirical relevance.  
 
7.6.2 Lower Tier Unobserved Heterogeneity in the Dual-Level Stochastic Frontier  
 
In chapter 6, we extended the dual-level stochastic frontier model in a number of ways to 
account for, and test, different forms of unobserved heterogeneity. The controls we used were 
implemented in either the first stage (i.e. Mundlak), or the second stage at upper tier level 
(i.e. Kumbhakar et al.). We noted in passing that we were not able to capture unobserved 
heterogeneity at the lower tier level in our approach.  
 
Before we address this, we note that this is perhaps not entirely true. Of course, we applied 
controls exclusively at the upper tier level in estimation but, in the case of the Mundlak 
adjustment, these controls were applied to lower tier data, albeit stratified according to the 
upper tier. Therefore, the argument could be made for having controlled for unobserved 
heterogeneity at the lower tier that is correlated with the regressors. Of course, even if this is 
accepted, there remains unobserved heterogeneity at the lower tier that is uncorrelated with 
the regressors.  
 
If the data are permitting, it would be possible to address this issue. That is, in our data, we 
have a time series dimension. By making use of this, it would be possible to examine any 
remaining unobserved heterogeneity at the lower tier level. In some preliminary work, we 
have attempted this via the Wang and Ho (2010) approach to the true fixed effects model. 
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The initial results appear promising, and suggest there is some residual unobserved 
heterogeneity at this level, although we will conduct further testing before reporting any 
empirical results. There may be other approaches to this issue, the latent class model, for 
example.  
 
We see this as a very useful area of future research, so that lower tier unobserved 
heterogeneity is not misinterpreted as inefficiency.  
 
7.6.3 Larger NHS Data Set for the Application of the Mundlak-Transformed Four-
Component DLSF 
 
Whilst we have defined and tested a model for varying forms of unobserved heterogeneity, 
we found difficulty in estimation. We attributed this difficulty to the small cross section of 
SHAs in our data. Therefore, a clear extension would be to deploy this approach using a data 
set with a larger cross section which we believe would rectify this issue. Further, if a dataset 
could be found for some disaggregate NHS hospital activity (e.g. proton beam therapy), then 
the findings could be expanded not only in methodological terms, but in terms of the policy 
goals identified in this thesis. This model is of particular relevance for application in this 
setting, since hierarchical managerial structures exist in the provision of hospital services. 
This would further allow us to investigate some of the issues that we were unable to do with 
the data here, e.g. patient level cost variation. This objective can be coupled with other 
proposed directions for future research, in particular single stage estimation given that 
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Appendix A: Mean-Scaled Translog 
The cost elasticities derived from the translog functional form are, given the squared and 
cross terms, functions of the variables. This is the feature which allows the elasticities to vary 
across the range of values in the sample. The drawback of this is that the elasticities are not 
immediately obvious from the model’s coefficients. One solution to this issue, which is 
commonly employed by researchers, is to mean-scale the variables. This allows the 
coefficients on the first order terms to be interpreted directly as elasticities at the sample 
mean. We derive this result below.  
Suppose a cross-sectional cost function with two outputs, y1 and y2, 
𝑐𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑦1,𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑦2,𝑖 + 𝑖                                                                                                          (𝐴1) 
The translog specification of which is, 










+ 𝛽12 ln(𝑦1,𝑖) . ln(𝑦2,𝑖) + 𝑖                                                                                   (𝐴2) 
Then, the cost elasticity with respect to output y1 is, 
𝜕 ln(𝑐)
𝜕 ln(𝑦1)
= 𝛽1 + 𝛽11. ln(𝑦1,𝑖) +  𝛽12. ln(𝑦2,𝑖)                                                                               (𝐴3) 
Which reflects that the cost elasticity changes over values of y1 and y2. If the variables are 
mean-scaled, as (𝑦1,𝑖̅̅ ̅̅  are sample means of variables), 






















+ 𝛽12 ln (
𝑦1,𝑖
𝑦1,𝑖̅̅ ̅̅
) . ln (
𝑦2,𝑖
𝑦2,𝑖̅̅ ̅̅
) + 𝑖                                                                               (𝐴4) 
Then the cost elasticity with respect to y1 becomes, 
𝜕 ln(𝑐)
𝜕 ln(𝑦1)
= 𝛽1 + 𝛽11. ln (
𝑦1,𝑖
𝑦1,𝑖̅̅ ̅̅
) + 𝛽12. ln (
𝑦2,𝑖
𝑦2,𝑖̅̅ ̅̅
)                                                                           (𝐴5) 
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At the sample mean, the numerator and denominator are equal and the expressions in 
brackets in equation (A5) reduce to 1. Then, because ln(1) = 0,  
𝜕 ln(𝑐)
𝜕 ln(𝑦1)
= 𝛽1                                                                                                                                        (𝐴6) 
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